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Essays on Coercion, Corruption, and the State
Jasper Cooper
This dissertation is about how the state influences individuals’ behavior by giving
certain citizens the legal and physical means to coerce other citizens. Using field
experimentation, participatory observation, and time-series analysis of two large sets
of micro-data on crime to study policing in West Africa and Melanesia, the findings
challenge conventional wisdom about the relationship between coercion, corruption,
and the state. Empowering women by sending police o cers to assist them in disputes
with men may not necessarily reduce gender-based coercion, because men can pre-
serve their privileges by drawing on alternative authorities. Conferring police o cers
powers to coerce other people does not necessarily induce corrupt behavior, because
conferral of power may cause them to care more about their reputation than the rents
they can extract. Competitive elections may not reduce petty police corruption even
if they make principals accountable; instead, elections may incentivize corruption by
increasing agents’ uncertainty about how principals will act in the future. These
findings contribute new insights to the theory of state-building, accountability, and
bureaucratic politics.
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At around midnight on June 23rd, 2014, I lay shrouded in darkness in the sleeping
compartment of a cargo truck, stopped on Benin’s route nationale a few hours from
the Togolese border. I watched as a police o cer violently extorted the truck’s driver,
Noah.1 Noah had left Lagos, Nigeria, in the morning and picked me up in Benin on
his way to Ghana. We had been driving for three hours and police had already
stopped and extorted us for bribes fifteen times. Noah—a Togolese man in his mid-
twenties—had now relinquished most of the frais de route his employer had provided.2
At the sixteenth checkpoint, he refused to pay. The police o cer grew increasingly
impatient, and eventually struck Noah with the butt of his rifle. Noah relented. He
had his apprentice fetch the $10 USD bribe. We moved on.
One year later, on an island in the Pacific Ocean, I was hunched over case records
in the central police station of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, when shouts and
stamping flared from the narrow hallway to my right. Tilting my head out the door, I
saw Celeste, a community police o cer from the Haku region some three hours’ drive
over rough terrain to the North. In one arm she held her young baby, and in the
other, despite her five-foot stature, she held a man named Richard, struggling against
the coarse rope in which he was bound. Richard had savagely beaten his wife, Grace,
that morning. Celeste had intervened. With the help of other community members,
she had tied Richard up and hauled him down to the central police station on public
1All names changed to preserve anonymity.




Both Noah and Grace found themselves on the losing side of a pervasive form
of power inequality: the greater ability of one person to inflict harm on another.
Uniformed agents of the state, however, played a fundamentally di↵erent role in each
situation. In Noah’s case, a police o cer abused his superior coercive capacity to
enrich himself at Noah’s expense. However, when Richard exploited his physical
dominance over Grace, a police o cer forced him to stop. Celeste employed the legal
powers conferred to her by the state to protect Grace from further harm.
Narrowly, this dissertation is about how the state influences individuals’ behavior
by giving certain citizens the legal and physical means to coerce other citizens. More
ambitiously, it is about the mechanisms through which states do or do not enhance
rule of law as their administrative capacity and political institutions develop (Tilly,
1975; Skowronek, 1982; Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002).
The questions of how states create order and why they so often fail to do so have
provoked debate at least since Hobbes’ Leviathan. They continue to be of pressing
concern for policymakers seeking to provide e↵ective and equitable legal protection
to citizens in unstable contexts (Paris, 2004; Autesserre, 2014; Girod, 2015).
However, answering those questions is di cult. Some studies look at big struc-
tures and large processes, inferring causality based on “huge comparisons” (Tilly,
1984). Others trace the evolution of power relationships as the state’s administrative
apparatus gradually insinuates itself into the social life of a small handful of communi-
ties (Ensminger, 1996). These modes of inquiry provide longue dure´e perspective on
the co-development of a broad array of state institutions. Yet, they face serious infer-
ential challenges due to the strategic manner in which state-builders delegate powers
to di↵erent people in di↵erent parts of their territory (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2000;
Boone, 2003). Moreover, many studies do not specify the mechanisms linking changes
in power inequalities at a broader social level to the behavior of individuals at the
2
micro-level.
By contrast, this dissertation adopts a relatively limited temporal perspective,
studying processes of state-building in realtime, analyzing conferral of power in situ,
tracing changes in police extortion to the day and time in which they took place. Each
chapter combines a close examination of how individual police o cers use and abuse
their coercive powers with methods that reveal systematic patterns in behavior. I go
to great lengths to make the causal inferences credible, such as convincing a police
department in a remote, post-conflict area to randomly assign where it does and does
not locate its police o cers.
This approach to studying how individuals use the power conferred to them by
the state reveals non-obvious insights.
The first chapter illustrates that improving access to state justice among vulner-
able sectors of the population may not result in more equal protection from harm. I
conducted a field experiment on state-building in the region of Bougainville, Papua
New Guinea, described by the United Nations as one of the “worst places in the world”
to be a woman after sixty percent of men surveyed there self-reported perpetration
of rape (Jewkes et al., 2013).
Women in remote communities lack access to formal justice providers, and so rely
on customary authorities to address conflicts with men. Yet the decisions of those
authorities appear to reflect and sustain pre-existing power inequalities. A woman
who survived assault by a group of men described the chief’s response as follows: “All
parties involved were told to cook food and share together and the perpetrators were
told to apologize.”
To provide more equitable rule of law, the Papua New Guinea and New Zealand
police forces hire men and women as uniformed police o cers who live and work in
remote villages. They train those police to respond more e↵ectively to gender-based
violence.
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To answer the question of how increasing the state’s capacity to address inter-
personal violence influences pre-existing power inequalities between men and women,
I conducted a field experiment in collaboration with the police that randomly as-
signed permanent police o cer presence to seventeen villages and not to twenty-two
others. I hired a team of nine enumerators and traveled to villages that had never
encountered survey teams before. We interviewed 1,383 adults in total. I broaden the
findings through time-series analysis of an archive of over 30,000 crimes and disputes
in non-experimental villages.
I show that the presence of community police o cers empowers women to come
forward and report assaults and robberies perpetrated by men, which represent over
one-third of all criminal incidents. But the potential reduction in violence is o↵set
by men’s ability to draw on customary leaders who are likely to take their side in
disputes. Thus, even in a best-case scenario in which the police tend to side with
vulnerable members of society, expanding state capacity to intervene in interpersonal
conflict might actually increase reliance on chiefs—at least among segments of the
population privileged by the custom.
The second chapter illustrates that conferring policing power on individuals can,
but does not always, have a corrupting e↵ect on their behavior. Power conferral can
cause individuals to care more about their reputation than extracting rents.
I conducted one of the first ever studies to randomize who is and is not hired into
a police force. In a random recruitment lottery, that also served as the basis for the
inference in Chapter One, seventeen individuals were hired to become community
police o cers and twenty-eight were not.
To analyze the causal e↵ect of power on proclivity for corrupt behavior, I designed
a behavioral game played with successful and unsuccessful candidates eight months
later. The game—modeled on other measures that have been validated as good pre-
dictors of empirical corruption—is designed to measure both the player’s propensity
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for rule breaking and whether that rule-breaking is prosocial. It also randomly assigns
two windfalls to the player or to a community member, each equal to half a day’s
average income, according to a probability set by the player. I also conducted the
behavioral games with non-randomly hired o cers from a di↵erent branch of the po-
lice. Those police o cers have greater coercive powers than the community police in
the experimental sample and cannot be held accountable by their constituents to the
same extent. I played two versions of the game with each participant, and thus ana-
lyze a total of 150 games and seventy-five attitudinal surveys across the experimental
and observational samples.
Power does not corrupt the community police o cers. Overall, and in line with
much of the evidence from similar games, participants do not appear to cheat much.
But community police do appear to falsify die rolls to the benefit of a randomly
selected community member when they face higher risks of being accused of cheating:
i.e., when their behavior cannot be monitored and when they play a second round
having already won a windfall in the first. Meanwhile, windfalls elicited no such
prosocial responses from regular police o cers. I point to additional attitudinal
evidence to argue that power does not corrupt the community police because they
need a good reputation to ensure the cooperation of community members. The
example of Celeste described above exemplifies just how vital this cooperation can
be to the exercise of their policing power.
The second chapter thus suggests police o cers are more accountable when they
do not hold stark coercive asymmetries over civilians. The third chapter, however,
casts doubt on a di↵erent accountability mechanism that has often been suggested as
a structural fix to widespread petty corruption, namely: making political principals
compete for o ce through elections. Set in West Africa, the third chapter illustrates
that electoral competition may not reduce petty corruption even if it makes principals
accountable, because truly competitive elections increase agents’ uncertainty about
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the behavior of principals and thereby incentivizes corruption.
I provide a novel explanation for the observation that recently democratized states
have higher levels of petty corruption than autocracies (Montinola and Jackman,
2002). While competitive elections may render political leaders more accountable,
they also increase turnover in leaders. In countries whose bureaucracies are poorly in-
sulated from political influence, new leadership can lead to new public appointments,
transfers of personnel, new budgets, and other changes that can depress public wages.
Police may use their ability to coerce citizens as a means to supplement their income
when they feel their public sector wages are threatened by political uncertainty.
I test this theory by examining electoral cycles in over 300,000 bribes police o cers
extorted from truck-drivers over a seven-year period in five West African democra-
cies and autocracies. To better understand the data-generating process behind this
dataset, I conducted participant observation with truck drivers. During a three-week
period in 2014, I traveled over 800 miles of highway through Burkina Faso, Ghana,
Togo, and Benin, observing police extortion from the cab of a truck. I also inter-
viewed members of the survey team in Burkina Faso and Ghana—two hub points for
the survey—to better understand risks of systematic measurement error.
The average bribe extorted by police increases by twenty-two percent in the
buildup to competitive elections. Consistent with the idea that political competition
only increases extortion when it increases income uncertainty, bribes in the post-
election period return to the non-electoral average when incumbents win reelection
but increase when challengers win. There is no evidence that such dynamics exist
around facade elections in autocracies. The findings imply that democratization can
have adverse e↵ects on corruption in the short-term, and highlight the importance of
civil service insulation as an anti-corruption policy.
Each chapter in the dissertation shares a six-part structure. The first section
introduces a micro-level theory of how individuals respond to inequality in coercive
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capacity generated through the state’s conferral of policing power. The second section
describes the research design, detailing relevant aspects of the context as well as the
strategy for causal identification and statistical inference. The third section presents
the main results and makes a core claim about the underlying mechanism. The fourth
defends the interpretation of results through consideration of evidence for alternative
mechanisms. The fifth and sixth sections discuss and conclude.
The discussion section of each chapter highlights its individual contributions to
the literature, its scope conditions, and any policy implications. Rather than repeat-




How access to state justice might not provide protection:
An experiment on state-building
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It doesn’t matter that she shouldn’t, that she never
would. What matters is that she could, if she wanted.
The power to hurt is a kind of wealth.
Naomi Alderman (2017)
Citizens frequently need the help of a more powerful authority to resolve inter-
personal disputes. A primary purpose of the state is to provide such authority.1 In
contexts where police and courts are inaccessible or have low capacity, however, many
people settle conflict with the help of non-state authorities, such as chiefs, religious
leaders, and clan heads.2 Non-state authorities thus play an important role in regu-
lating social conflict where few alternatives exist.3 However, much evidence suggests
their judgments reflect and sustain pre-existing power inequalities: between men and
women, autochthons and migrants, landed and landless, and so on.4
1 While scholars from di↵erent traditions have emphasized that some degree of social cooperation
without the state is possible (e.g., Posner and Landes, 1975; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fearon and
Laitin, 1996; Henrich et al., 2006), the historical evolution of interpersonal violence speaks in favor
of Hobbes’ Leviathan as a supremely e↵ective solution to the problem of social order (Hobbes, 2004).
Authors such as Gurr (1981) and Eisner (2003), for example, have illustrated that the rise of central
states in Europe and the United States throughout the 800-year period spanning the thirteenth to
twenty-first centuries precipitated a massive reduction in the rate of serious inter-personal violence,
on the order of 10:1 to 50:1. By contrast, crime rates in the developing world today are estimated to
be over eight times higher than in Western Europe and the United States (see Table A.4 of appendix
for data source).
2 As Baker (2008, 157) puts it “in rural areas of Africa the great majority of disputes are
processed in customary courts. The cases are normally brought to the court by the disputants,
although arrests may be made by native authority police. Hence customary leaders have a very
great influence on local policing [in addition to adjudication].” Note that “dispute resolution”
refers here and in the rest of this chapter to both the policing services that take place prior to
adjudication—i.e., arrest, protection, investigation—and to the adjudication itself. In practice, the
same actor or group of actors will perform both policing and adjudication roles during dispute
resolution. See Isser (2011) for a review of non-state justice.
3In a field experiment in Liberia, for example, Blattman, Hartman, and Blair (2014) find that
strengthening non-state dispute resolution mechanisms reduced violence.
4 Begler (1978) and Harris (1993), for example, have argued that even in the most egalitarian
traditional societies, dispute resolution practices are biased toward men. More recently, Sandefur
and Siddiqi (2013) show in Liberia that women plainti↵s are more likely to take complaints to
the formal sector over customary fora because they expect to face bias under the custom. Gender
is not the only salient cleavage that determines partiality. Baldwin, Muyengwa, and Mvukiyehe
(2017) illustrate that village heads in Zimbabwe are frequently accused of making dispute resolution
decisions in favor of co-partisans in either the ruling ZANU-PF or opposition parties. In her study of
customary governance and state-building in Afghanistan, Murtazashvili (2016, 77) quotes a Pashtun
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Central governments, often with foreign assistance, have sought to enforce more
equitable rule of law by locating security forces in remote areas where state services
are lacking.5 As the state expands its capacity to address interpersonal conflict, the
increasing availability of police and courts is expected to gradually supplant non-
state institutions, which are perceived to be less equitable.6 Often, however, these
outcomes fail to materialize. Deep social inequality, violence, and reliance on non-
state authorities can persist even after the installation of state security forces.7
In this chapter, I explain one reason for which power inequalities may persist
even in the face of expanding state presence. I assess the observable implications of
the theory using a novel opportunity to study the causal impact of state-building in
remote parts of post-conflict Papua New Guinea.
Expanding police presence into remote areas, I argue, may not necessarily diminish
nomad who believes that her family receives biased decisions from customary authorities because
her people do not use the local mosque: “The village mullah is not from our side. He is from
another group and usually makes decisions that favor them.” Along similar lines, a report by the
Danish Institute for Human Rights (2010) describes how poor members of society in Bangladesh
are typically disadvantaged when disputes with richer members of society are adjudicated by the
informal shalish court, because poor members cannot a↵ord the services of “middlemen” who can
pre-arrange the outcome of disputes.
5 For example, in an attempt to decentralize state security services to war-torn communities in
Afghanistan in 2010 to 2013, the U.S., the U.K., and Afghan governments spent billions of dollars
to locate 30,000 Afghan Local Police throughout remote villages. See also Fukuyama et al. (2004),
Paris (2004), Autesserre (2014), and Girod (2015).
6 According to O’Donnell (2004, 37-8), rule of law is equitable when it “extends homogeneously
across the space delimited by the state—there must be no places where the law’s writ does not run
[...] the legal system must treat like cases alike irrespective of the class, gender, ethnicity, or other
attributes of the respective actors.”
7 Oomen (2000) describes how, as state courts became more accessible to townships in post-
apartheid South Africa, for example, some chiefs violently resisted plainti↵s’ attempts to have cases
heard in civil statutory courts, insisting they instead be decided back in the traditional village court.
Autesserre (2014) describes the persistence of violent conflict and ongoing reliance on local customs
despite the “successful” installation of UN security forces in the Congo. A report on the judicial
system in Somaliland describes how, even after the state courts had become available, women were
forced to use traditional courts that would be less favorable to them: “Someone guilty of homicide
may be brought before court for trial under state law, but if settlement is reached outside the court
in accordance with customary authorities, he or she may be set free without punishment. Women
can be particularly vulnerable to the substitution of customary law for state law. Elders routinely
exert pressure on women to settle out of court through traditional channels and thus forfeit their
legal rights” (ADP, 2002, 5).
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the role of customary authorities. As the state empowers those disadvantaged by the
custom, they begin to report to police victimization by high-status individuals about
which they might otherwise have kept silent. High-status individuals can protect their
interests against police involvement by appealing to customary leaders who are likely
to take their side in the dispute resolution process. Thus, even in a best-case scenario
in which the police tend to side with vulnerable members of society, expanding state
capacity to intervene in interpersonal conflict might actually increase reliance on
chiefs—at least among segments of the population privileged by the custom. The
ability to draw on alternative authorities can blunt any deterrent e↵ects of policing.
Consider the following example taken from case records kept by police who are
stationed in remote parts of Papua New Guinea. On December 27, 2008, a woman in
a coastal village in the region of Bougainville complained to a nearby female police
o cer that a man had attempted to rape her. With the aid of community vehicles,
the police took the suspect to the nearest jail, located at a distance of several hours’
travel over rough terrain. The suspect implored his family members to summon the
village chief, who eventually negotiated the man’s release through assurances that
he would be tried according to customary procedure. Back in the village, the chief
ordered the suspect to pay the woman roughly 30 USD—police records suggest he
never did so.
I formalize such processes in order to think through the counterfactual outcomes
of cases like this. If the female complainant did not have an o cer she could turn
to, it is very likely she would have anticipated the unfavorable outcome provided by
the chief and not have reported the incident at all. Given that neither the chief nor
the police would have been called upon if the police were absent from the village,
the causal e↵ect of state expansion in this scenario is to increase reliance on both
authorities simultaneously. While the outcome of the conflict ultimately upheld the
male defendant’s privileged position, the complainant was nevertheless able to attain
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some temporary measure of security by going to the police. Thus, the presence of
state police might have reduced power inequality somewhat, but ultimately the state’s
ability to deter violence is limited by high-status individuals’ ability to forum shop.
Eight months of fieldwork in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, helped to form
the descriptive inferences underlying these claims. To test them, I pursue two main
empirical strategies that generate and compare counterfactual situations like those
previously described.
First, I designed a field experiment in partnership with the New Zealand and
Papua New Guinea police forces that randomizes permanent police o cer presence
to seventeen remote villages and not to twenty-two others. Eight months after the
police have been working in the treatment villages, I conducted one of the first ever
surveys on crime and political attitudes in this part of Papua New Guinea, working
with nine enumerators to interview 1,383 adult men and women in experimental
villages.
Consistent with the idea that the police cater to the interests of women in conflict
with men, I find that men and women experience state expansion in fundamentally
di↵erent ways. Men become more likely and women less likely to report negative
experiences with police when the police are present in their village—especially when
the o cer is a woman. In this part of Papua New Guinea, just over one-third of
interpersonal conflict involves men assaulting or robbing women.8 Thus it is very
possible that these di↵erential experiences arise from first- or secondhand observation
of how police presence changes reporting behavior. As a result of the treatment,
police are more likely to be involved in the resolution of conflict women have with
men. When community police are located in their village, men become substantially
8 In the endline survey conducted for this chapter, for example, I collected data on 2,385 criminal
incidents. Of those, 842 (35%) were man on woman crime. The police records analyzed as part
of this study contain information on 16,701 disputes in which the gender of both parties could be
identified. Of these, 5,376 (32%) were between men and women.
12
more likely to agree with the notion that “The police should never be able to tell the
chief how to resolve issues in the community; The chief always knows what’s best,”
whereas women on average remain of the opinion that “Sometimes the chief should
let the police step in and handle issues, even if not everyone agrees.” Consistent
with the theory, I find no evidence that the apparent shifts in behavior and attitudes
around conflict resolution reduce underlying victimization rates: the study is powered
to reject at the ↵ = .05 confidence level any constant negative e↵ect on the per-capita
crime rate greater than one-tenth of a standard deviation. The findings suggest that
any reduction in violence is faint.
Building o↵ the internal validity of the experimental design, my second empirical
strategy seeks to expand the temporal and spatial scope of the findings by analyzing
over 30,000 case records generated by police over a five year period from January 2005
to December 2009.9 This inquiry focuses on a slightly di↵erent estimand: rather than
the presence or absence of the police in a village, the historical analysis asks whether
dispute resolution behavior is di↵erent in villages that have male versus female police
o cers. To address concerns about underlying di↵erences in the types of villages that
do or do not have a female police o cer, I focus only on villages in which a female
police o cer was present at some point, and leverage plausibly exogenous timing in
when women o cers start and finish in a given village for identification. I further
show that the results are robust to a generalized di↵erence-in-di↵erences strategy.
The historical results lend further weight to the main theoretical claims. Relative
to village-months in which only male o cers were present, the presence of at least
one female community police o cer greatly increases the relative probability that in-
cidents of violence against women involve both the police and the chief. Bougainville
features both matrilocal village networks—in which newlyweds move to the village of
9 Data provided by the Bougainville Police and New Zealand Police services subsequent to
written approval from police and Columbia University IRB approval under protocol AAAQ2006.
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the wife—and patrilocal village networks—in which newlyweds move to the village of
the husband. The e↵ect of female police o cer presence on dispute resolution dynam-
ics is much stronger in matrilocal versus patrilocal communities. One interpretation
is that female police o cers are best able to support women in conflict with men
when they can draw on a coalition of family and clan members. The success of state-
building appears to be shaped by variation in non-state institutions that influence
power relationships between men and women.10
Taken together the theory and results yield two principal insights. First, expand-
ing the state’s capacity to intervene in interpersonal disputes does not necessarily
crowd-out non-state authorities, but can instead increase reliance on them. The
strategic complementarity between reporting to police and reporting to the chief cap-
tured by my model is not anticipated in comparatively more complex models of forum
shopping, because they structure the decision to involve either the state or the custom
in a given dispute as inherently zero-sum.11
Rather than supplanting customary dispute resolution, the expansion of state
capacity may simultaneously increase reliance on customary authorities and state
authorities. By locating police in remote areas, the state lowers the costs of accessing
formal dispute resolution services. This incentivizes low-status individuals to report
conflict with high-status individuals to police, which in turn incentivizes high-status
individuals to draw upon customary authorities to protect their interests. In principle
then, state expansion can foster the emergence of hybrid institutional environments,12
10 See also Lowes (2018), who finds that women in matrilineal societies may be better-positioned
in the household to implement their preferences, for example, and Brule´ and Gaikwad (2018), who
find men hold greater political and economic influence than women in patrilineal communities.
11As discussed in more detail below, disputants in Aldashev et al. (2012), Sandefur and Siddiqi
(2013) and D’Aoust and Sterck (2016) must choose between either the customary authority or the
state authority as an adjudicative forum (in Aldashev et al. this is a sequential choice). The two
kinds of resolution agents cannot be simultaneously involved in a single dispute.
12 The vast literature on legal pluralism (See Merry, 2017, for a review) illustrates that “hybrid”
or “plural” institutional environments remain common throughout the world. Demand for dispute
resolution by non-state actors remains high even in contexts where growing state capacity has
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as individuals fall into disputes and simultaneously draw upon the authorities that
will best advance their interests during the resolution process.
This claim engages a longstanding debate in comparative politics about the con-
ditions under which state and non-state institutions constitute substitutes or comple-
ments.13 Based on the view that non-state authorities such as chiefs are “competitors
to the centralized state and are viewed as such by leaders” of government, scholars
such as Herbst (1990, 172), Ensminger (1996) and Boone (2003) have depicted the ter-
ritorial broadcasting of state power as a zero-sum game, in which increasing demand
for state services among the population decreases the demand for and legitimacy of
non-state service providers.14 However, if state-builders strategically broadcast power
to areas in which non-state authorities are already weak, associations of this kind
can appear without any causal e↵ect of state expansion on institutional demand.15
By generating exogenous variation in the areas in which the state permanently in-
stalls uniformed police o cers, this study is able to address this inferential concern.
Whereas zero-sum accounts of state expansion struggle to account for the persistence
of non-state authorities in the face of growing state capacity, my theory provides a
simple logic through which demand for multiple institutions persists.16 As I point out
drastically reduced the cost of accessing state services (Baker, 2008; Isser, 2011; Sandefur and Siddiqi,
2013; Holzinger, Kern, and Kromrey, 2016; Zenker and Hoehne, 2018).
13 Aspects of this debate are summarized in Helmke and Levitsky (2004). While authors such
as Tilly (1975) and Herbst (1990) have painted the broadcasting of state power as a process that
inevitably undermines competing authorities provided the state is su ciently capable, others such
as Migdal (1988), Mamdani (1996) and more recently Logan (2009, 2013) have argued the expan-
sion of the state’s “infrastructural power” (Mann, 1993; Soifer, 2008; Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno,
and Robinson, 2015) through the decentralization of centrally-controlled functionaries can actually
bolster the power of local elites.
14 Ensminger (1996), for example, contends that the expansion of state policing under Kenyan
decentralization in the late 1980s undermined elders’ ability to enforce customary laws around
grazing and family quarrels, as disputants increasingly relied on the more e↵ective state institutions.
15 Boone (2003), for example, elaborates four di↵erent strategies of expansion pursued by state-
builders in West Africa, all of which condition on spatial variation non-state authorities’ local ca-
pacity.
16See also Baldwin (2015) for an electoral theory of customary authorities’ persistence in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
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in the discussion, this logic is not limited to the case of Papua New Guinea, gender
inequality, or even weak state societies.
The second principal insight is that, while the mere presence of agents of the
state may be su cient to influence interpersonal power dynamics, forum-shopping
sets a limit on the state’s capacity to deter violence against vulnerable members of
society. In principle, I here study a most-likely case for state-building to generate
large positive changes. The community police at the frontlines of state-building e↵orts
in Bougainville are well-trained, engage in very low levels of corruption, work hard,
and appear highly publicly motivated. Moreover, despite apparently high levels of
community support, they do not appear subject to capture by elites or relational
contracting by villagers, instead maintaining a degree of independence in the work
that they do. Finally, the di↵erence between the treatment and control communities is
sometimes large. Without the community police presence, many villagers would have
to trek through dense jungle and travel hours over open ocean or rugged mountains
in order to access state police.
And indeed, these di↵erences in state presence do produce di↵erences in disputant
behavior. Even so, we do not see the large shifts in outcomes that many policymakers
hope for: while many villagers perceive that there is less violence against women in
their communities, there is no evidence of a reduction in violence in the victimization
data. Failure here, however, does not appear attributable to poor implementation, a
misunderstanding of local realities (Autesserre, 2014) or misguided foreign interven-
tion strategy (Girod, 2015). Rather, the ability of the state to provide more equitable
outcomes is limited by the strategic response of those with a vested interest in in-
cumbent institutions, who shun the state and turn towards customary authorities.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds in five sections. In the next section, I
describe my theory and apply it to the case of state and non-state authority in
Bougainville. Section two presents the research design, while section three presents
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the results. The results are grouped thematically, so that experimental findings on
forum-shopping behavior, for example, are presented alongside the observational find-
ings on forum-shopping behavior. I address alternative mechanisms in section four.
Section five discusses the scope conditions and broader implications of the findings
and concludes.
1.1 Theory
Prior to the state’s arrival—or following its collapse—remote areas are often governed
by local elites referred to in this chapter as “customary authorities:” chiefs, headmen,
traditional leaders, religious authorities, prominent landowners, and so on (Baldwin,
2015; Murtazashvili, 2016; Zenker and Hoehne, 2018). Those customary authorities
perform functions that can overlap with fundamental services provided by the state:
from taxation and investment in agricultural productivity (Boone, 2003), to man-
agement of property rights (Oomen, 2000; Herbst, 1990), provision of social welfare
(Cammett and MacLean, 2014), and the maintenance of social order through dispute
resolution and punishment (Malinowski, 1926; Blattman, Hartman, and Blair, 2014).
We are here interested in the latter.
How does the behavior of potential disputants change as the government expands
its capacity to address interpersonal conflict into new areas? Is the mere presence of
police o cers su cient to transform the power dynamics of traditional societies?
Speculating about these processes informally is di cult because there are many
moving parts. Continuing the story from the introduction, for example, conjectures
about how the woman would have behaved if she did not have the option of reporting
to police requires specifying both her and the man’s beliefs about how each other and
the chief would react to the di↵erent actions she could take. I thus formalize a number
of simplifying assumptions and use game theory to think through the implications
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of one important source of strategic complexity: namely, dispute resolution often
implicates not just one but a range of di↵erent authorities.17
The model shares features in common with other theories of forum-shopping pre-
sented in Aldashev et al. (2012), Sandefur and Siddiqi (2013) and D’Aoust and Sterck
(2016). By allowing both the chief and the police o cer to be involved or not involved
in the resolution of a single dispute, however, I arrive at quite di↵erent conclusions.
In Sandefur and Siddiqi (2013) and D’Aoust and Sterck (2016), once the customary
authority has been selected as dispute arbiter, the state no longer plays any role
(and vice versa). In Aldashev et al. (2012), the customary authority can never be
bypassed by disputants in favor of the state, who serves only as a court of appeal.
These models thus rule out common situations in which multiple state and non-state
actors simultaneously influence the outcome of a single dispute. s
The theory is premised on two main claims inspired by anthropological literature
and fieldwork in Papua New Guinea. First, the resolution practices of police and
chiefs are partial to di↵erent groups in society. Second, such authorities only become
involved in disputes when called upon.
Regarding the first claim, I assume that resolutions to disputes enforced by cus-
tomary authorities exhibit more partiality than those produced by state authorities,
even in contexts where certain groups face systemic disadvantage. As Baker (2008,
157-8) puts it, in most African countries “the customary courts overall have a con-
17 Baker (2008, 30) gives this summary of an incident reported in (Salamone, 1998), for example:
In another situation, a Hausa young man who stole money from a market woman in
the Yoruba city of Ibadan, Nigeria, was chased by a crowd bent on violence, but was
arrested by a policeman after a struggle. Both the policeman and the market woman
believed that both justice and their own interests would best be served if they took
the accused to the local Hausa community’s court, presided over by Hausa elders and
the local Emir’s deputy. After both had given testimony, the informal court found the
young man guilty, fined him a large sum of money, lent him this money to pay the fine
to the woman and policeman, and warned him that any further trouble and he would
be exiled to his home town in the North and confined there.
18
ciliatory character, aiming to restore peace between members and social order.”18
However, Afrobarometer data suggests that in almost every region of Africa, both
men and women see traditional leaders as significantly more biased against women
than police and courts (see Figure 1.9 in the discussion section).
To the di↵erence of state courts and police, the decisions of customary leaders
are not based on written legal code and formal sentencing guidelines; are almost
never subject to appeal or review by a higher authority; and are presided over exclu-
sively by a very small group of people who often hold the political power in a given
community. In the remainder of the chapter, I focus on the e↵ects of patriarchal
bias because gender is perhaps the primary cleavage structuring interpersonal con-
flict in the Bougainvillean context (Nash, 1978, 1981). More generally, however, the
literature documents diverse sources of group bias in customary dispute resolution,
including favoring rich over poor citizens, autochthonous citizens over migrants, eth-
nic majorities over minorities, ruling party partisans over opposition sympathizers,
and so on.19 Finally, it should be noted that diverse instances of ethnic and other in-
group bias have also been documented in formal courts and in the behavior of police
o cers.20 However, formal rules tend to limit the scope of such partiality relative to
18 “However,” he clarifies, “chiefs do not always follow conciliatory procedures. They may autho-
rise posses to go after cattle thieves and kill the presumed culprits; they may send organised urban
vigilantes out to ‘catch criminals’ with little concern if they are shot or beaten to the point of near
death.”
19 See footnotes 4 and 10 above for examples of bias in the customary sector. Various explanations
exist to account for gender bias. For example, favoritism of men’s interests may be linked to
the reproduction of agnatic lineage through patrilineal property institutions (Friedl, 1975; Hudson,
Bowen, and Nielsen, 2015). Most societies structured into lineage-based groups transfer property
through the patriline, which subordinates women’s economic interests particularly in disagreements
over property (Agarwal, 1994).
20 See, for example, Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2010) for a study of ethnic bias in judicial
decision-making. As Hudson et al. (2009, 15) point out, the formulation of state law has also often
featured strong patriarchal bias: “Those with physical power also dominate political power, so that
when law developed in human societies, men created legal systems that, generally speaking, favored
male reproductive success and interests—with adultery as a crime for women but not for men; with
female infanticide, male-on-female domestic violence, and marital rape not recognized as crimes;




Regarding the second assumption, in many weak state societies, local actors who
have the power to address interpersonal conflicts cannot do so because citizens are
reluctant to come forward about their problems.21 Sometimes this reluctance relates
to a concern about paying transfers to authorities, such as bribes.22 But often, it is
costly to report simply because it takes time and e↵ort.
Despite their potential partiality, one of the key advantages that customary au-
thorities present to all disputants over the state is their availability. Chiefs, headmen,
and religious authorities often constitute a port of first call in disputes because they
are immediately geographically accessible to disputants (Ensminger, 1990; Murtaza-
shvili, 2016). By contrast, the nearest state police o cer or magistrate can be located
hours of travel away from many citizens in rural parts of developing countries (Ace-
moglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson, 2015). I thus formalize state expansion as a
reduction in the travel cost imposed on disputants who choose to report to the police.
I focus comparative statics on variation in this cost.
Similar to other models of forum-shopping (Sandefur and Siddiqi, 2013), I do not
model chief and police strategy in this theory. This abstraction helps to derive intu-
itions about how potential disputants will behave holding dispute resolution norms
constant while varying the cost of access to police. Yet, if chiefs derive legitimacy
or even material benefits from dispute resolution, it seems plausible that they would
adjust the way in which they adjudicate conflict in order to capture more disputant
demand.23 However, it is not clear that chiefs have a strong incentive to expand or
21 Green, Wilke, and Cooper (2018), for example, document widespread unwillingness to come
forward about allegations of intimate partner violence in Uganda, resulting in an inability of local
village elders with jurisdiction over such cases to address abuse.
22 Ubink and Quan (2008), for example, describe how “drink money” must be paid to customary
authorities during land disputes in Ghana, while Baker (2008) describes a number of contexts in
which help from state police is seen as conditional on bribes
23Aldashev et al. (2012), for example, endogenize the customary norm and make predictions
about the strategic response of customary authorities to state reforms and forum shopping by dis-
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even retain their role as the primary resolution forum in contexts like the one I study.
Anthropologists, such as Clastres (1974), have noted that in societies where power
is attained through gift-giving, customary authorities exist in something of a gilded
cage.24 As I describe in greater detail below, chiefs are expected to play a range of
social functions for which they are not necessarily remunerated. In the Bougainvil-
lean context, many chiefs see the increasing availability of the police as something
that frees them from a tiresome and not particularly pleasant burden.
Formal Framework
The model features two citizens who each belong to two di↵erent social groups, A
and B. For example, one might think of A as women and of B men, or of A as an
ethnic minority group and B as the majority. The game is finite and contains two
consecutive stages.
In the first stage, the citizens play a prisoner’s dilemma against one another. In
the second, they both decide whether to report to state and non-state authorities—the
police and the chief.
The payo↵s in the first stage are structured to capture the idea of defection as
property crime, but can also be interpreted as assault that generates as much benefit
to the o↵ender as it does cost to the victim. When actors bilaterally cooperate the
status quo is maintained—they keep their property (obtaining 0). Defectors obtain
s from defection against cooperators, who obtain  s (theft). And under mutual
putants. Indeed, much evidence suggests that norms of practices of customary dispute resolution
evolve. However, typically this process takes decades (Tombot, 2003). If anything, one is struck by
the remarkable persistence of norms and tendencies in customary dispute resolution that remain in-
variant in the face of large structural changes. Given the processes under analysis in this study span
a maximum of five years, it seems reasonable to assume that customary dispute resolution norms
will not change greatly (i.e., become less biased toward women) in response to state expansion.
24 Clastres (1974, 30-1) cites Francis Huxley’s description of headmen in the Urubu as follows:
“It is the business of chief to be generous and to give what is asked of him. In some tribes you can
always tell the chief because he has fewest possessions and wears the shabbiest ornaments. He has
to give away everything else.”
21
defection, both actors su↵er  s—through fighting one another or destroying each
other’s property. The value of theft is assumed to be strictly positive, 0 < s 2 R+.
Information is perfect and complete, and actors share the same beliefs about the
values of the parameters.
If both actors cooperate, the game ends. If either actor defects, they reach a
second stage in which each actor makes a simultaneous institutional choice. They
can choose to appeal to the chief (C) for assistance in conflict resolution, appeal to
the state police (P ), or simply refrain from reporting the incident at all (;).
Authorities resolve conflict by forcing redistributive transfers between A and B.
The baseline for such transfers involves subtracting s from the payo↵ of defectors
and adding s to the payo↵ of cooperators. But transfers also include various kinds of
additive bias that systematically favor some disputants over others.
First, both the police and the state may share a general social bias against A.
The previously mentioned Afrobarometer data, for example, illustrates that people
in many communities see both traditional leaders and police as biased against women.
I denote this norm n 2 R+ and suppose that it is subtracted o↵ actor A’s payo↵ in
any instance where authorities are involved.
Relative to n, authorities are assumed to exhibit additional bias for or against
actor B, denoted  j. In line with the motivation above, I assume that the customary
authority is relatively B-biased and the state authority is relatively A-biased, such
that  C < 0 <  P . Thus, for example, if actor B defects and A cooperates, and
actor A reports to the chief, the transfer A will receive will equal s    C   n, while
authorities will mete out punishment  s+  C for actor B. For su ciently high n, A
never defects or reports. Thus, to home in on the relevant comparative statics and
to simplify exposition, I set n = 0.
Any actor who decides to involve one of the authorities incurs a transaction cost
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t. I assume that the cost is small.25 Citizens also pay a travel cost ✓(1  Z) in order
to report incidents to the police, where Z 2 {0, 1}. I assume that travel costs are
higher than the sum of all other relevant considerations: ✓ > s+ t+
P
j | j|.
Thus, Z is an indicator for state expansion: when Z = 0 travel costs are so high
as to render appealing to the police a strictly dominated strategy, whereas when
Z = 1 the police are as cheap to access as the chief. The parameter Z captures
state expansion. It is therefore the primary variable upon which I focus comparative
statics. It is also the parameter that the field experiment in this study manipulates.
In section A.4 of the Appendix, I solve the model when Z = 0 and Z = 1, and
analyze di↵erences in equilibrium outcomes at both stages of the game.
When the state is absent, the chief’s bias in favor of B makes it unlikely that A
reports when defected against, and makes it very likely that B reports when defected
against. As such, B defects against a cooperating A, who does not report at all unless
bias is very low. This equilibrium resembles the situation in Papua New Guinea, and
one that is common in other parts of the world, in which women who are victimized
by men must report to patriarchally-biased chiefs if they do report, and so in practice
stay silent for the most part (Begler, 1978; Harris, 1993).
Appealing to the police and appealing to the customary authority are strategic
complements when police are available. If A reports to the police, B is strictly better
o↵ when paying the transaction cost to report to the chief, thereby mitigating the
impact of the state’s punishment.
Before the state expands women are likely to stay silent about their victimization—
neither authority is in demand. When the state expands its capacity to address
disputes by locating a police o cer in the village, women are more likely to come
forward. Accused men protect their interests by involving the chief. Like the man
described in the case records in the introduction, actor B knows he will be better o↵
25Specifically, in relationship to the bias parameter I assume t < minj | j |.
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if he can involve customary authorities who will protect his interests. The expansion
of the state increases reliance on both kinds of authority.
What can we say about the e↵ect of state expansion on the probability that
disputes arise at all? Supposing that actors do in fact anticipate the subsequent
institutional choices of their counterpart, the model predicts that bias will play a
large role in determining the probability that conflict arises. Bias plays this role
because it determines the net transfer between actors, and in this sense reflects the
relative strength of the state and customary authorities.
Suppose that chiefs and police o cers have roughly equal strength so that their
respective bias terms e↵ectively nullify one another: i.e., | C +  P | < t. In this case,
conflict does not arise because neither actor expects to be better o↵ if they instigate
a resolution process. Crime is deterred.
In practice, however, customary authorities are often able to undermine and even
reverse the sanctions imposed by the state, nullifying their deterrent e↵ect. Consider
the example in the introduction: the man received a relatively steep sanction in the
form of jail time. However, the chief was able to negotiate his release and presided
over a reconciliation whose terms the man never met. Formally, I represent such
situations as ones in which the relative bias that the chief is able to impose is more
than t larger than the relative bias imposed by the police: t <  C +  P . In this
case, the equilibrium outcome is for A to cooperate and B to defect—even though
the unique equilibrium outcome in the second stage is the strategy pair in which A
reports to the police and B reports to the chief. In other words, while the availability
of the chief does not stop a woman from reporting, it blunts and even nullifies any
deterrent e↵ect that this reporting might otherwise have had on the man’s behavior.26
26 Suppose, for example, that the chief was removed from the game entirely. In this case the
players would face a classic prisoners dilemma and simply defect against one another whenever
Z = 0. As soon as the police becomes accessible (Z = 1), however, this would deter defection by
the man.
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To summarize, there are three main predictions that arise from a comparison of the
equilibrium outcomes when the state does and does not have the capacity to cheaply
intervene in disputes. First, reporting to either actor is likely to increase when police
become more accessible, as women refrain from reporting when only biased chiefs are
available (unless the bias is not too strong). Second, the increasing availability of the
police encourages reporting not just to police, but also to chiefs, because men seek
to preserve their advantage in incidents that women decide to report. Third, in a
context where the chief is able to undermine the state’s sanctions to produce outcomes
that are still somewhat favorable to men, the increasing availability of police will not
deter defection by men. Women still have an incentive to report such cases, however,
insofar as doing so enables them to obtain some form of compensation or temporary
protection. In the following subsections, I present features of the case study that
support the assumptions underlying these predictions.
State Capacity and Violence Against Women in Bougainville
This study is set in the islands that comprise the Autonomous Region of Bougainville
(AROB), in Eastern Papua New Guinea (PNG). Geologically, the islands form part of
the Solomon Archipelago, situated in the Pacific Ocean to the northeast of Australia.
Bougainville has roughly the same land mass as Jamaica or Cyprus and was home
to about 250,000 people in 2016. I describe here the features of this context relevant
to the theoretical predictions made above. Specifically, I describe the weakness of
state capacity there, in particular with respect to security forces. I describe the
nature of customary authority and provide examples of how dispute resolution often
disadvantages women. Finally, I provide background on the community policing
project that comprises the “treatment” in the field experimental component of this
study.
Prior to its independence in 1975, Bougainville fell under German then Australian
25
Figure 1.1: Bougainville and Papua New Guinea.
colonial rule.27 By and large, colonial territorial strategy in Bougainville resembled
what Boone (2003) describes as non-incorporation: the lack of strong potential for
taxation or resource extraction there meant colonialists largely neglected Bougainville,
with the exception of occasional coconut and cocoa plantations (Thurnwald, 1934).28
Communities that did fall under colonial administration operated through the kiap
(captain) system. The kiap—a white Australian o cer—would serve in principle as
the ultimate arbiter of disputes in an area. In each village under his administration
sat a luluai or hatman—a government-appointed chief who was given an o cial hat
and constabulary duties.29
The advent of WWII marked the first of two serious state retrenchments in
Bougainville, as missionaries and colonial administrators withdrew what small pres-
ence they had established under the looming threat of Japanese occupation. Discovery
of major copper ore deposits sparked the onset of serious mineral exploitation by Rio
27German colonial presence in Bougainville began in 1905 with the establishment of an admin-
istrative post at the port of Kieta (Oliver, 1991). Australia inherited control over Bougainville
following WWI.
28 Bougainvilleans living near natural ports, particularly on the Eastern coasts, had some contact
with outsiders, such as missionaries, planters, and administrators. However, penetration of state
institutions into Bougainville’s hinterland was uneven at best, with many communities living as they
had during pre-colonial times (Ogan, 1991).
29 As Oliver (1991) describes, the actual authority exercised by the luluai varied greatly as a
function of the degree of overlap with pre-existing traditional authorities.
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Tinto in 1964. This resulted in some infrastructural development, largely confined to
the area surrounding the mine.30 Until its closure, the copper mine was the largest
open cut mine in the world, and responsible for almost half of PNG’s total export rev-
enue. Its severe negative impact on the Nasioi people in the surrounding mountains31
led to tensions, and in late 1988 landowners from those communities sabotaged its
operations. Secessionist groups took advantage of outcry sparked by the PNG gov-
ernment, who sent in police to violently reopen the mine (Regan, 2010). Growing
support for armed revolution eventually resulted in a full-scale civil conflict. The
following decade brought severe inter-clan strife and repression by the PNG military,
deployed to Bougainville in 1989. By the time a ceasefire was signed in 1998, the war
had wrought vast damage: 12,000-20,000 people had been killed; over 15,000 had fled
Bougainville; around 67,000 were internally displaced, and; the homes of roughly a
third of the population had been razed (Tierney et al., 2016).
Throughout long stretches of the conflict, what minimal state services had been
brought to the towns of Bougainville (courts, police, tax o ces, etc.) were with-
drawn, once again leaving the region stateless. Into the power vacuum stepped gangs
of young men, who pillaged communities and settled long-standing clan grievances.
Reestablishing order in the wake of the Bougainville crisis has been a fraught exercise,
and crime rates remain extremely high. Some 87% of households in this study report
experiencing at least one incident of theft or assault over the preceding year. Women
experienced especially severe violence, possibly aggravated by the fact that they are
the primary property owners in the mostly matrilineal Bougainville. Following a
study in which 60% (502/846) of Bougainvillean men self-reported having “forced a
woman [...] to have sex,” the UN labeled Bougainville one of the worst places in
30By 1980, approximately 2,000 Bougainvilleans were employed in the Bougainville Copper Mine
in Panguna (Regan, 1998).
31Including loss of land, social tensions due to inequitable compensation and environmental degra-
dation (Regan, 1998, 276).
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the world to be a woman (Jewkes et al., 2013). Of the 2,385 incidents of assault or
property crime reported by respondents in this study, 35% constitute man-on-woman
crime.32
Victims of crime in Bougainville rarely rely on the central police force. In part,
this may be due to distrust.33 However, geography undoubtedly plays a large role.
The Bougainville Police Service (BPS), or the “regulars” (to contrast them with the
community police o cers who are the object of this study) live in the urbanized towns
in housing provided by the government. By contrast, most Bougainvilleans live in
small villages that are extremely di cult to access. Four communities in this study,
for example, are over three hours’ boat ride away over open ocean from the central
police station. Other communities are located high in the mountains, and lack means
of communicating with the central police other than by physically visiting them,
usually requiring up to four hours’ trek and several hours of transport in four-wheel
drive vehicles.
The Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) model in Bougainville was conceived as a
way of providing security to remote communities. On the tail end of the Bougainville
civil war in early 1998 the nascent Bougainvillean government requested the help of
New Zealand and Australia to train and recruit a force of community-based police
that would work under the authority of the BPS (Dinnen and Peake, 2013, 575).
In 2005, the New Zealand Police—in Bougainville with advisory, non-operational
powers under the auspices of New Zealand’s aid programme—o cially took charge of
32Defined as an incident of assault or theft whose victim was a woman and whose perpetrator
was a man, alone or in a group. By contrast, only 3% of incidents feature male victims and female
perpetrators.
33The Bougainville Police Service are part of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, widely
maligned for its repressive role in the Bougainville crisis. Although many BPS are now from
Bougainville, for a long time the “regulars” were recruited from areas outside of Bougainville upon
completing their training. As a result of this outside recruitment, many Bougainvilleans did not
draw a distinction between the BPS and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC).
The stark phenotypical di↵erences between West Papuans and those to the east in Bougainville and
parts of the Solomon islands archipelago only reinforced such perceptions (Friedlaender, 2005). The
BPS were widely distrusted and seen as an outside force.
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recruiting, training and assisting in the management of the CAP. Community police
o cers are present today in about 350 of Bougainville’s roughly 2000 villages. For
the most part, Bougainvilleans thus live without immediate access to state dispute
resolution services. Instead, they rely on customary authorities.
Customary Authority and Dispute Resolution in
Bougainville
Among all criminal victimization incidents recorded during the endline survey for this
study, fewer than one-quarter were reported at all. When they are reported, however,
the vast majority of incidents are reported to customary authorities.34
Customary authority in Melanesia is usually exercised at a much smaller scale
than in other parts of the world, such as nearby Polynesia, or farther afield in West
Africa. Non-state political units in Melanesia seldom govern more than seventy to
three hundred persons.35
With some degree of inaccuracy, customary governance in Melanesia is often asso-
ciated with the “big-man” style of attained authority, in contrast to the inheritance-
3470% of incidents that were reported at all were reported to the chief, which is roughly the same
as the proportion of respondents who cited the village or clan chief as “the first point of contact in
case of law and order problems that involve family members” in a similar survey by Curran et al.
(2017).
35Environmental features make large population concentration and wide-ranging communication
impracticable in most Melanesian settings (Hogbin and Wedgwood, 1953): the islands often feature
a towering backbone of tall mountains (such as the Crown Prince range in Bougainville), and large
tracts of land are required for farming because the main crops (taro, sweet potato, sago) cannot be
stored and are grown in a system of shifting cultivation. A typical “tribe” in Bougainville does not
extend beyond one or two villages, which fall roughly into one of two models: nucleated villages
containing fifty or so dwellings, typically located in coastal areas; and scattered clusters of hamlets,
often inland, with one to ten dwellings per cluster (Oliver, 1991, 95).
The minute scale of traditional authority is also reinforced by kinship patterns that have produced
a high degree of cultural heterogeneity. While village-level exogamy is practiced throughout Melane-
sia and especially in Bougainville, kinship groupings between villages are typically organized into
area-specific moieties that share the same language and are for the most part endogamous (Hage,
2004). Bougainville exemplifies the cultural diversity that results from such highly fragmented pat-
terns of interaction: it contains twenty-six distinct language groups distributed among a population
of roughly 250,000, giving a linguistic fractionalization index of .88 (Herfindahl - calculated based
on census data).
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based authority style of the Polynesian “chief” (Sahlins, 1963). Melanesia’s as-
sociation with the “big-man” style of governance, in fact, stems primarily from
Bougainville, namely Oliver’s 1955 study of the Siwai. In pre-WWII Siwai culture,
the mumi was the man in the village who had the most renown, which he attained
by generating surpluses of material goods, usually pigs, and holding large feasts.36
In Bougainville, successful ascension to the position of headman—referred to in
contemporary Tok Pisin interchangeably as bikman (“big man”) or “chief”—brings
both benefits and duties. One of the core services chiefs provide is the maintenance of
social order through dispute arbitration.37 Disputes are principally resolved through
a reconciliation process referred to as the wanbel kot—literally “one-belly court,” or
“agreement/reconciliation court.”
The following account of the wanbel kot system is given by a chief from Bougainville
in Tombot (2003, 256):
The chief asked the disputing people to meet and to come to an agreement. When
36 The model of status attainment through competitive gift-giving is found in Western Papua
New Guinea as well, most famously in the Moka exchange in Mount Hagen (Strathern, 1971) or the
Kula exchange in the Trobriand islands (Malinowski, 1922). However, Oliver (1991, 106) himself
points out that the degree to which headmen inherit versus attain status is a matter of degree and
depends to some extent on the size and lineage structure of their clan:
At one extreme were those tribal neighbourhoods dominated numerically, or in terms
of land-holdings, by one particular matrilineage. In such cases the members of the
principal matrilineage constituted an aristocracy, and their senior member a hereditary
chief, to be succeeded in time by the eldest son of his eldest sister (not by his own
son, who would of course have been a member of a di↵erent matrilineage). [...] At
the other extreme were those tribes whose leaders earned their positions of authority
solely by exercising military or political skill. Usually, actual fighting prowess was
less important than the ability to gain and inspire followers, which was exemplified by
forcefulness of personality and by shrewd distribution of favours and hospitality.
37Others include managing land use, interfacing with outsiders, and mobilizing the community for
collective contributions to public goods (i.e., building structures, clearing paths through the bush).
The four principal benefits chiefs enjoy are personal prestige (public deference and praise from
one’s peers), material goods (regular distributions of pork and other valuables), influence over policy
(decisions about land use that a↵ect the collectivity), and financial solvency (including the ability
to raise loans and a tacit right to use the land of those in the patronage network—referred to as the
tuhia in the Siwai mumi system) (Oliver, 1991, 54). There is no evidence that the marginal e↵ort
put into the dispensation of these duties results in marginal rewards, however. To the extent that
the chief can retain his authority while doing less work, he has an incentive to reduce the amount
of e↵ort exerted in customary duties.
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they did, the chief prepared a betel nut with lime and mustard on his thumb and asked
them to take their share and chew it. While they chewed, the chief dug a hole and
then told the chewing people to spit into the hole. Then he covered the hole. He told
them to have courage and shake hands. The anger and hate was now in the covered
hole.
Often disputes are resolved simply through talking: “Property dispute between two
men. Both parties to look after the coconut plantation as being decided by the Wan
Bel Court” (police case records, May 2005). In addition to such symbolic reconcil-
iations, chiefs often require disputants to give material goods as compensation for
wrongdoing. Cash, shell money (cowrie shells), betel nut, and pigs are all exchanged
as part of such ceremonies.38 While the wanbel kot system has the advantage of a
restorative and immediate approach to justice, many respondents in focus groups and
in-depth interviews in 2015 and 2016 suggested chiefs exhibited bias particularly dur-
ing the resolution of disputes between men and women. For example, a respondent
in the 2016 survey described how, in August 2015, a female member of her house-
hold was physically assaulted by a group of men. The incident was resolved through
a form of chiefly mediation below that of the wanbel kot, called sek han—shaking
hands: “All parties involved were told to cook food and share together and the per-
petrators were told to apologise.” Perhaps most problematically, compensation is
even used in serious cases of sexual assault where reo↵ending is a major risk: “The
drunkard man raped a lady. The matter was referred to the wanbel kot. The o↵ender
compensated the victim with some money” (police records, March 2006). In another,
we read, “Case reported that [male o↵ender] raped [female complainant]. O↵ender
38 In fact, many places have an elaborate system of fines associated with various infractions
of village norms. Nash (1990, 128), for example, describes the following case of verbal insult be-
tween a husband and wife that was settled through the wanbel kot in a Nagovisi village in central
Bougainville:
Bernadette asked her husband, Francis, to clean up their toddler daughter’s feces. He
said he didn’t have a shovel. She then said he should shovel it with his tongue. He got
mad and went home to his sister. The sister demanded payment (which she received)
for this insult.
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compensated complainant with [80 USD] and 1 mimis and both parties shook hands”
(police records, March 2009).
The Community Auxiliary Police
The Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) program that is the subject of this study
was conceived as a way to bring better protection to vulnerable citizens in remote
villages of Bougainville, where such non-state solutions to the problem of social order
otherwise predominate.
The core innovation of the CAP programme is to identify well-respected members
of remote communities, who are not direct family of the chiefs, and to hire them into
the state’s police force. Once hired, CAP wear a uniform almost indistinguishable
from that of the regular police and work full time as police in their home communities.
CAP o cers are authorized by the Police Act of 1988 to use the full powers of the
police for o↵enses whose punishment comprises a prison term of no more than twelve
months, and the power of detention and referral to the central police for all other
o↵enses. In addition to enforcing the law through arrest and investigation, the CAP
can levy fines in civil cases. This adjudicative role relieves some of the burden on
state courts by locating low-level sentencing in the village. As mentioned, only a
minority of all villages in Bougainville have community police working in them.
The issue of gender equity looms large in the work that the CAP do. They
attend frequent training from international experts in gender-based policing, in which
they learn not only how to gather evidence for prosecution of gender-based crimes,
but also go through a sociological training on the constructedness of gender-based
power inequalities. Consider, for example, the following excerpt I recorded during a
qualitative interview with a CAP o cer in his home village. The CAP, a man in his
fifties, had recently been to a gender-based violence training given by an expert flown
in from Fiji. In this excerpt, recorded after our interview had finished, the CAP was
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addressing the chief, who had recently arrived to stori with us (make small talk):
During my time as a boy, I used to think di↵erently, but now I can see that gender is
not something like sex. Sex is what makes you di↵erent—between a man and a woman.
A woman has breasts, a man, penis and that, but that’s it. That’s natural. But talking
about ”you are a man, therefore you’re the leader of the house”? No. That’s a gender
bias thing. It’s just how people see it. We men think that we are masters. That’s our
culture here, to teach men to be warriors. You know, I’ve learned some new things
about privileges. In the pacific, and in Papua New Guinea, there’s no privileges given
to the ladies. But in overseas, there is privilege. For example, ownership of land. In
name, the woman may own the land, but in practice, the man will control it - so there’s
no privilege given to the woman here. And even privilege can be seen in small things,
like serving food. We don’t bring tea or make food for our women. Or even serve them
a big plate of food. [Gives anecdote about how, at meal time, a wife will go without
food in order to feed her husband, will even feed him in excess while starving herself,
because that is what he and society demand]. This thing comes with a lot of problems!
She has no privilege, while the husband takes EVERYTHING.
(CAP in North Bougainville, September 2017)
The chief clearly did not share the views being expressed by the CAP, but seemed to
hold his tongue both in the face of the CAP’s conviction and possibly his authority
as a man in uniform.
Moreover, hiring policies advanced by the New Zealand Police aid programme have
made the CAP more representative in terms of gender. Of the forty-five candidates
who made the shortlist in the round of recruitment this study analyzes, for example,
twenty were women.
CAP are not armed and so in principle cannot wield unaccountable coercive power
over the community members they police. According to interviews with CAP, they
see their main source of authority as the uniform they wear when on duty. Indeed,
many CAP state that they would be unable to make arrests were they not wearing
the uniform, as its symbolic weight is so important.
Nevertheless, they appear to wield substantial coercive power in the villages where
they work. Analyzing case records reveals many incidents in which both male and
female CAP intervene to protect or assist women in disputes with men. Consider the
following incident from 2007, for example:
Case reported that o↵ender namely [male suspect] bashed his wife, complainant [female
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name] and said that’s because you are having sexual intercourse with [male name]. I
got complainant’s statement and arrested o↵ender.
That incident was reported by a relatively young CAP o cer who works in his spare
time as a carpenter. He had attended trainings on communication skills, arrest pro-
cedures, crime scene investigation, and conflict resolution skills. A slightly older CAP
from a di↵erent region, who otherwise works as a subsistence farmer and states in his
file that his reason for enlisting was to “serve the people in the Community,” reports
that
[Female victim] was returning from school on the 5/04/07 and [male o↵ender] grabbed
her on her way home and tried to rape her. [Female victim] squeezed his testes and
ran away from him. I arrested the suspect after receiving the report from the victim.
While male CAP frequently intervene to protect women who have been attacked
by men, female CAP often appear to go a step further in accompanying victims
of assault to report o↵enses at the central police station. A married CAP in her
thirties, who has conducted trainings in communication skills, listening skills, crime
scene investigation, statement taking, and police procedure, for example, reports
that “on 27/01/09 [she] escorted 3 victims of rape to Arawa Police Station.” It is
telling that three victims simultaneously came forward to her and that the group
traveled together to the police station. While male CAP are trained to intervene in
gender-based conflict and certainly do, it seems that female police o cers form closer
alliances with female complainants.
Thus, the case of the community auxiliary police in Bougainville represents an op-
portunity to test the theory laid out above. In most villages throughout Bougainville,
women are on the losing side of frequent violent conflicts with men. Seeking justice
from customary authorities, they often face bias. The CAP program expands the
state’s capacity to address interpersonal conflict by permanently locating community
police o cers in remote communities, and training them to use their legal powers to
34
address disadvantages faced by women. In the next section, I describe my strategy for
estimating the causal e↵ect of this form of state expansion on resolution behaviors.
1.2 Research Design
To understand how the expansion of state policing services through the CAP a↵ects
behavior and attitudes around dispute resolution, I designed a randomized controlled
trial to maximize internal validity and a much larger historical analysis of case records
to bolster the external validity of the findings.
Field Experiment
In 2015 the Bougainville Police Service expanded the serving CAP force by recruiting
an additional thirty-five community police o cers. They received over 400 applica-
tions for the positions. The applicants were put through an intensive interview and
literacy testing process, and areas thought in severe need of police had o cers hired
there.39 After this preliminary vetting and selection process, there remained forty-five
candidates for seventeen unfilled positions. The police were indi↵erent among these
candidates, all of whom were deemed equally qualified for the community police of-
ficer role. I worked with the police to hire these candidates through a randomized
recruitment lottery. The successful and unsuccessful candidates were not present at
the lottery and were not informed that this method of selection was employed.
39 The usual procedure for recruiting CAP works in a two-step selection process designed to
produce a police force whose members have both the blessing of local authorities and the educational
standing deemed necessary by the BPS. In a first step, the BPS and New Zealand Police invite local
chiefs and elders to nominate members of their community as potential applicants to the position.
Importantly, the chiefs cannot nominate those in their immediate family, so as to ensure some
degree of independence from traditional authorities. Typically, many hundreds more applicants are
nominated than can be hired. Having sifted through a large number of applicants to ensure they
meet basic requirements (high school education, good English, no criminal record), the police then
put applicants through two rounds of testing and interviews. A subset of the top candidates to
emerge from this process are then hired.
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A key feature of the randomization is that community police work in their own
communities. Thus, hiring the candidate from community 1 and not community 2
e↵ectively assigns all of the villagers in community 1 to have access to the community
police and not the villagers in community 2. In this way the randomized recruitment
lottery cluster-assigns villagers to the presence or absence of a community police
o cer. The randomization procedure is described in detail in the appendix with
graphical illustrations (Figure A.1).
Candidates were grouped into fifteen constituencies and selected via constituency-
level lotteries. Thus, the design is blocked and clustered, with heterogeneous assign-
ment probabilities within and across blocks. Heterogeneous assignment probabilities
can generate bias in naive estimators if potential outcomes are correlated with block
membership. Thus, in accordance with the pre-analysis plan, I obtain unbiased es-
timates of the sample average treatment e↵ect through the use of estimators that
weight each unit’s contribution to the likelihood by 1Pr(Zi=z) (Hirano and Imbens,
2005; Gerber and Green, 2012). Due to the relative within-block homogeneity of
these weights, the e ciency of the estimator is not greatly decreased. Using a Monte
Carlo analysis in an approach developed in another paper (Blair et al., 2018), I show
in section A.2.2 of the appendix that this design is powered to detect a one-fifth stan-
dard deviation e↵ect size with 80% probability, even with intra-cluster correlation
(ICC) of .10 (most outcomes exhibit ICC in the .01-.05 range). In the literature on
standardized e↵ect sizes (such as Cohen’s d), this is considered a “small” e↵ect size
(Cohen, 1992). The Monte Carlo simulations—which closely model the actual sam-
ple size and assignment mechanism—further illustrate the design exhibits desirable
properties in terms of coverage and unbiasedness, even when outcomes are correlated
with cluster and block.
I measure outcomes at the household level through a face-to-face survey conducted
in late 2016. With a team of nine enumerators, we listed all households in a village,
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then randomly selected some to have a woman and others a man interviewed in them.
Enumerators then randomly selected eligible male or female adults from the household
using a random-number grid. Section A.1.3 of the appendix provides greater detail on
sampling and outcome measurement. The sample fell short of the target, providing a
response rate of 89%, but there is no evidence of di↵erential response by treatment.
In Table A.5 of the appendix, I report balance on all twenty-eight available covariates.
The rate of imbalance is consistent with imbalance due to sampling variability, and
wherever possible I condition estimates on all covariates.
Not all candidates who were selected for recruitment were eventually hired, and
some candidates who were not selected ended up being hired by the police following
randomization.40 In total, five of the fifteen blocks are a↵ected by non-compliance.
In all analyses, I report the intent-to-treat (ITT) e↵ect, estimated using inverse
probability-weighted regression as pre-specified. However, all regression tables also re-
port estimates of the complier average causal e↵ect (CACE) by estimating a weighted
instrumental variables regression with block fixed e↵ects.
Unless indicated, point estimates of ITT e↵ects in all tables are calculated using
the pre-registered inverse-probability weighted least squares estimator, with fixed
e↵ects for blocks and probability of being in assigned condition as (inverse) weight.
The main model can be written:
yijk =  k + ⌧Zj +Xi  + ✏ijk, (1.1)
where yijk is the outcome for the i’th respondent,  k is a fixed e↵ect for the k’th
block, ⌧ is the intent-to-treat e↵ect, Zj is a treatment assignment indicator for the
40 In the constituencies of Carterets, Hagogohe, Haku and Selau, a candidate was hired even
though the candidate was not selected in the recruitment lottery. This occurred due to low recruit-
ment numbers in the Southern region (not included in this study because the number of eligible
candidates was too low to facilitate randomization), which e↵ectively freed up positions for candi-
dates elsewhere. In the constituencies of Kunua, Hagogohe and Haku, a candidate who was selected
was not hired, due to pregnancy and successful induction into the commissioned police force.
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j’th cluster, Xi is a vector of covariates (see Table A.5 in the appendix),   is a vector
of covariate e↵ects, and ✏ijk an error term.
Consistent with the pre-analysis plan, the pre-registered upper-, lower- or two-
tailed p-values are calculated for all outcomes by computing 2000 draws from the
sampling distribution of the estimator under the sharp null of no (positive) e↵ect
for all units using randomization inference. All standard errors are clustered at the
village level. As pre-specified, all outcome values that are missing at the item-level
are imputed using multiple imputation through chained equations, conditioning only
on outcomes from the same family and not on covariates or on treatment status.
Historical Analysis
An implication of the theory developed above is that access to police is most likely
to change behavior when police strongly counteract male-centric bias by providing
a policing service favorable to women. To widen the temporal and spatial scope
of the experimental findings, I provide supplementary evidence for the theory using
historical panel data that a↵ords better statistical power and broader external validity
than the experiment.
The Community Auxiliary Police program began in earnest with the election of
the parliament to the Autonomous Bougainville Government following elections in
2005. During the first four years of the program, CAP were required to provide very
detailed monthly reports on all incidents that they came across. Those 412 CAP who
began working at the time generated a dataset on over 30,000 incidents, detailing
for each a range of contextual variables, such as the name and gender of the parties
involved, an incident category code, and a detailed description of what happened and
how the incident was resolved. The frequency distribution of the di↵erent kinds of
incidents is reported on Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
Those directing the CAP program took pains to hire as many women as possible.
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Many villages were thus not only exposed to a direct link to the police for the first
time ever but also had their first ever experience dealing with a female police o cer.
Sixty-one villages had at least a month of exposure to policing from a woman CAP
o cer during the period from early 2005 to late 2009.
One might be tempted to simply compare villages with female police o cers to
those with male police o cers. However, there may be reason to believe that the
two kinds of villages are di↵erent in important ways that may confound inference.
A more conservative approach is to focus on those sixty-one villages that ever had
a woman police o cer in them, and leverage the fact the presence and absence of
women shifted over time in plausibly exogenous ways to identify the e↵ect of having
a male versus a female police o cer.
Figure A.5 in the appendix illustrates that there is a substantial degree of tem-
poral variation in the presence of women police o cers in the villages covered by
the monthly reporting data, even when we subset to only those villages that had a
woman for at least one month at some point.
One strategy for identifying the e↵ect of having a woman versus a man as the po-
lice o cer in one’s village is to assume the probability that a woman and not a man
was the police o cer in a given village-month is independent of the potential out-
comes we care about—in this case how reports of violence against women were dealt
with.41 Another identification strategy I employ is to use a generalized di↵erence-in-
di↵erences estimator, regressing the outcome in a given village-month on indicators
41 Most women are in a given village for some years at a time, and usually a minimum of 6
months. At the beginning of the program, they also typically worked in villages where men were
already working, as the particularly dire security situation in the immediate aftermath of the war
was seen as too di cult for women o cers to face on their own.
To understand the factors that determine the duration that a woman police o cer will spend in
a given village, I interviewed senior police who oversee the CAP program, but also looked through
the CAP program archives, including letters of resignation sent by women, and records of personnel
movements. Broadly speaking, the main reason for movement out of the force is pregnancy. However,
despite Bougainville having principally matrilocal residence patterns, women also move to other
villages on occasion due to marriage. They also move in order to look after their parents or to start
school in the capital city.
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for female o cer presence, village and month. This approach relies on a parallel
trends assumption. Missing village-months during periods where police o cers were
present are imputed using linear interpolation, and all specifications condition on an
imputation fixed e↵ect.
Consistent with the identifying assumptions, I conduct statistical inference by
comparing the test statistic (a regression coe cient) to the null distribution that
arises by simulating random start and end dates for women police o cers within the
timeframe in which at least one police o cer was present in the village.
1.3 Main Results
I provide here a high-level summary of how the empirical results support the theo-
retical claims, before delving into more detail in the following subsections.
I interpret the experimental manipulation of the assignment variable, Z, to be
equivalent to experimental manipulation of the theoretical variable representing state
expansion, also denoted Z. Consistent with the core theoretical suppositions about
the gendered nature of dispute resolution institutions, men and women experience
state expansion in fundamentally di↵erent ways, with women more likely to report
positive and men negative experiences with police. The experimental and obser-
vational findings speak in unison about how these experiences a↵ect demand: the
immediate availability of community policing drives men toward customary author-
ities and women toward the state. Demand for both institutions increases. This is
consistent with the core comparative statics presented in section 1.1.
Consistent with the notion that  P is much farther from 0 for female o cers
than for male o cers, and thereby creates a stronger reporting incentive for women
in disputes with men, the e↵ect of state expansion on women’s reporting proclivities
appears especially pronounced when the agent representing the state is a female police
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o cer.
The theory also predicts that state expansion may not have a deterrent e↵ect
when the custom favors men more than the state favors women. And indeed, there
is little evidence that community police presence reduces crime.
The Gendered Experience of Expanding State Capacity
I show here that men and women experience state expansion through community
policing in fundamentally di↵erent ways. To measure perceptions of police treatment
and service quality, I adapt and extend the procedural justice index developed in
Rosenbaum et al. (2015).42 The battery is composed of the following yes or no
questions, with “yes” responses coded as 1 and “no” as 0:
In your recent experience, when you or a [man/woman] like you take a problem to the
police, do they:
- explain how they will deal with the issue?
- listen to what you have to say?
- seem concerned about your feelings?
- treat you politely?
- take your problem seriously?
- treat you the same as they would a [woman/man]?
- appear to know what they are doing?
Since this measure focuses on experiences with police, and access to policing
is di↵erent between treatment and control, one may be concerned that the index
measures a di↵erent phenomenon depending on treatment status. To minimize this
risk, the following prompt introducing the index encouraged respondents to consider
police generally: “Now I would like to talk about your experience with the police.
When I talk about the police, I mean anyone who has a uniform and is paid by
government to arrest people. This includes both the CAP and the regular BPS.” As
explained above, while accessing the central police is very rare for those in remote
42The questionnaire in this study asks respondents two batteries of identical questions, one per-
taining to the chiefs, and one pertaining to state police (CAP and regulars). The order of the two
batteries was randomized in order to prevent ordering e↵ects.
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villages, people often have second- if not firsthand experience dealing with police. I
therefore encourage respondents who have not had experience with police to “answer
to the best of your knowledge, given what you know from the experiences of people like
you when they have brought their problems to the police.” Those with and without
direct access to the police are thus able to answer with a similar interpretation of the
questions.
The top row of Figure 1.2 presents predictions and the bottom row presents point
estimates arising from the pre-registered inverse-probability weighted (IPW) regres-
sion specification, conditioning on all available covariates and block-level fixed e↵ects
(see Table A.7 in section A.3.1 of the Appendix). The upper row of panels reports
the predicted response in control on the left and in treatment on the right, stratified
by gender. For example, the top left panel states that just under 60% of men and
over 60% of women in villages without community police are estimated to a rm that
police will explain how they will deal with issues brought to them by similar men and
women. As one moves from left to right on each sub-panel, the shift downwards for
men and upwards for women indicates negative and positive treatment e↵ects on this











































































































































































































Figure 1.2: Men and women experience state expansion through community policing
in significantly divergent manners.
Top row plots predictions from pre-registered inverse probability-weighted estimator, conditioning
on block e↵ects and available covariates. Left side of x-axis shows prediction for the control, right
side shows prediction for the treatment. y-axis predicts percent of people who answer yes to the
question displayed above the plot.
Bottom row depicts point estimates among men (labeled M), point estimates among women (labeled
W), and the di↵erence in these point estimates (W - M). Statistical significance is calculated using
randomization inference and pre-registered upper-tailed tests, ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01. See
Table A.7 in the Appendix for underlying regression specifications.
The corresponding coe cients are presented on the bottom row.43
43For example, the bottom left panel indicates that men are four percentage points less likely
and women 8.6 percentage points more likely to state that police explain how they will deal with
issues brought to them. The e↵ect is significant at the .10 level for women, and, as the point labeled
“W-M” indicates, the 12.6 percentage point di↵erence in e↵ects is also statistically significant. No
e↵ect is significant for men, in part because an upper-tailed hypothesis test was pre-registered for
these outcomes.
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Looking first at the vertical di↵erences on the top row of Figure 1.2, it is note-
worthy that women in the control (No community police) consistently appraise their
and other women’s experiences with police more positively than men appraise their
own. While less than half of all men believe that police take their problems seriously,
for example, roughly 70% of women do believe police take their problems seriously.
A particularly telling baseline gap occurs in the question of whether the police are
gender-equitable. Women are very likely to say that police would treat them the same
as they would a man, and having community police in the village increases this belief
by an estimated 7.3 percentage points. Men do not see it this way. Compared to the
proportion of women who believe they are treated in a gender-equitable manner by
police, men are over twenty percentage points less likely to say that the police would
treat a man like them the same as they would treat a woman. While we cannot rule
out the interpretation that men view police as negatively biased toward women, in the
context of the other measures this finding seems to suggest that men see police as the
partisans of women. This perception is hardened by the treatment: the gap in men
and women’s appraisals of gender equity among police widens by twelve percentage
points.
The widening gap in experiences with police is pervasive: across all measures, the
di↵erence in e↵ects among women and men (labeled “W - M”) is positive and in four
of seven tests it is statistically distinguishable from 0 at the ↵ = .10 level. Across all
outcomes, we see evidence of a small, negative e↵ect for men, and a large, positive
e↵ect for women.
This divergence in e↵ects may arise because community police o cers are more
likely to engage with and take the side of women, as the qualitative evidence pre-
sented above suggests. This represents a stark contrast to incumbent non-state service
providers, such as chiefs, whose adjudicative procedures are typically biased toward
men.
44
If indeed the widening of the gender gap in police appraisals is driven by some
co-partisan dynamic between women and police, we would expect it to be stronger
in those communities where a woman police o cer was hired (Karim et al., 2015). In
eighteen communities, at least one woman was a candidate to become a police o cer.
Thus, we can define for all of them a probability between 0 and 1 of being observed
in the condition “did have female community police o cer recruited” and “did not
have a female community police o cer recruited.” The other communities must be
discarded, as their probability of receiving this particular treatment was 0 and their
treatment status is thus non-random.
I subset the analysis here to the eighteen communities in which at least one woman
was a candidate to become a police o cer and use the alternative definition of treat-
ment to construct inverse-probability weights. The reduced sample size greatly in-
creases the variance estimates but the picture that emerges is telling. Note, for
example, the di↵erence in the y-axis between Figures 1.2 and 1.3: the positive e↵ect
on women’s appraisals and the negative e↵ect on men’s appraisals are in many cases
over three times greater when a woman police o cer is present. The divergence in























































































Figure 1.3: Presence of women police o cers produces a much larger divergence in
the gender gap in perceptions of police.
See note on bottom row of Figure 1.2. Analysis is here subset to those eighteen villages that had a
probability of having a woman community police o cer selected falling in the interval (0, 1). Inverse
probability weights correspond to probability of having a woman police o cer in the village. See
Table A.8 in the Appendix for underlying regression specifications.
Together, these findings suggest that men and women experience state expansion
in fundamentally di↵erent ways. Already predisposed toward police, women who have
community police hired in their village are more likely than those who don’t to report
positive appraisals of their own or other women’s experiences, and to see the police
as a gender-neutral arbiter in disputes. The opposite is true for men, who already
have a generally low appraisal of the way they and other men like them are treated
by police. In particular, men attest that the police treat women very di↵erently.
By increasing the number of first- and secondhand experiences with police, state
expansion sharpens these appraisals and widens the gender gap.
Shifts in Resolution Behavior
The gender-di↵erentiated experiences of state expansion produce changes in behavior
and beliefs around conflict resolution that are consistent with the theory. The frame-
work elaborated above suggests that, rather than weakening the position of the chief,
the increased availability of state service provision should increase the importance of
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having an empowered chief among men. Figure A.9 presents findings in support of
this notion. It reports treatment e↵ects on responses to the following forced triplet:
Sometimes the police might not agree with the way in which the chief has handled an
incident in a village. The police may want to step in and resolve the issue in a di↵erent
way. Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?
1 = A The police should never be able to tell the chief how to resolve issues in the
community. The chief always knows what’s best.
.5 = B Sometimes the chief should let the police step in and handle issues, even if not
everyone agrees.
0 = C The police most often knows the best way to handle a situation, and the chief
should always defer to their authority.
Higher values represent higher demand for intervention by actors representing the
customary institution. Recall that we expect demand for the involvement of custom-
ary authorities to be especially high among men when the police are accessible to
women. It is in those situations that their interests are threatened during dispute
resolution.
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the presence of the community police
increases men’s support for autonomous, empowered customary authorities in mat-
ters of dispute resolution. Originally a one-tailed positive test was pre-registered,
but I here report the results of a two-tailed test, which suggests that the observed
e↵ect was highly unlikely under the sharp null hypothesis of no e↵ects for all units
(p < .01). The e↵ect is substantively large, at .07 scale points. This amounts to an
increase of about 12% relative to the control. Already in the control men were more
likely than women to prefer the chief have autonomy in his decision-making about
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0 = The police most often
knows the best way
to handle a situation,
and the chief should always defer
to their authority.
.5 = Sometimes the chief should
let the police step in
and handle issues,
even if not everyone agrees.
1 = The police should never
be able to tell the chief
how to resolve issues
in the community.
The chief always knows what's best.
Figure 1.4: Community police presence increases men’s preference for dispute reso-
lution by chiefs rather than by police.
Predictions arising from inverse-probability weighted regression of outcome on treatment and block
indicators, and all available covariates. Predictions generated by holding all variables at their mean
and varying treatment assignment and gender. Statistical significance is calculated using random-
ization inference, ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01. The PAP pre-registered a one-sided test but here
a two-sided test was conducted. Underlying regression specification reported in Table A.9 of the
Appendix.
By contrast, women on average choose the equivocal option: the chief should
sometimes let the police step in and handle issues in the community. Consistent with
the theory, we see no statistically significant evidence that state expansion changes
this belief among women.
It thus appears that men’s negative experience of the expansion of state policing
leads them to vest more authority in the chief. How do these shifts in experiences
and preferences change demand for the alternative providers in the presence of actual
disputes? According to the theory, we should see changes in the way that women
respond to disputes with men.
Decisions about whether and to whom to report crime are made conditional on
the occurrence of crime, which is itself possibly a↵ected by the treatment. I therefore
adopt an approach to analyzing reporting decisions that, as I show in appendix section
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A.2.3, is unbiased because it targets an estimand that does not condition on the first-
stage outcome. Specifically, I seek to understand changes in the proportion of women
who:
1. Never report, either in the survey or to authorities, having been victimized by
men;
2. Report at least one incident in which they were victimized by a man, and in all
cases only the chief was involved in dispute resolution;
3. Report at least one incident in which they were victimized by a man, and in all
cases only the police was involved in dispute resolution;
4. Report at least one incident in which they were victimized by a man, and both
the chief and the police were involved in dispute resolution.
This estimand can be di cult to interpret when there is a large treatment e↵ect on
the first stage.44 However, as we shall see below in the discussion on crime e↵ects,
pre-registered hypothesis tests enable us to reject the hypothesis of even very small
constant e↵ects on the crime rate (i.e., more negative than -.05 standard deviations).
The apparent absence of a treatment e↵ect on crime greatly simplifies the interpre-
tation of e↵ects.
Table 1.1 reports the results of a multinomial logit regression of the outcome
described above on a treatment indicator and block fixed e↵ects, among all women
in the sample. The coe cients are log-odds that are relative to the probability that
the respondent reported no disputes with men in the post-treatment period. Thus,
for example, the coe cient in column 1 indicates that if a woman has community
police hired in her village, the probability that she will have a dispute with a man
and that it will be resolved by the chief decreases relative to the probability that
she will report no disputes with men (to authorities or survey enumerators). The
coe cients in columns 2 and 3 indicate, to the contrary, a strong increase in the
relative probability that a woman reports an incident and it is handled by the police
alone (p < .05) or by both the police and chief (p > .1).
44 If policing deterred all crime, for example, then the proportion of women who report incidents
that are resolved by the police would drop to 0—not because women become less likely to report to
police, conditional on crime, but because crime itself is less likely to occur.
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Relative to no disputes reported,
log-odds woman reports case(s) and...
...resolved by ...resolved by ...resolved by
Chief only Police only Chief and Police
(1) (2) (3)
Comm. Police  0.845⇤ 0.721⇤⇤ 0.270
RI p-value 0.084 0.047 0.865
N Observations 715 715 715
N Villages 39 39 39
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 1.1: Relative to other events, state expansion significantly increases the proba-
bility that women report disputes with men to the police and reduces the probability
that such incidents are handled by chiefs alone.
Inverse-probability weighted multinomial regression of the reporting outcome on indicator for pres-
ence of community police o cer in that village, conditional on block fixed e↵ects. Two-sided p-value
reported for column 1, and p-values from one-sided positive test reported for columns 2 and 3. All
p-values calculated using randomization inference. Regression is subset to women.
Given the lack of e↵ects on the crime rate, the inference that women become
significantly more likely to report disputes with men to the police is strongly plausible.
Table 1.2 eases interpretation by providing predictions from the model in 1.1 in
one block of the experiment where reporting was relatively high (Tsitalato). State
expansion is predicted to halve the probability that women’s disputes with men are
resolved by chiefs alone, double the probability that they are resolved by police alone,
and increase by 50% the probability that they are dealt with by a combination of
chief and police.
No Community Police Community Police
No disputes with men reported 82% 83%
Disputes reported and all resolved by chief 10% 5%
Disputes reported and all resolved by police 5% 10%
Disputes reported and resolved by police and chief 2% 3%
Table 1.2: Predictions from multinomial model in Table 1.1 suggest state expansion
makes women substantially more likely to report disputes with men to police than to
chiefs.
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To home in more closely on gender-specific dynamics, we would ideally like to be
able to analyze how reporting of disputes between men and women in the experiment
is a↵ected by the presence of women police o cers versus men police o cers. How-
ever, we run into serious issues of data sparsity when subsetting the experimental
sample in this manner.
The observational panel data described in section 1.2 is useful in this regard:
using a much larger sample, we can estimate the e↵ect of having a woman versus a
man as community police o cer in a given village month, on a reporting outcome
constructed in a very similar manner to that reported in Table 1.1.
Specifically, I take over 30,000 incidents reported by CAP o cers from 2005 - 2009
in sixty-one villages that had a female CAP at some point (see Figure A.5 above).
I use it to construct a panel dataset tracking the following multinomial outcome at
the village-month level:45
1. No single case of conflict between a man and a woman was recorded by the (male
or female) CAP in that village month;
2. The CAP recorded at least one incident of conflict between a man and a woman
in that village month, and all such incidents were resolved exclusively by the
chief;
3. The CAP recorded at least one incident of conflict between a man and a woman
in that village month, and all such incidents were resolved exclusively by the
police;
4. The CAP recorded at least one incident of conflict between a man and a woman
in that village month, and those incidents were resolved by a combination of the
chief and the police.
The findings are plotted on Figure 1.5 (the underlying regression tables can be
found in Table A.10 in the Appendix). The observational analysis lends strong sup-
port to the theory: among those villages that ever had a woman police o cer work
in them, the presence of at least one woman police o cer in a given village month
45 Again, since the outcome is not observed conditional on post-treatment quantities, it is not
subject to post-treatment bias. However, the interpretation of e↵ects as being principally driven by
changes in reporting behavior is predicated on the absence of treatment e↵ects on crime that are
correlated with reporting.
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greatly decreases the probability of no VAW being reported and increases the proba-
bility of all other kinds of events. The probability that all reported incidents are dealt
with by the police increases substantially, as in the experimental findings. To the dif-
ference of the experimental findings, we see that the relative probability with which
a chief resolves all reported incidents also increases here. This is possibly related to
the fact that this data captures initial reporting by both men and women. Again, the
expansion of the state via policing agents who ally with individuals disadvantaged by
the customary sector bolsters the dispute resolution role of both state and customary
institutions. The e↵ects are all statistically distinguishable from 0. In Table A.12 of
the appendix, I show that the results remain mostly unchanged when using a gen-
eralized di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimator that conditions on both period and village
fixed e↵ects, although the coe cient on the log-odds of “resolved by police only” falls
short of significance.
80.5% 5.0% 9.5% 5.1%
62.4% 8.5% 21.6% 7.5%
+2 pp+12 pp+4 pp−18 pp
Woman present
No woman present
No VAW cases reported VAW cases, all resolved by chief
VAW cases, all resolved by police VAW cases, resolved by chief and police
Figure 1.5: Presence of woman community police o cer increases the relative proba-
bility of reporting and resolving crimes with the involvement of the police and chief.
Plots represent predicted probabilities from an inverse-probability weighted multinomial regression
of the reporting outcome on indicator for presence of a woman police o cer in that village-month,
an imputation fixed e↵ect, and month fixed e↵ects. Predictions are generated by firstly setting the
woman police o cer indicator to 0 for the whole sample (top row) and then setting it to 1 for the
whole sample (bottom row), and taking the average. Underlying regression model is presented in
Table A.10 in the Appendix.
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State Expansion and Protection from Harm
The evidence presented in the preceding section lends support to the notion that,
rather than crowding out demand for non-state institutions, the expansion of the
state via community policing can in fact increase demand for adjudication by state
and non-state authorities simultaneously. Recall, however, that such increases in
demand may not necessarily prevent crime. On the one hand, potential perpetrators
may simply not weigh the consequences of their actions before engaging in crime.
In Bougainville, many assaults are committed under the influence of alcohol. On
the other hand, even if potential perpetrators do backwards induct, the presence of
institutions that are biased in their favor may make it profitable to defect against
others in the community, even if it is highly likely that this defection will be reported
to the authorities. Institutions partial to the interests of di↵erent groups may actually
hamper the positive welfare impacts of state expansion.
The survey measures crime in two ways. First, respondents are asked to count
the number of times they or someone in their household was a victim of an assault or
a property crime over the preceding year. I refer to such questions as “victimization”
measures. Second, respondents were asked di↵erent questions about the rate of crime























































































































































































































































































































































● ●No Community Police Community Police
Figure 1.6: There is very little evidence to suggest that the per-capita crime rate
changes as a function of the treatment.
Each point represents the per-household rate of incidents of assault and property crime in a given
village in a given month. The y-axis plots the crime rate, the x-axis plots the month in which
respondents recalled the incidents occurring. Empty circles correspond to control villages and filled
circles to treatment villages.






















Figure 1.7: Constant negative treatment e↵ects on the crime rate that are any more
negative than .05 standard deviations can be rejected at the ↵ = .10 confidence level.
x-axis reports hypothesized constant e↵ect sizes in the negative range as pre-registered. y-axis
represents the p-value arising from the pre-registered hypothesis-testing procedure based on Bowers,
Fredrickson, and Aronow (2016) and Rosenbaum (2002). See section A.2.4 of the Appendix for more
detail.
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Figure 1.6 illustrates that the rate at which households reported victimization be-
fore and after the randomization is almost identical between treatment and control.46
Moreover, using the pre-registered hypothesis-testing method, Figure 1.7 shows that
we can rule out at the ↵ = .10 confidence level any constant negative e↵ect on the
per-capita victimization rate that is more negative than -.05 standard deviations, and
at the ↵ = .05 level any e↵ect more negative than -.075 standard deviations.
These null findings on victimization are also reflected on Table 1.3, which reports
the results on crime disaggregated by type (to save space and because the e↵ects
are homogeneous, I do not di↵erentiate with respect to gender). Overall, however,
while we see little evidence of an e↵ect on victimization, we see strong evidence of a
reduction in the “prevalence” measures of crime.
Columns 1 and 2 report counts of assault incidents. The victimization measure
asks respondents how many times over the year preceding the survey someone in
their household experienced a violent assault of any kind, while the second asks the
respondent to give their best guess of approximately how many times over the same
period someone was seriously assaulted in his or her village. The estimated e↵ects
on these variables are substantively small and statistically insignificant.
Columns 3 and 4 measure e↵ects on outcomes related to violence against women.
When respondents reported that someone in their household had experienced one
or more incident of violence, they were asked specific questions on up to four such
incidents (going from the most to the least serious), including the gender of the victim.
The VAW victimization measure takes the sum of assault incidents that had a woman
46Respondents were asked to provide micro-data on up to eight incidents of assault and property
crime to which they or members of their household fell victim (see section A.1.4 of the Appendix
for more details). They were given three temporal markers and asked to situate the incidents with
respect to those: first, the Bougainville elections in 2015, which took place roughly 6 months prior
to randomization and involved a major mobilization in even very remote parts of the country;
second, Christmas 2015, when randomization took place; and third, the day of the survey. By
asking respondents to situate incidents relative to these three temporal markers, we were able to
reconstruct a recall-based panel on monthly crime in the villages.
55
victim. The estimated e↵ect of the community police on this outcome is very close
to zero and is statistically insignificant. Column 4 reports e↵ects on responses to the
following question:
In many of the villages we have visited, husbands sometimes bash their wives. Thinking
back over the past month, would you that this happened more than about once a week
in [R’s village]?
If yes: Does it happen almost every day, or just about once a week?
If no: Does it happen about once every month, even less than once a month, or never?
The responses are coded 0 - 4 as frequency increases from “never” to “almost every
day.” The baseline average of 2.44 indicates a frequency of about 2-3 times a month.
The presence of the community police appears to reduce this perceived frequency by
up to roughly 7% relative to this baseline (ITT = -.13, CACE = -.17, p < .1).
Columns 5 and 6 bear evidence of a similar pattern. The property crime victim-
ization measure asks respondents how many times over the year preceding the survey
a member of their household had property stolen or intentionally damaged. The
estimated coe cient is substantively small and falls short of significance. However,
as column 6 illustrates, respondents perceive the prevalence of property crime to be
much lower in the treatment than in the control. When asked how many incidents
they knew of, over the past year, in which a neighbor had property stolen or dam-
aged, respondents in the treatment gave answers that were .23 incidents lower on
average (CACE = -.32, p < .1). In relative terms, this is a very large reduction: with
a control mean of 1.27 incidents, the treatment is estimated to reduce the perceived
prevalence of property crime by 25%.
56
Assaults VAW Property Crime Public Intoxication
Victimization Prevalence Victimization Prevalence Victimization Prevalence Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Comm. Police 0.052 0.122  0.009  0.125⇤  0.076  0.228⇤  0.130⇤
(0.072) (0.077) (0.040) (0.062) (0.104) (0.125) (0.060)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CACE 0.07 0.17 -0.01 -0.17 -0.11 -0.32 -0.18
RI p-values 0.756 0.924 0.397 0.08 0.303 0.07 0.081
Contr. mean 1.44 0.75 0.63 2.44 1.78 1.27 1.59
Contr. clust. SD 0.47 0.32 0.23 0.35 0.61 0.58 0.26
[Min, Max] [0,16] [0,30] [0,4] [0,4] [0,20] [0,15] [0,2]
ICC 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.28
Hypothesis lwr lwr lwr lwr lwr lwr lwr
N Clust. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
Observations 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 1.3: While there is little evidence community policing reduces number of criminal incidents to which respondents’
household members fell victim, it strongly reduces the perception that violence against women and property crime are prevalent
in the surrounding community. This is consistent with the finding that alcoholism is much less likely to be seen as a major
problem in treatment communities relative to those in control.
Point estimates are calculated using inverse-probability weighted least squares regression, conditioning on block indicators and all available covariates
(see Table A.5 in appendix). Probability of being in assigned condition is (inverse) weight. All standard errors clustered at the village level. All
p-values calculated using randomization inference with the hypothesis test as pre-registered in the pre-analysis plan. A detailed description of the
summary statistics provided in section A.1.2 of the Appendix.
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How can we reconcile the large reductions in VAW and property crime prevalence
perceptions with the weaker and statistically insignificant e↵ects on victimization?
One explanation is that the presence of community police improves publicly visible
instances of disorder, without necessarily deterring private conflicts between individu-
als. In section A.3.2 of the appendix, I explain how the perception of an improvement
in order may be related to the treatment e↵ect on alcoholism.
Do Non-State Institutions Limit State-Building?
The foregoing analyses largely take non-state institutions as given, and consider how
variation in the presence or absence of state institutions—represented by Z—a↵ects
behavior and beliefs. However, as mentioned above there is a substantial degree of
variation in customary institutions in Bougainville. Concerning disputes between
women and men, one particularly salient dimension of variation pointed to by an-
thropologists such as Jill Nash concerns patri- versus matrilocality.
In addition to property institutions (matrilinearity and patrilinearity), residence
institutions likely play a large role in disadvantaging women in disputes with men.
Under the patrilocal system that often goes hand-in-hand with patrilineal inheritance,
brides move to the village of their spouses following marriage, whereas in matrilocal
systems grooms move to the woman partner’s village. According to Hudson, Bowen,
and Nielsen (2015, 541)
Patrilocality makes the formation of agnatic clans a fairly straightforward task and
thus is universally favored by patrilineal groups. In this system, most males in a par-
ticular area are kin, which forms a natural foundation for male alliances in patrilineal
clans. Such societies, in which land and resources belong exclusively to men, e↵ect
the complete economic dependence of females, resulting in a profoundly subordinate
status for women.
In her work with the Nagovisi in Bougainville, where most societies are in fact matri-
lineal and matrilocal, Jill Nash (1978, 1981, 1990) argues that matrilocal institutions
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lead to relatively more empowered women because wives in such villages are sur-
rounded by their own kin, rather than by the kin of their husband.
These residence institutions thus produce coalitional dynamics that might influ-
ence the e↵ectiveness of state-building. Whereas women police in matrilocal commu-
nities can rely on the support of their kin when helping a woman to resolve conflict
with a man, those in patrilocal communities would be isolated from their kin. Given
CAP o cers’ reliance on community support, it is, therefore, possible that women
police o cers in patrilocal communities wield less authority and are thus less e↵ective
relative to their better-supported counterparts in matrilocal communities.
Figure 1.8 plots the results of an analysis similar to that presented in Figure 1.5,
albeit with two main di↵erences. First, there are very few village-months in patrilocal
villages that had a woman at some point when a woman o cer was not actually
present but a man o cer was. Thus, the analysis takes place among all villages
and is not as conservative with respect to identification as the specifications above.
Second, the analysis in the top panel is conducted among villages with matrilocal
residence institutions, and in the bottom among villages with patrilocal residence
institutions.
The results suggest that women police o cers are half as e↵ective at reducing
the number of unreported incidents of VAW in patrilocal villages as they are in
matrilocal villages. Furthermore, we see e↵ects that are much closer to a substitutive
process: women police presence is estimated to reduce the relative probability of
any kind of resolution by chiefs, with all of the increase in relative probabilities
going to resolution by police only. One interpretation of these results is that women
police o cers are much less able to exercise authority when they are undermined by
patrilocal institutions, such that they do not constitute a real threat to the interests
of men and thus do not engender the same shifts in dispute resolution behavior as in
matrilocal contexts.
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80.0% 4.7% 10.0% 5.3%
62.4% 8.2% 19.9% 9.5%
+4 pp+10 pp+4 pp−18 pp
76.7% 8.5% 13.2% 1.6%
69.0% 4.8% 26.2% 0.0%
−2 pp+13 pp−4 pp−8 pp
Villages with patrilocal residence institutions





No VAW cases reported VAW cases, all resolved by chief
VAW cases, all resolved by police VAW cases, resolved by chief and police
Figure 1.8: Women police o cers are more e↵ective at increasing reporting and
resolution of violence against women in matrilocal communities than in patrilocal
communities.
Top set of bars subset to communities with matrilocal institutions, bottom set of bars subset to
communities with patrilocal institutions. Plot represents predicted probability from a multinomial
regression of the reporting outcome on indicator for presence of a woman police o cer in that
village-month, an imputation fixed e↵ect, as well as month fixed e↵ects. Estimates are calculated
by inversely weighting observations by the probability of being in assigned condition. Predictions
are generated by firstly setting the woman police o cer indicator to 0 for the whole sample (top
row) and then setting it to 1 for the whole sample (bottom row), and taking the average. See Table
A.11 in appendix for underlying regression models.
Broader E↵ects
An important question for state-building policy and for theories of state legitimacy is
the extent to which access to one form of state service “spills over” onto perceptions
of the state more generally. In Table A.14 of the appendix, I report the treatment
e↵ects of community policing on several indicators of state legitimacy. The first is
trust in government, measured using an indicator for whether the respondent agrees
with the statement “I trust the government to make the right decisions for the people
of Bougainville and for [respondent’s village].” In line with findings above, men
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exhibit a negative and women a positive treatment e↵ect on this outcome, although
we cannot reject the sharp null hypothesis of no e↵ect for all respondents. The second
indicator measures the extent to which respondents believe one should “vote with the
chief” (Baldwin, 2015), with an indicator for their disagreement with the following
statement: “If the chief tells you to vote for someone in the elections, that is who you
should vote for.” The relatively large negative e↵ect (indicating greater agreement)
for women is not statistically significant because the pre-analysis plan pre-registered
an upper-tailed test. The final column indicates there is no evidence that contact with
the state through the police improves knowledge about government: the treatment
does not appear to improve respondents’ ability to correctly name the President
of Bougainville. Thus, the e↵ects of increased availability of police appear largely
concentrated among attitudes and behavior directly related to dispute resolution.
Long-Run E↵ects
One limitation of the experimental evidence is its relatively narrow temporal scope.
What evidence can we glean about the long-run e↵ects of police o cer presence from
the five years of observational panel data? While I only possess historical data from
villages that had CAP o cers at some point, I can provide some descriptive sense
of the long-run e↵ects of the CAP program by comparing outcomes in the first six
months of policing to outcomes in consecutive six-month blocks. In Table A.13 I
use a generalized di↵erence-in-di↵erences model that conditions estimates on village
and month fixed e↵ects in order to estimate the di↵erence in the number of incidents
of violence against women reported to police, using all villages and months in the
entire historical panel. While estimates are not precise, there is some evidence that
the number of cases of violence against women in the first six months is higher than
in subsequent six-month blocks. Specifically, the number of VAW incidents reported
in the first six months is estimated to be almost half an incident higher on average
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than the number of incidents reported once the o cer has been there for more than
four and a half years. However, given the experimental results illustrate the presence
of community police increases the rate at which incidents are reported, even in the
first months of police presence, this estimate might strongly over-estimate the true
reduction in violence. Overall, while it is tempting to interpret the results as evidence
of a reduction in the incidence rate, the experimental findings caution against such
optimistic interpretations.
1.4 Alternative Mechanisms
In the preceding sections, I have used experimental and observational evidence to
argue that the increasing availability of police causes women to come forward about
disputes with men. In turn, this causes men to draw more upon customary author-
ities. The ability of perpetrators of violence to protect their interests by drawing
on alternative authorities blunts to some extent the deterrent e↵ects of police avail-
ability. Multiple pieces of evidence speak in favor of this argument. I here provide
evidence against alternative explanations.
In Figure 1.2 and the underlying regression Table A.7 in the Appendix, I show
that women become more likely and men less likely to report positive experiences
with police when community police are hired in their village. I attribute this to the
fact that disputes between men and women make up over one-third of all disputes,
and the police provide more equal dispute resolution services than the chief. An
alternative interpretation is that gender is correlated with covariates that would lead
one to prefer state dispute resolution services for other reasons: for example, chiefs
often use pigs as compensation during mediation in the wanbel kot, and rates of pig
ownership are higher among men. Whereas a man who loses an asset is likely to have
it replaced if he goes to a chief, if he goes to the police he is less likely to have his
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asset replaced. Thus, gender-based di↵erences in asset ownership (or other covariates)
may induce di↵ering preferences for justice. To address this concern, however, the
main results condition on thirty available covariates, including various indicators of
asset ownership. Moreover, as the results in Figure 1.3 and Table A.8, illustrate, the
gender-based divergence in experiences is higher when the police o cer is a woman.
This is consistent with the main interpretation but inconsistent with the proposed
alternative.
Table 1.1 illustrates that women become more likely to report disputes with men
when community police o cers are hired in their village, which I interpret as evidence
of the better treatment they expect to receive. An alternative explanation for this
finding might be that households organize a gendered division of labor, in which
women and men are not in contention but simply face lower costs for reporting to
police and chiefs, respectively. Hence, the gendered e↵ects in reporting would not
reflect underlying preferences, but cost di↵erentials. Yet, men do indeed report to
the police when they experience theft or assault at the hands of other men (the theory
does not hold that men will never report to police, but that men will be more likely to
report to chiefs due to women’s increased propensity to report gender-based disputes).
Moreover, if the results are driven purely by gender-based cost di↵erentials, it is hard
to understand why, for example, men’s preference for autonomous decision-making
by the chief (Figure 1.4 and Table A.9) would increase due to cost asymmetries alone.
Turning now to the historical analysis, the core finding presented in Figure 1.5 and
underlying Tables A.10 and A.12 is that the probability that cases of gender-based
violence are both reported and dealt with jointly by police and chiefs increases when
female as opposed to male police o cers are present in a given village-month. Given
the reliance on administrative data, one may worry that the e↵ect is driven in part
by gender-based di↵erences in reporting standards. My fieldwork suggests two key
indicators of the administrative capacities of police o cers are their literacy levels
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and the amount of training they receive. In particular, literacy levels likely a↵ect the
quantity of reports, while training sessions—which focus on investigative techniques,
trauma counseling, crime scene investigation, “people skills,” domestic violence, and
prosecution—likely a↵ect the quality and detail of the reports. As Table 1.4 indicates,
women CAP in the sample used for the observational analysis have higher literacy
rates than men. This may in part explain why they gather more reports overall.
However, there is no evidence that women are better trained to detect and describe
crime. It thus seems unlikely that the di↵erences in forum-shopping behavior revealed
in the data reflect underlying di↵erences in reporting techniques used by the police.
Mean Among Men Mean Among Women Di↵erence p-value
High literacy 80.3% 95.5% 15.2pp 0.027
Training 41.18% 39.39% -1.78pp 0.861
N 85 33
Table 1.4: Male and female community police in the observational analyses have
roughly the same level of training, although women exhibit a slightly higher rate of
literacy.
1.5 Discussion
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, leaders of newly independent states throughout
Africa railed against the persistence of powerful village-level customary authorities
and predicted agents of the state, increasingly deployed throughout remote rural ar-
eas, would supplant traditional leaders (Herbst, 1990; Boone, 2003; Baldwin, 2015).
However, as in many other parts of the world, such predictions proved inaccurate:
throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Pacific, non-state
authorities continue to play an important role in the governance of rural and some-
times urban populations. They provide citizens with services that parallel those
provided by the state (Cammett and MacLean, 2014), particularly in the domain of
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security and dispute resolution (Baker, 2009; Lazarev, 2017; Blair, Karim, and Morse,
2018).
The persistence of non-state institutions is linked at least in part to demand for
the services they provide. The theory and evidence presented in this chapter shed
light on one set of dynamics that can sustain citizen demand for multiple providers
of dispute resolution services.
By generating experimental variation in the areas where community police o cers
begin working as uniformed agents of the state in remote parts of Papua New Guinea,
I am able to demonstrate that men and women experience state expansion in divergent
ways: men expect more negative and women more positive experiences with police—a
divergence that is much wider when the police o cer is a woman. The theory predicts
that these di↵erences in expectations mean that state expansion will lead women to
report disputes with men to police and men to appeal more frequently to chiefs.
And indeed, the experimental and observational sources of evidence are consis-
tent with this prediction: state expansion causes an increase in men’s preference for
customary authorities’ autonomy, on the one hand, and strongly increases the prob-
ability that women report to the police victimization at the hands of men, on the
other. When a woman police o cer begins working in a village where only male po-
lice o cers were present, this is estimated to cause a large increase in the probability
that disputes between men and women are reported and handled by both chiefs and
police.
I find evidence against deterrence of violence, at least in the short-run: at the
↵ = .05 confidence level, I can reject any constant reduction in the crime rate greater
than one-tenth of a standard deviation. The availability of alternative authorities
appears to blunt the state’s capacity to reduce violence.
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Scope Conditions
How well could the theory of state expansion put forth in this chapter travel to other
contexts and explain the persistence of hybrid institutional environments there? For
one thing, many of the preconditions identified as theoretically relevant—customary
authorities relatively more partial to the interests of men than women, poor access
to state policing services—exist in many parts of the world where we also see hybrid
institutional environments. In the African context—described by Baker (2008) as a
‘multi-choice’ policing environment—three-quarters of citizens living in rural areas
lack easy access to police, according to Afrobarometer data. Moreover, as Figure 1.9
illustrates, customary authorities are pervasively seen as more biased towards men
than state authorities are.47 In a number of regions in Southern, West and North
Africa, for example, almost all women claim that traditional leaders treat women
unequally, whereas police and courts never do. These observations suggest that many
parts of Africa exhibit preconditions for the sorts of strategic interaction posited in
this study.
47Each point on the graph represents the average response to two questions among men and
women in one rural subnational region in North, Southern, West or East Africa. The y-axis plots
the average response to the question “How often, in this country, are women treated unequally by
the police and courts?”, while the x-axis corresponds to the question “How often, in this country,
are women treated unequally by traditional leaders?” The left panel plots responses provided by
men, and the right those provided by women.
The first thing to note is that the two measures are highly correlated: certain regions appear to
exhibit general bias that is present in the way that both state and non-state authorities are perceived
to treat women. Note, however, that both scatterplots exhibit considerable skew rightwards: people
in most regions of Africa see customary authorities as more male-biased than state authorities. The
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Figure 1.9: Men and especially women in rural regions of Sub-Saharan Africa see
customary authorities as significantly more biased toward men than the state.
Each point on the graph represents the average response at the subnational region level. Sample is
subset to rural respondents. Letter indicates supranational region of Africa in which the geographic
unit is located.
Source: Afrobarometer 2015.
Moreover, there is no reason that such dispute resolution dynamics should only
arise in weak state societies. Israel, for example, presents a possible case of strategic
complementarity between state and non-state resolution mechanisms. Lavee and Katz
(2003, 200) describe family law there in the following way:
A double system of courts has been established. All issues of property division and
child custody may be adjudicated in either a civil court or a rabbinical court, but the
writ of divorce remains solely under the authority of the religious court. To prevent the
possibility of adjudication of a given case in two courts simultaneously, the law states
that whenever one spouse brings suit against the other in a given legal system, all
proceedings must continue in that system. Since the civil courts are generally viewed
as more favorable to women and the rabbinical courts more favorable to men, it is in
each spouse’s interest to be the first to file suit in the court of his or her preference.
This is exactly the sort of incentive structure that creates the kinds of strategic
interaction formalized in this chapter: if the husband expects the wife not to file suit,
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he can rely on prevailing social norms to protect his interests. As soon as he believes,
however, that there is some chance the wife will file in the civil court, he has a much
stronger incentive to file in the rabinnical court.
It is worth noting that civil courts in Israel did not always have jurisdiction over
matters ancillary to divorce, such as custody and property division: the state’s juris-
diction was expanded to these domains under pressure from women’s organizations
in the 1990’s. Future work could explore whether the expansion of the state, in the
form of providing civil courts jurisdiction over post-divorce disputes between men and
women, may have set o↵ a dynamic whereby more cases were filed with rabbinical
courts by men once the civil courts became an option for women. Such phenomena
suggest that the scope conditions of some of the core arguments might not be limited
geographically to Papua New Guinea, or even to developing contexts.
Moreover, nothing about the core logic of the argument requires focusing on state
versus non-state or men versus women as the core cleavages. As discussed in the in-
troduction (see footnote 4), authors have documented bias in customary dispute res-
olution along other dimensions, such as political partisanship (Baldwin, Muyengwa,
and Mvukiyehe, 2017) and religion (Murtazashvili, 2016, 77). In a field experiment
in Zimbabwe, Baldwin, Muyengwa, and Mvukiyehe (2017) show that political op-
ponents of the village head are more likely to expect fair outcomes from the village
court over which he presides when he has been trained and pressured by civil society
actors to adopt more impartial decision-making procedures.
The argument presented in this chapter suggests that this situation in Zimbabwe
might produce the opposite set of empirical outcomes to those observed in Papua
New Guinea. Suppose, for example, that state institutions also exhibit partisan
bias toward members of the incumbent party. In that case, an intervention that
reduces bias in the customary sector might increase reliance on the state, insofar
as co-partisans of the government now have a greater incentive to settle disputes in
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the relatively more biased formal sector where they are favored. Thus, in a similar
manner to the way in which reforming formal institutions in Papua New Guinea seems
here to have increased reliance on customary institutions, interventions that seek to
reform customary governance might increase reliance on state institutions, at least
among those whose interests were harmed by the reform. Wherever multiple dispute
resolution fora exist—be they state or non-state—and are seen as partisan to di↵erent
social strata, the increasing availability of one forum should increase demand for the
other.
Broader Implications
The manner in which state institutions interact with non-state institutions under ex-
panding states has been of central concern both to classical (Tilly, 1975; Skowronek,
1982; Mann, 1993) and more recent political science (Herbst, 1990; Soifer, 2008; Abra-
hamsen and Williams, 2010) and legal theory (Merry, 2017). Some authors have
argued that the state’s security apparatus crowds out non-state security services pro-
vided by local elites (Herbst, 1990; Ensminger, 1996), and others have pointed to the
adeptness with which local elites capture or collude with agents of the state in order
to reinforce the institutional dominance of alternatives to the state (Mamdani, 1996;
Scott, 2014).
A core inferential challenge in previous work, however, is the endogeneity of state
expansion to a host of strategic considerations (Boone, 2003). If state-builders ex-
pand capacity where local governance is weak, then a non-causal correlation between
expansion and non-state institutional weakness could be spuriously interpreted as
evidence of the state undermining customary institutions.
This study is able to overcome such inferential challenges because the random
recruitment lottery ensures that the variation in where police are assigned to be
present or absent is exogenous to any strategic concerns. As such, I am able to
identify the causal e↵ect of a shock to the state’s capacity to deliver a fundamental
service.
I find that institutions that appeal to antagonistic preferences in the citizenry
can foster the emergence of hybrid political arrangements. This explanation con-
trasts strongly with existing accounts of positive-sum interactions between state and
non-state institutions. Logan (2009, 116), for example, has argued that “traditional
leaders are not in competition with elected government but, in fact, the two are mu-
tually reinforcing” because rural citizens view the two modes of authority as part of
an integrated whole. She points to the fact that respondents in the Afrobarometer
survey are more likely to perceive local level government institutions as legitimate if
they also see traditional leaders as legitimate.
However, her account downplays very real di↵erences in the way that customary
and state institutions cater to di↵erent genders, which, as illustrated on Figure 1.9
above, is obvious even in Afrobarometer data. Especially in the domain of dispute
resolution, non-state institutions—informal courts, mediation by chiefs, reconciliation
rituals, trial by ordeal, mob justice—present very di↵erent tradeo↵s to disputants
when compared with their formal alternatives—police and courts. The evidence in
this study suggests it is the di↵erences, not the similarities, that produce “mutually
reinforcing” institutional hybrids.
This finding bears lessons for our understanding of state-building failures. Par-
ticularly in post-conflict contexts such as Bougainville, state-building through the
expansion of police forces into peripheral areas often fails. Scholars point to the fact
that agents of the state are often unaccountable, corrupt, and foreign to the areas in
which they work. For example, Autesserre (2014), begins her book on state-building
failure with the following illustrative anecdote:
In an attempt to reconstruct state authority in the eastern part of the [Democratic
Republic of Congo], various international peacebuilding agencies had decided to assist
the Congolese police in deploying o cers to some of the most unstable areas. [...]
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O cials at the United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York claimed that they
had successfully accomplished an essential step in their mandate to stabilize Congo.
In theory, mobilizing a greater law enforcement presence in an unstable area would
secure it, allowing for the deployment of other state representatives and eventually
contributing to the reestablishment of state authority and the return to peace.
In reality, the program made a bad situation worse. The newly deployed police were
untrained, and they had to compete for control of the area with both local militias
and remnants of rebel groups. Not only did they fail to improve the stability of the
region, but they also became one more factor of insecurity. The new o cers came
from faraway provinces and had no ethnic or family links with surrounding groups.
While this strategy was supposed to prevent corruption and collusion, it also produced
a new force with no support among local populations, no deep-rooted personal stakes
in bettering security in the area, and little knowledge of the specific local history and
customs of the villagers.
In contrast to such e↵orts, the CAP project presents significant advantages that have
led it to be heralded as a “vision of a more socially embedded approach to policing
and justice” (Dinnen and Peake, 2013, 575). Because CAP o cers police the same
communities that they are from and live in they are directly accessible to and much
more representative of their constituencies. Moreover, CAP are not armed and so in
principle cannot wield unaccountable coercive power over the community members
they police. This innovative approach to state-building through local recruitment
deserves further study as a response to low state capacity in other post-conflict con-
texts.
However, the findings highlight that even when a program such as the CAP project
is able to overcome issues of representation and accountability that bedevil state-
building in other contexts, the expansion of new powers can pose a threat to those
who benefit from the status quo. Far from passive recipients of state expansion,
those social actors respond strategically by drawing upon their sources of support
and withdrawing from the state (Scott, 2014). In the Bougainvillean context, the
fact that the program is less e↵ective in patrilocal versus matrilocal communities
suggests that variation in non-state political organization can play an oft-neglected
role in shaping state-building success and failure on the ground.
In addition to the contribution to a broader literature on state-building, this
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study’s ability to randomize permanently-assigned community police o cers to some
and not other parts of a weak state society contributes new policy insights to a
burgeoning field of experiments with police in political science (Mummolo, 2018).
Writing of the literature on community policing in 2014, Reisig and Kane made the
following criticisms:
police executives and researchers have rarely been able to utilize experimental or strong
quasi-experimental designs in their studies of community policing e↵ectiveness. Rather,
despite good intentions and significant e↵ort, most community policing evaluations
have employed case studies and similarly weak research designs. Limitations have
included lack of control groups, lack of randomization, and a tendency to measure
only short-term e↵ects. Consequently, the findings of the many community policing
studies have not had as much scientific credibility as would be desired. (2014, 161)
Reisig and Kane were speaking mainly of the literature in developed countries. For
many years the situation was much worse in developing, post-conflict contexts, where
the need for policies to improve state-citizen interactions seems most dire. As Blair,
Karim, and Morse (2018, 3) point out, existing studies in such contexts are “almost
all observational, and many rely on anecdotal evidence alone.”
This study joins a small but rapidly growing set of field experiments bringing
new insights into policing in developing states. Banerjee et al. (2012) examined how
management reforms changed the behavior of the Rajasthan police force in India,
while Sandefur and Siddiqi (2013) showed how increasing access to the formal justice
sector through legal assistance changes the distributive dynamics within villages in
Liberia. The Liberian police have collaborated with researchers on a series of inter-
ventions aimed at measuring how gender balancing and increasing foot patrols into
the periphery change attitudes towards police and the state (Karim et al., 2015; Blair
et al., 2015; Karim and Gorman, 2016; Blair, Karim, and Morse, 2018). In Latin
America, Magaloni, Franc, and Melo (2015) have conducted a series of evaluations
with the police, while Blattman et al. (2017) report the results of a hotspot policing
intervention in Colombia. While many of these studies focus on central police forces,
rather than on community policing, a series of forthcoming studies supported by the
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EGAP Metaketa initiative directly addresses the issue of community policing across
a range of contexts.
The present study contributes to this research agenda in distinct ways. While
previous studies have looked at the e↵ect of short-term, intensive applications of police
presence, this study is able to assess the e↵ect of permanently installing agents of the
state in areas that were virtually stateless until that point. As the heterogeneity of
the findings by gender illustrates, the introduction of a new pole of power in the form
of the community police represents a substantial structural shift in the local political
economy. Moreover, while others have looked at e↵ects on crime, reporting and trust
in state institutions, the interaction with particular kinds of non-state institutions—
such as gender-based inheritance or residence institutions (Lowes, 2018; Brule´ and
Gaikwad, 2018)—has largely been left out of such studies. However, the results
suggest that the nature of incumbent non-state institutions may matter a great deal
for uptake of state policing services.
Finally, from a policy perspective, the CAP programme itself represents an in-
novative extension of common community policing models. The model draws and
extends upon the basic philosophy of community policing, which can be defined as
“full service policing, where the same o cer patrols and works in the same area on
a permanent basis from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership
with citizens to identify and solve problems” (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1998,
3). This philosophy can be contrasted with centralized policing strategies, in which
o cers principally deal with issues on an incident-by-incident basis, operating from
a handful of district stations and involving themselves with communities only when
called upon to do so (Colvin and Goh, 2006). The findings suggest innovative policy
solutions to the problem of unequal access to justice may work, provided that those
at the front line are able to form meaningful alliances with disadvantaged groups.
However, even in the best of cases where disadvantaged groups cooperate with state
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police and generally report a positive experience doing so, this is not guaranteed to
bring about large reductions in crime and victimization.
1.6 Conclusion
Scholars in political science have long debated how states transform societies. In the
field of development, it was often assumed that the state will supplant any institution
that provides a similar service to its own. This study joins other recent e↵orts to un-
pack the black box of state expansion in order to examine such assumptions critically.
I show that the assumption that the state inevitably crowds out non-state institutions
neglects the strategic behavior of those with a vested interest in the maintenance of
the status quo. In Papua New Guinea, expanding state dispute resolution services
does not crowd-out the role of chiefs in resolving disputes: it reinforces their role
by increasing men’s demand for the services they provide. Gender inequality both
facilitates state expansion, by creating the demand for alternative services to those
provided by the custom among women, but ensures the maintenance, at least in the
short-run, of a hybrid institutional environment. The ability of men to retain much
of their privilege in dispute resolution by drawing on chiefs blunts the state’s ability
to deter violence. The results and theory reiterate the important lesson that devel-
opment is not a unilateral process: while states indeed shape societies by changing
opportunity structures for social actors, those same social actors also influence the
shifting limits of the state.
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Chapter 2
How access to coercive power might not induce corruption:
Evidence from randomized police recruitment
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I cannot accept that we are to judge Pope and King
unlike other men, with a favourable presumption that
they did no wrong. If there is any presumption it is
the other way, against the holders of power, increasing
as the power increases. Power tends to corrupt, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are
almost always bad men, still more when you superadd
the tendency of corruption by authority. There is no
worse heresy than that the o ce sanctifies the holder
of it.
Lord Acton (1906 [1887])
Introduction
One of the ways that states create order is by giving certain individuals—the police—
asymmetric powers to coerce other individuals. But conferral of policing power poses
a dilemma: how to create a police force that is su ciently empowered to address
crime, but not so powerful they are unaccountable?
The notion that power corrupts the holder looms large not only in political sci-
ence but also in popular debates around policing and abuse of force (Bittner, 1973).
Whether conferral of power through public o ce does, in fact, cause abusive behav-
ior, however, is a very di cult question to answer. In particular, if abusive or corrupt
types self-select into positions of power, even in the absence of corrupting e↵ects one
might erroneously infer that public o ce itself has caused a change in the behavioral
proclivities of the o ce-holder (Finan, Olken, and Pande, 2017).
This chapter reports the results of one of the first randomized controlled trials on
the e↵ect of becoming a police o cer on proclivity toward corrupt behavior. In early
2016, seventeen of forty-five eligible candidates were randomly selected for recruit-
ment into the police force in Papua New Guinea, while the remaining twenty-eight
were not. To estimate the e↵ect of becoming a police o cer on proclivity for corrupt
behavior, I design a behavioral game that the seventeen successful and twenty-eight
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unsuccessful candidates play eight months after the recruitment lottery. The be-
havioral measure belongs to a family of random allocation games that have been
validated as an empirical correlate of petty corruption (Ga¨chter and Schulz, 2016;
Hugh-Jones, 2016; Hanna and Wang, 2017), and is designed to measure both the
player’s propensity for rule-breaking and whether that rule-breaking is prosocial. To
analyze the mechanisms that I posit as moderators of the e↵ect of power conferral, I
also designed the game to randomly assign windfalls to the player or to a community
member (equal to half a day’s average income), as well as to a community-based
monitoring mechanism. In addition to the experimental sample, I ran the behavioral
games with a sample of thirty non-randomly hired o cers from a di↵erent branch
of the police, who have greater coercive powers and cannot be held to account by
their constituents to the extent that the community police can. I play two versions
of the game with each participant, so analyze a total of 150 games and seventy-five
attitudinal surveys across the experimental and observational samples.
The core finding is that citizens who become community police o cers behave
more prosocially than citizens who remain civilians. The e↵ect does not appear
driven by a reduction in cheating: consistent with meta-analyses of over seventy
studies using such allocation games, I find little evidence of cheating overall (Abeler,
Nosenzo, and Raymond, 2018). Rather, community police o cers appear to falsify
die rolls to the benefit of a randomly selected community member when they face
higher risks of being accused of cheating: i.e., when they cannot be monitored and
when they are playing a second round having already won in the first.
I interpret this evidence as consistent with the core theoretical claim, which is that
the corrupting e↵ects of conferring power can be curtailed by rendering the exercise
of that power dependent on those over whom it is exercised. Community police, to
the di↵erence of the regular police force, are not armed, and depend on support from
their community in order to coerce o↵enders. Seen in this light, playing the behavioral
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game completely honestly poses a risk: by random chance, it may look as though the
o cer is behaving corruptly. To avoid a situation in which a community member
infers they are corrupt, it is rational for the community police to misrepresent the
true allocation in a way that benefits the community member against whom they are
playing.
In support of this interpretation, I show attitudinal evidence that becoming a com-
munity police o cer makes one more concerned with one’s reputation, and less con-
vinced of one’s unilateral coercive power. I cast doubt on alternative interpretations
of the findings, according to which the prosocial e↵ect of empowerment represents a
form of inequity aversion or experimenter demand e↵ects.
Furthermore, I use the observational dataset to expand the external validity of
the findings. One concern is that, even if corrupting e↵ects of empowerment are
moderated by reputational concerns, this might simply represent a culturally-specific
response to holding high status in a collectivist society, such as Papua New Guinea.
To address such concerns, I conduct the same behavioral games with thirty (non-
randomly hired) regular police o cers. While the thirty regular police o cers come
from the same culture as the seventeen community police o cers and twenty-eight
civilians in the experimental sample, they are not dependent on their community
members to coerce other civilians. The regular police have guns, handcu↵s, and
vehicles. I find no evidence of prosociality in their response to randomly assigned
windfalls. If anything, regular police o cers exhibit exactly the sort of “corrupt”
behavior documented among police in other developing contexts. The di↵erences
in behavior between the regular police o cers, the community police o cers, and
the civilians in the study suggest that power only corrupts when too much of it is
conferred. The community police exercise su cient power to intervene in and redirect
the course of ordinary disputes, but cannot do so unilaterally, and so behave in a non-
corrupt way toward their fellow citizens.
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The first section of the chapter presents the theory, and in particular spends some
time overcoming a conceptual problem, which is to define corrupt behavior indepen-
dently from the possession of public o ce. It discusses predictions about the direct
and moderating e↵ects of conferring the state’s policing powers on individuals, draw-
ing on literature in political science, behavioral economics, and social psychology. The
second section describes the research design, including the context, the recruitment
lottery, and the measurement and estimation strategies. The third section illustrates
the main finding. The fourth interprets the main findings through the lens of rep-
utational e↵ects. It presents evidence in favor of this mechanism and against other
mechanisms. The fifth section discusses and concludes.
2.1 Theory
Does the state corrupt an individual when it confers upon her or him its coercive
powers? Any investigation into the corrupting e↵ects of power quickly meets with
a conceptual challenge, which is to formulate a definition of corruption that can be
applied to the behavioral proclivities of both those who do and those who do not
occupy a position of public o ce. Suppose, for example, that one were to define
propensity to engage in corrupt behavior as the willingness to take bribes. In this
case, public o ce would always appear to exert a ‘corrupting’ influence because it
is not possible for those who do not hold o ce to take bribes. As many common
definitions of corruption include possession of public o ce among their definitional
criteria (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), some care must be taken
here to derive an adequate definition of corrupt behavior that is independent of tenure
in public o ce.
I focus on two dimensions that together constitute necessary and su cient condi-
tions to define behavior as “corrupt.”
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The first dimension is compliance with rules. Rule-breaking through non-compliance
comports well with common sense understandings of behaving “corruptly” both in
and out of o ce: cheating on a test by bringing in study notes and taking bribes are
both corrupt in the sense that they constitute behavior that is expressly prohibited
by the rules. If, on the other hand, the exam were open-book or tipping bureaucrats
were legal, then neither act would be considered “corrupt.” In this sense, it is neces-
sary for a behavior to be considered against the rules in order for it to be considered
corrupt.
However, non-compliance is not a su cient condition for a behavior to be consid-
ered corrupt. For example, police will frequently turn a blind eye to minor incidents
of rule-breaking, such as jaywalking. Such forbearance is seldom considered corrupt,
whereas many would consider it corrupt for the police to turn a blind eye to major
crimes such as drug tra cking or murder.
The second dimension I use to define behavior’s “corruptness” is thus the degree
of pro- or anti-sociality of the behavior (Gino and Pierce, 2009). To continue the
jaywalking example, no one is harmed, and someone is benefited by the police choosing
not to comply with the rules by letting the jaywalker go free. However, it would be
considered corrupt for the police to let drug dealers operate with impunity because
this generates private gain while causing harm to others.
Again, this dimension constitutes a necessary but not a su cient condition for
behavior to be considered corrupt. In discharging his or her duties, a police o cer
will often inflict harm on some people and benefit others: for example, by arresting
a suspect in order to protect a victim. As long as this behavior is entirely compliant
with the institutional rules governing it, however (e.g., the o cer does not exact
vengeance for the victim by illegally beating the suspect), it would not be considered
corruption. Rather, this behavior constitutes impartial compliance.
Corrupt behavior is here defined as rule-breaking to benefit oneself at significant
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cost to another. The definition is represented on Table 2.1. The rows indicate whether
the behavior in question benefits or harms the other. The columns indicate whether
the behavior is in compliance with institutional rules. Strict adherence to the rules will
sometimes benefit and sometimes harm the other: in both cases, the rules are simply
applied in a way that is impartial to their consequences. Whether rule-breaking
constitutes corruption depends on its e↵ects on the other. When rules are broken
to the benefit of the other we have a situation of ‘prosocial non-compliance,’ which
is defined as non-corrupt herein. This definition informs the measurement strategy
detailed below: I measure both the extent to which individuals are willing to break
rules and the extent to which those rule violations benefit them at the expense of
others.







Table 2.1: Rule-breaking and prosociality as two dimensions that define a behavior
as “corrupt” or not. Corrupt behavior is defined as rule-breaking that benefits ego
at the expense of the other.
Having defined the kind of behavior we are interested in explaining, it is helpful
to clarify what is meant by conferral of power through public o ce. In this chapter
I adopt the classical definition of power as a form of “asymmetric interdependence:”
the unequal ability of an actor to influence another actor.1 Dahl (1957, 202) used the
following formulation to summarize this understanding of power: “A has power over
B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”
By conferring public o ce to individuals, the state often gives those individuals
new powers over others. The specific type and amount of power vary with the o ce.
Low-level bureaucrats are often provided discretion over the distribution of some
1As Guinote (2017) points out, we can distinguish between this understanding of power and the
“control over outcomes” (Emerson, 1962; Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson, 2003) and “sociofunc-
tional” (Maner and Case, 2016; Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser, 2008) accounts.
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good or service: they hold power over others insofar as they can selectively provide
or withhold goods and services in order to gain compliance from others (Banerjee,
1997). This distributive power is much greater for o cials who are elected to serve
in a parliament, who might have discretion over how vast amounts of resources are
employed (Ting, 2012).
Individuals given public o ce as a member of the armed forces of the state—
the police and the military—represent a special case insofar as they are given an
asymmetrical ability to use physical force against others in order to gain compliance
(Bittner, 1973). Police o cers hold special, non-negotiable privileges to detain and
fine civilians, seize their property, and investigate their private a↵airs.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that state powers are not obtained in a
vacuum. Rather, insofar as they are conferred through the attainment of public o ce,
they are always accompanied by the other rights, duties, and benefits associated with
o ce. When considering whether power corrupts when it is conferred through public
o ce, we must consider components of public o ce that moderate empowerment.
Power Conferral: Direct and Moderating E↵ects
I develop predictions about how becoming a police o cer a↵ects one’s proclivity for
corrupt behavior by considering the literature on both the direct e↵ects of power
conferral (Empowerment e↵ects) and the moderating e↵ects that arise from the insti-
tutions within which that power is exercised. I focus here on the moderating influence
of increasing concern about the beliefs others hold about ego (Reputation e↵ects), and
of increasing material inequality between ego and other (Inequity e↵ects).
Empowerment e↵ects. The behavioral evidence for the “corrupting” e↵ects of
power stems largely from psychology studies documenting anti-social behavior among
empowered individuals in lab settings. Zimbardo (1971) and Kipnis (1972), for ex-
ample, found that conferring punitive power on study participants in a simulated
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institutional environment led them to view subordinates as objects of manipulation.
The hypothesis to arise from such studies is that individuals readily exploit the op-
portunity to manipulate others when provided with it, and in order to manipulate
others e↵ectively it is necessary to objectify them. Hence, placing individuals in a po-
sition where they are able to asymmetrically manipulate others fosters an anti-social
orientation in their behavior. Guinote et al. (2015) suggest that such behavioral
tendencies may emerge early in human development: they find that conferring high
social status on children aged four to five reduced prosocial behavior and the expres-
sion of egalitarian life goals. In one of the few studies to analyze how power a↵ects
proclivity for rule-breaking, Swanner and Beike (2015) find that study participants
are more likely to lie for self-benefit when they are put into a high power position at
random.
Much of the behavioral psychology literature on empowerment, however, finds
that the e↵ects of power conferral are moderated by the context within which power
is conferred: in some cases, power conferral can lead to the adoption of prosocial
behavior (Guinote, 2017).2
Reputation e↵ects. Several theories of government predict that the corrupting
influences of o ce can be curtailed by making o ce-holders accountable to their
constituents (Ferejohn, 1986; Myerson, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Przeworski et al.,
2000; Adsera, Boix, and Payne, 2003; Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi, 2003). At
the micro level, there is evidence to suggest that conferral of power can result in
prosocial behavior when there exists some relationship of interdependency between
the power-holder and the other (Torelli and Shavitt, 2010; De Cremer, Hoogervorst,
and Desmet, 2012; Ratcli↵ and Vescio, 2013; Sassenberg et al., 2014). Such situations
2In lab settings, positive relationships between prosocial behavior and empowerment are doc-
umented in DeCelles et al. (2012), Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh (2001), Coˆte´ et al. (2011), and
Anderson, John, and Keltner (2012). These studies stipulate complex pathways through which
empowerment interacts with certain psychological predispositions.
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may arise because the power-holder’s own payo↵s or ability to achieve goals are
dependent on their reputation with the other. Because the power-holder’s future
success in o ce is dependent on the inferences that others draw about her type, it is
useful to act prosocially. Elections are one example of a mechanism associated with
o ce that might induce power-holders to signal their type through good behavior
(Fearon, 1999), and there are also non-electoral examples of such mechanisms. In
an evolutionary model, Due´n˜ez-Guzma´n, Sadedin, and Szolnoki (2012) show that
conferring very small reputational benefits to empowered actors who act prosocially
can induce altruistic behavior. Similarly, Gregory (1982) describes how in Papua New
Guinea traditional leaders gain and maintain power through a reputation of being a
bikman: a generous feast-giver. Henrich et al. (2005) demonstrate that people make
larger o↵ers in the ultimatum game when they live in societies that depend heavily
on cooperation, as, for example, in whaling communities in Indonesia.
In addition to increasing prosocial proclivities, heightened reputational concerns
due to power conferral might also induce willingness to break rules. Van Kleef et al.
(2012), for example, find that rule-breaking to benefit others results in the rule-
breaker being conferred more power by individuals in a group, suggesting a possible
positive feedback between prosocial non-compliance, reputation, and power. In a
similar vein, Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond (2018) provide a theoretical rational-
ization for the observation that individuals will often “cheat downwards” in random
allocation games. In their theory, if individuals strongly value their reputation for not
being a self-interested person (say, because it is socially useful to have this reputa-
tion), individuals will cheat against themselves in random allocation games. I return
to this very useful theoretical insight in the section on mechanisms.
Inequity e↵ects. The literature on “returns to o ce” suggests conferral of o ce
often results in direct and indirect material windfalls for those who gain it. Using the
regression discontinuity design to estimate the e↵ect of just winning versus just losing
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an election on candidates, for example, researchers have estimated positive returns to
o ce for firms or individuals in India (Fisman, Schulz, and Vig, 2014; Lehne, Shapiro,
and Eynde, 2018), the Philippines (Querubin, 2016), Denmark (Amore and Benned-
sen, 2013), Sweden (Folke, Persson, and Rickne, 2017), and the United Kingdom
(Hainmueller and Eggers, 2014). How might windfalls from o ce moderate any cor-
rupting e↵ects of power? One possibility implied by the insights of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) is that, especially in places with a strong norm against inequality, windfalls
may increase the prosociality of o ce-holders by increasing inequality. Moreover,
there is some lab evidence that inequity e↵ects might drive both rule-breaking and
prosociality. In a pair of random allocation games, for example, Gino and Pierce
(2009, 1159) find that “individuals increase hurting behavior and reduce helping be-
havior when they experience negative inequity (i.e., when they are worse o↵ than the
referent other), and they increase dishonest helping when they experience positive
inequity (i.e., when they are better o↵ than the referent other).”
Summarizing the discussion above, empowerment has been shown in lab settings
to produce a corrupting e↵ect on behavior. However, such e↵ects are likely to be
moderated by contextual factors associated with conferral of o ce: reputation and
inequity e↵ects may temper or even reverse the corrupting e↵ects of o ce.
2.2 Research Design
I employ a behavioral game designed to capture the degree to which the player breaks
its rules in either a pro- or an anti-social direction (in line with Table 2.1). The game
is a variant of other random allocation mechanisms that have been validated as an
empirical correlate of actual corruption. I estimate the e↵ect of power conferral on
proclivity for corruption by comparing how three di↵erent populations play the game:
twenty-eight people randomly assigned to not become community police o cers; sev-
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enteen people randomly assigned to become community police o cers; and thirty
people who non-randomly self-selected into the position of regular police o cer. Each
person plays two versions of the game, giving 150 games to analyze. A key feature
of the game is that it randomly assigns sizable windfalls to the player or a randomly
selected community member according to a probability chosen by the player. In this
section, I describe the context, random recruitment procedure for community police,
and the behavioral game.
Context
The study takes place in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New
Guinea. Bougainville is located in the Solomon Islands archipelago in the South
Pacific ocean and comprises two main islands—Bougainville Island and Buka Island—
as well as a series of smaller islands and atolls. The roughly 250,000 people living in
Bougainville as of 2016 are concentrated mainly along the coasts in the North and
Central regions of the country, although villages are dotted throughout the south and
interior of the two islands.
Bougainville has two police forces: the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) and
the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP). The BPS are an arm of the Royal Papua
New Guinea Constabulary, often referred to as “the regulars” in order to contrast
them with the community police. Although many BPS are now from Bougainville,
for a long time the regulars were recruited from areas outside of Bougainville upon
completing their training program.
As in any police force, the civic-mindedness of o cers in the BPS varies from one
individual to another. While many o cers work extremely hard to serve their com-
munities, the BPS leadership complains of absenteeism and abuse of police resources
(such as vehicles). Bougainvilleans who have had dealings with the BPS complain
that they are corrupt: o cers demand money, cellphone credit, and food in exchange
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for their services.3 Most BPS live in the urbanized towns in housing provided by the
government. In relative terms, they receive a good salary. They are heavily armed,
with authority to use pistols, batons, rifles, and pepper spray in the course of their
duties.
By contrast, the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) are unarmed, non-commissioned
o cers who work in much closer proximity to their communities. While they lack
arms, CAP wear a uniform very similar to the BPS and are authorized by the Po-
lice Act of 1988 to use the full powers of the police for o↵enses whose punishment
comprises a prison term of no more than 12 months. They also hold the power of de-
tention and referral to the central police for all other o↵enses. In addition to enforcing
the law through arrest and investigation, the CAP can levy fines in civil cases. Not
all villages have community police working in them: just over 350 CAP are stationed
throughout Bougainville’s roughly 2,000 villages.
Though the CAP are not armed there is evidence that they wield substantial
power in the villages where they work. Analyzing monthly reports by CAP during
the period spanning 2005 - 2009, one comes across many incidents in which the CAP
intervene and redirect the course of an altercation between villagers. For example:
“[Female complainant] reported that her grassknife [machete] was stolen by [male of-
fender] when she left it against the classroom wall after cutting grass at the [village]
Primary School. An eye witness saw the incident and told the owner of the grassknife.
[Community police o cer] brought the complainant with him and they approached
the suspect’s house. The grassknife was identified by [complainant] and she said it
belonged to her and she took the grassknife back to her house.” - 2006;
“Two suspects namely [male] and [male] did break and entered into [male complainant]’s
store and stole some items belonging to [him]. [Community police o cer] apprehended
the suspects and took back the stolen items from them.” - 2008;
“I witnessed the stealing of bananas by three (3) men. [Community police o cer]
arrest made. Parties concerned agreed to reconcile and matter was solved.” - 2005.
Moreover, there are many instances in which CAP levy fines or even destroy property
3 In a separate survey, 40% of respondents stated that they expected the would ask them for
money or fuel in exchange for coming to their village in the case of a serious incident of violent
assault with a weapon.
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of those in the village, for example:
“CAP member spot fine the suspect [name redacted] the sum of K15.00 towards victim
[name redacted] of the same village. The K15.00 was for medical grounds after the
bicycle dragged the victim causing GBH on the main road.”
“I CAP [ID redacted] collected the gas cylinder at the o↵enders house at [village
redacted] because the community are not happy and they want manufacturing of home-
brew mus stop. [sic]”
These cases illustrate that, despite not being armed, the CAP are able to wield
coercive and distributive power over others in the village. According to interviews
with CAP, they see their main source of authority as the uniform they wear when
on duty. Indeed, many CAP state that they would be unable to make arrests were
they not wearing the uniform, because it helps to convince other members of the
community to assist in the apprehension of more serious violent o↵enders.
Recruitment of Community Police via Random Lottery
The thirty BPS that participated in this study were hired non-randomly. By contrast,
the seventeen CAP were selected at random from a pool of forty-five candidates.
Thus, by comparing the behavior of the seventeen CAP and twenty-eight people
randomly assigned to remain civilians, we can estimate the causal e↵ect of becoming
a police o cer on proclivity for corruption.
The usual procedure for recruiting CAP works in a two-step selection process
designed to produce a police force whose members have both the blessing of local
authorities and the educational standing deemed necessary by the Royal Papua New
Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC).4
In 2015 the Bougainville Police Service expanded the serving CAP force by re-
cruiting an additional thirty-five community police o cers. They received over four
hundred applicants for the positions. The applicants were put through an intensive
4See footnote 39.
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interview and literacy testing process, and areas thought in severe need of police had
o cers hired there.
After this preliminary vetting and selection process, there remained forty-five
candidates for seventeen unfilled positions. The police were indi↵erent among these
candidates, all of whom were deemed equally qualified for the community police
o cer role. I worked with the police to hire these candidates through a randomized
recruitment lottery. The successful and unsuccessful candidates were not present at
the lottery and were never informed that this method of selection was employed.
The design of the lottery is depicted in Figure 2.1. The candidates came from
fifteen di↵erent administrative units called constituencies. For example, the first two
candidates in the top left corner of Figure 2.1 came from constituency 1, while the
next four to the right all came from constituency 2. Recall that community police
o cers work in the villages from which they originate. Thus, to ensure territorial
equity, the police deemed that one to two o cers be hired in each constituency.
The recruits allotted to each constituency were selected through a constituency-
level lottery. Constituencies thus comprise experimental blocks.5
As Figure 2.1 illustrates graphically, the random procedure generates di↵erential
assignment probabilities by block.6 As I describe in more detail below, these hetero-
geneous assignment probabilities can generate bias in naive estimators if potential
outcomes are correlated with block membership. I employ estimators that weight
each unit’s contribution to the likelihood by 1Pr(Zi=z) in order to obtain unbiased esti-
5 In block 1, for example, one of the two candidates was hired. In block 2, two of the four
candidates were hired. In block 9, one of the four candidates was hired, and so forth. For each
block lottery, each candidate was assigned a number. The numbers were placed into a hat. Then, as
many numbers as recruits allotted to that constituency were drawn at random from the hat, without
replacement. The draw was only done once, and the name of the candidate to which the number
corresponded was recorded. These candidates were subsequently recruited into the CAP.
6Let Zi denote the assignment variable where Zi = 1 when a candidate is selected for recruitment
(black circle) and Zi = 0 when a candidate is not selected (white circle). Let z denote the possible
values of Zi, with z 2 {0, 1}. The probability that Zi = 1 in block 1 is .5, as is the probability that
Zi = 0. The same is true for blocks 2, 3, 4, 6, 13 and 15. Note, however, that the circles are very
di↵erent sizes in block 9: here Pr(Zi = 1) =
1
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Figure 2.1: Seventeen candidates were selected from a pool of forty-five via a series
of block-level lotteries.
Each circle represents one candidate, organized by block. Empty circles indicate the candidate was
not selected for recruitment into the community police, and filled circles indicate the candidate
was selected. The size of the circle corresponds to the inverse of the probability of observing that
candidate in the assigned condition. For example, in Block lottery 01, one out of two candidates
was chosen: the circles are the same size because the probability of observing either in control or
treatment is 1/2. In Block lottery 09, by contrast, only one of five candidates was selected. The
selected candidate thus had a probability of 1/5 of being in the in the observed condition, while the
non-selected candidates each had a probability of 4/5 of being in the observed condition.
Not all candidates who were selected for recruitment were eventually hired, and
some candidates who were not selected ended up being hired by the police follow-
ing randomization.7 In total, five of the fifteen COE blocks are a↵ected by non-
compliance. In all analyses, I report the intent-to-treat (ITT) e↵ect estimated using




The participants in this study play two versions of a random allocation game against
an opponent who is selected at random from the community.8 Figure B.1 in the
appendix presents a photographic example of what the game looked like in the field.
The two versions of the game are as follows:
• No monitoring: the enumerator instructs the player to roll a die sixteen times
inside a cup that hides the die from view. The player is instructed to simply
report the true number on the die following each roll, ensuring that no one else
sees the die. When the player calls a 1, a 3 or a 5, the community member
places a red token into a bowl situated between the player and the community
member. When the player calls a 2, a 4 or a 6, the player places a blue token
into the bowl. When the sixteen rolls are finished, such that the bowl contains
a mix of red and blue tokens determined by the player’s calls, the enumerator
shu✏es the bowl and blindly selects one token. If it is a blue token, the player
wins a packet of soaps. If it is a red token, the community member wins the
prize.
• Monitoring: the game is played exactly as above, with one di↵erence. As in
the other version, the player rolls the die hidden from view and reports the
outcome to the enumerator. The player or the community member place a
token into the bowl accordingly. Before rolling again, however, the enumerator
rolls two dice and shows the outcome to the player and community member. If
either of the dice is a 6,9 the player must reveal the true number they rolled.
There is no penalty for lying: if the player calls an even but the roll is revealed
8Due to logistical constraints on locating and interviewing the specific candidates in the recruit-
ment lottery, in a handful of cases we were unable to interview the candidate in their own community.
In those cases, we selected an opponent to play against by inviting someone from the surrounding
community to come and play the game.
9For two fair dice, the probability of rolling at least one 6 is equal to 1  5/6⇥ 5/6 = .31.
91
through the monitoring mechanism to be an odd, for example, the player’s
token remains in the bowl. The winner is determined as above.
At 5 PGK (⇡ 1.65 USD in 2016), the value of the prize from a single game is
equivalent to roughly half of the daily wages in Bougainville (Chand, 2013). Thus,
winning two prizes is roughly equivalent to winning a day’s worth of income. For
CAP, the monetary value of one prize is almost equivalent the daily value of their
monthly allowance of 200 PGK (⇡ 66 USD in 2016).
Every participant plays both versions of the game consecutively but in a randomly
determined order.10 The logic behind the game is that it provides a measure both of
candidates’ inclination towards non-compliance and prosociality.
Suppose, for example, that a player called evens half of the time. In this case, the
outcome is consistent with impartial compliance, in which the player simply reports
the die rolls truthfully. Suppose, on the other hand, that the player called evens
three-quarters of the time. This would be consistent with anti-social non-compliance:
non-compliant because the reports are relatively unexpected given truthfully-reported
fair rolls (suggesting dishonest reporting), and anti-social because the non-compliance
increases the player’s (expected) payo↵ at the expense of the opponent’s (expected)
payo↵.
Finally, a player might call evens only one-quarter of the time. This would be
consistent with prosocial non-compliance: disobeying rules in order to increase the
payo↵ to the other. Importantly, we can only verify the true behavior of the player
in the expected 16⇥ .31 ⇡ 5 times that he or she is monitored. The rest of the time
it is left to others to infer whether cheating has or has not occurred. Thus, a player
who feels she is suspected of cheating (say, because she rolled four consecutive evens
simply by chance), might dishonestly call a few odd numbers to level the field.




An important feature of such random allocation games is that they demonstrate
good external validity as a measure of corruption. Hanna and Wang (2017), for
example, show that the number of payo↵-maximizing die rolls is correlated with
preference for rent-generating public employment positions among students and with
absenteeism among nurses in India. Similarly, in a cross-national comparison of
random allocation games, Ga¨chter and Schulz (2016) demonstrate that cheating in
random allocation games is strongly correlated (⇢ = .73) with common cross-national
measures of corruption, and Hugh-Jones (2016) demonstrates a correlation between
cheating in a random allocation game and GDP in fifteen countries. Lowes et al.
(2017) find that survey participants in the Congo cheat more in a random allocation
game in areas that have traditionally featured centralized political institutions. See
Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond (2018) for a review of such games.
Windfall and Monitoring Estimands
In addition to providing a measure of prosociality and compliance, the game is set
up to allow for the unbiased estimation of two estimands that are informative about
mechanisms: the e↵ect of possible community monitoring and the e↵ect of windfalls
on proclivity for corrupt behavior. Figure 2.2 displays the game data from one player.
The x axis keeps track of the sixteen rolls in each round, and the y axis tracks the
die number called by the player. The player was assigned to play the “Monitoring”
game first, and the “No monitoring” game second, which is why three of the rolls on
the left panel are highlighted as observed. Note that in the first observed roll the
player called 6, but in fact had rolled a di↵erent number. When observed again at
rolls thirteen and sixteen, however, the player had truthfully reported a 6 and a 3.
Despite some evidence of cheating, the player won neither the first nor the second
game.
93
Round 1: Opponent won Round 2: Opponent won




















Not Called Called Told truth Lied
Figure 2.2: Example of the data for one player assigned to play monitored game first
and non-monitored game second.
Because the order in which the “No monitoring” and “Monitoring” versions are
played is random, we can estimate how the possibility of monitoring a↵ects behavior
independently from round e↵ects (a change in behavior from the first round to the
second). Moreover, the roll within which a player is actually monitored is randomized,
enabling identification of the e↵ect of actual versus potential monitoring on subse-
quent behavior. Section B.3.3 of the appendix presents time-series cross-sectional
analyses at the roll-level.
Finally, whether or not the player actually wins the first and second game is
randomly assigned: at the end of each game a ra✏e determines the winner. In other
words, the second round is played after a significant windfall was or was not randomly
assigned to the player at the expense of the other. This enables identification of how
behavior in the second round changes as a function of winning in the first round.
In order to estimate the e↵ect of winning the first round on behavior in the
second, we must account for the fact that the probability of winning is self-selected.
For example, if becoming a police o cer leads to anti-social non-compliant behavior
(calling evens when one receives odds), the most corrupt police o cers will also be
the most likely to win in the first round. Even if there is no e↵ect of winning the
first round on behavior, a naive estimator may estimate a corrupting e↵ect due to
selection of corrupt types into the winning pool.
Since the probability of winning is known, however, we can recover sequential
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ignorability through inverse probability weighting. Similar to post-stratification in
sampling, the inverse-probability weighted estimator up-weights groups that are “un-
derrepresented” in the likelihood (here, non-corrupt players who win and corrupt
players who lose) and down-weights “overrepresented” groups (corrupt players who
win and non-corrupt players who lose).
Estimation Strategy
Point estimates of intent-to-treat (ITT) e↵ects in all tables are calculated using the
pre-registered inverse-probability weighted least squares estimator, with fixed e↵ects
for blocks and probability of being in assigned condition as (inverse) weight. The
main model can be written:
yij =  j + ⌧Zi +Xi  + ✏ij, (2.1)
where yij is the outcome for the i’th respondent,  j is a block fixed e↵ect, ⌧ is the
intent-to-treat e↵ect, Zi is an indicator for treatment assignment, Xi is a vector of
individual-level covariates,   a vector of covariate e↵ects, and ✏ij an error term.
Consistent with the pre-analysis plan, the pre-registered upper-, lower- or two-
tailed p-values are calculated for all outcomes by computing 2000 draws from the
sampling distribution of the estimator under the sharp null of no (positive, negative
or absolute) e↵ect for all units using randomization inference.
2.3 Main Results
I restrict attention in the main results to the forty-five civilians in the recruitment
lottery, before considering observational quantities as part of the discussion of mecha-
nisms in the next section. The overarching picture to emerge from the main results is
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that power does not corrupt: to the contrary, community police recruits appear less
prone to lying for their own self-interest than civilians. This e↵ect does not appear
driven by a reduction in cheating, however. Consistent with many other random allo-
cation studies (Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond, 2018; Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg,
2018), I find generally quite low levels of cheating overall.
Rather, the apparent prosocial e↵ect of being hired as a police o cer seems driven
by “downwards cheating.” When community police recruits win a prize equivalent to
half a day’s wages at the expense of their opponent in the first round, they appear
to falsify calls in the second round in order to maximize the likelihood that their
opponent wins, rolling as few as 42% evens on average.
Being hired as community police induces more prosocial
behavior
Table 2.2 presents the main results of the experiment. “Police recruit” indicates that
the participant was randomly assigned to become a community police o cer, and
“Control” indicates that the participant was randomly assigned to remain a civilian.
Column 1 reports the e↵ect of recruitment into the police in all games. Columns
2-3 present the treatment e↵ect on behavior in the monitoring and no monitoring
versions of the game, respectively. The final two columns report the e↵ect of the
treatment on evens called in the second round when the player did or did not receive
a randomly-assigned windfall in the first round.
Turning first to the (inverse-probability weighted) control means, we see that
civilians consistently call roughly eight or more evens, which is just at or above the
number expected under the null of impartial compliance for sixteen calls per game.
Police recruits, by contrast, call a number of evens that is consistently lower than
what we would expect if they reported die rolls honestly. Averaging over both games,
police recruits report .74 fewer evens compared to civilians. Relative to the average
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in the control, this represents a roughly 9% decrease in the number of evens called.
Using randomization inference to construct p-values, the probability of observing such
an e↵ect under the null hypothesis of no e↵ect for all units is roughly .12.
Number of Evens Called in Round
All games No Monitoring Monitoring No Windfall Windfall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Police Recruit  0.736  1.143  0.330  0.039  1.843⇤⇤
(0.369) (0.623) (0.482) (0.675) (0.767)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 8.2 8.5 8 8.1 8.1
RI p-value 0.12 0.13 0.56 0.83 0.03
Observations 90 45 45 25 20
Adjusted R2 0.011  0.143  0.005  0.043 0.201
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 2.2: Being hired as a community police o cer appears to induce prosocial
behavior, especially following windfalls that benefit the o cer at the expense of a
community member.
The dependent variable is the total number of evens that players claim to have rolled over sixteen
rolls of the die for a given round of the random allocation game. Each observation is at the level of
the player-round, giving 45⇥2 observations. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the player.
Observations are weighted by the inverse of the probability of their assigned treatment condition.
All specifications include block fixed e↵ects. p-values reflect the probability of observing an e↵ect
at least as large as the estimated e↵ect if the sharp null hypothesis of no e↵ect for all units is true.
This probability is calculated by taking the proportion of 2000 simulated estimates that are at least
as large in absolute value as the absolute value of the observed estimate, generated by re-permuting
the treatment assignment and calculating the test statistic each time.
Recall that the players were assigned in random order to play a version of the
game in which the possibility of being monitored by the community member exists,
and one in which this possibility does not exist. The e↵ect of becoming a police
o cer on the number of evens rolled is over three times more negative when the
player cannot be monitored compared to when monitoring exists. This is consistent
with the idea that the principal risk the game poses for police o cers is that they
may be falsely accused of cheating. In the monitoring version of the game, police
were caught misrepresenting die rolls three times. Of these three, two times involved
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misrepresenting to benefit the community member. By contrast, civilians in the control
group were caught misrepresenting five times: four of these were to their own benefit.
The final two columns report treatment e↵ects on behavior in the second round
of play. Recall that whether the player wins the first round is randomly assigned
with a known probability corresponding to the proportion of tokens they put into the
cup. Because this probability may be correlated with potential outcomes, I inversely
weight observations by the joint probability of the actual winning and recruitment
status of the player.
The analysis of windfall e↵ects reveals that the e↵ect of being a police o cer on
prosociality in the second round is much stronger among players who won the first
round. Relative to the civilian control group, police recruits call 22% fewer evens in
the second round when they have already won a windfall in the first round. We can
reject at the ↵ = .05 confidence level the sharp null hypothesis of no e↵ect for all
units.
Table 2.3 breaks this result down further, reporting the inverse-probability weighted
averages of the number of evens called in the second round, as well as the conditional
di↵erences-in-means arising from an inverse-probability weighted least squares regres-
sion (see Table B.4 in the appendix for the regression models). The rows indicate
whether the player was selected for recruitment, and the columns whether he or she
won the first round. In expectation, impartially compliant players should call eight
evens across the sixteen rolls in the second round.
The analysis shows that much of the main prosocial e↵ect is driven by the way
in which police o cers respond to windfalls. Players who did not win the first round
behave in a manner entirely consistent with impartial compliance: they call exactly
50% evens on average.
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Windfall in First Round?
No Yes Di↵erence
8.07 8.59 +0.52
No (7.1,9.0) (7.7,8.8) p = .51
Police recruit? N = 12 N = 16
8.03 6.75  1.28⇤⇤
Yes (7.3,8.8) (5.3,8.2) p = .04
N = 13 N = 4
Di↵erence  0.04  1.84⇤⇤  1.80
p = .95 p = .03 p = .10
Table 2.3: Community police o cers appear to cheat against themselves to avoid
winning the second round when they win the first round. Civilians exhibit no such
behavior.
Cells show inverse-probability weighted averages of the number of evens called in the second round,
as well as the conditional di↵erences-in-means arising from an inverse-probability weighted least
squares regression (see Table B.4 in the appendix for the regression models).
Play diverges in response to windfalls: civilians who win the first round call slightly
higher numbers of evens, whereas community police o cers call many fewer evens
than expected given the underlying distribution of die rolls. Those o cers appear to
“give away” the second prize to their opponent, rather than risk accumulating all of
the prizes.
Are these windfall e↵ects for police and civilians statistically distinguishable? The
bottom-right corner of the second panel on Figure 2.3 reports the di↵erence in e↵ects.
With a p-value of .101, this e↵ect falls just short of statistical significance at conven-
tional levels. As Table B.4 in the appendix illustrates, players were significantly more
likely to call evens in the second round when they were no longer being monitored.
This e↵ect is consistent with the idea that candidates assigned to play the monitoring
game first learn how the game works in the first round and cheat more when they
realize they cannot be caught redhanded in the second. Accounting for this source
of variation in behavior increases the adjusted R2 considerably and reduces the esti-
mated variance of the coe cients. We see evidence in this model that the negative
e↵ect of winning is statistically significantly larger in magnitude for police recruits
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than for civilians. As evidenced on Table B.3 in the appendix, this e↵ect is robust to
the inclusion of covariates that exhibit statistically significant imbalance.
2.4 Alternative Mechanisms
Being hired as a community police o cer appears to induce more prosocial non-
compliance in the random allocation game designed to measure proclivity for corrup-
tion. Tellingly, prosocial e↵ects of becoming a police o cer are strongest when there
is a higher risk of being falsely accused of lying: i.e., when players are not monitored
and when they have won in the first game. In this section, I argue that these e↵ects
should be interpreted as a strategic attempt by community police o cers to signal
their “type” to the community member. In other words, becoming a community
police o cer does not make one more altruistic. Rather, it makes one value one’s
reputation more highly. When random variations in the game heighten the risk that
the community member infers the police o cer is corrupt, police o cers seek to signal
their fairness and generosity by playing against themselves.
Reputation E↵ects
In the theory section above, I outlined a logic whereby power-holders may take actions
to benefit others not because they have altruistic preferences, but because they rely
on others to achieve their goals, and others will not assist them in achieving those
goals if the power-holder has a bad reputation.
If becoming a community police o cer causes one to care about one’s reputation,
then formalizations of random allocation games suggest this may lead to “downwards
cheating” (Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond, 2018; Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg, 2018;
Gneezy, Kajackaite, and Sobel, 2018). The basic setup involves a decision-maker (in
this case, the police o cer), and an audience (in this case, the community member).
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The audience draws inferences about whether the decision-maker is a corrupt type
based on the die rolls the decision-maker calls, given their knowledge of the true
underlying distribution. Decision-makers benefit from allocating more of the good to
themselves but incur a cost that is increasing with the likelihood that the audience
infers they are corrupt, as well as a direct, intrinsic cost to dishonesty. If the decision-
maker places a high value on signaling to the audience that she is not corrupt, relative
to the direct payo↵s from winning and the costs of dishonesty, she has an incentive
to falsify even the true rolls that benefit her.
Especially problematic for individuals with such preferences are any signals that
are unlikely to be sent by a non-corrupt player: for example, calling a string of evens,
or perhaps, winning a first round of the game. Such signals might sharply increase
the likelihood that the audience erroneously infers the decision-maker is corrupt, and
thus require compensatory behavior such as downwards cheating.
Thus, one interpretation of the findings is that becoming a police o cer makes
one’s reputation much more important. Table 2.4 presents evidence in support of
the notion that recruitment causes an increase in the value candidates place on their
reputation. The outcome reported in the first column asks people in the experimental
sample the following question:
For some people, being respected by others in their community is very important, and
they care a lot about what others think of them. Other people don’t care so much
about what others think, they do what they think is right without concern for the
judgment of others. What about you: how much do you care about what others think
of you?
Responses are coded on a four step scale ranging from 0 for “not at all” to 1 for “very
important.” With a control mean of .72, most civilians care considerably about
others’ opinion of them. Becoming a police o cer increases this concern by 18% in
relative terms (p < .1).
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Dependent variable:
Reputation Recognition Unilateral Coercion Relative Impunity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Police Recruit 0.137⇤ 0.100⇤  0.307 0.132
(0.068) (0.050) (0.080) (0.090)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 45 45 45 45
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 2.4: Becoming a community police o cer makes one more sensitive to reputa-
tional concerns and less convinced of unilateral coercive power.
Each observation is at the level of the candidate. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the
probability of their assigned treatment condition. All specifications include block fixed e↵ects. p-
values reflect the probability of observing an e↵ect at least as large as the estimated e↵ect if the
sharp null hypothesis of no e↵ect for all units is true. This probability is calculated by taking the
proportion of 2000 simulated estimates that are at least as large in absolute value as the absolute
value of the observed estimate, generated by re-permuting the treatment assignment and estimating
the test statistic each time.
The second column assesses recruitment e↵ects on the probability that candidates
agree with the following statement: “I do not get enough recognition for the work
that I do. I deserve better recognition and more respect for my e↵orts.” It thus
provides a potential indicator of the importance of recognition by others. Again,
we see statistically significant evidence (p < .1) of an increase, equivalent to a ten
percentage point change in the probability of agreement.
The third column provides a measure of the extent to which candidates believe in
their ability to coerce others, independently of aid from the community. The outcome
is based on branched responses to the following question: “If a group of young men
in your village was getting drunk and making noise, do you think they would be quiet
and go home if you asked them to?” The pre-analysis plan registered a one-tailed,
positive test for this outcome, and so the result is statistically insignificant. As the
variance estimate illustrates however, the coe cient is statistically distinguishable
from 0, though we must exercise caution in interpreting it causally. Nevertheless, the
evidence lends further support to the notion that being hired as a police o cer makes
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one more reputation-dependent: those who have actually worked as o cers recognize
much more readily how di cult it is to coerce those in their village to do what they
want. In practice, much of the power that CAP o cers yield tends to rely on the
support and cooperation of others in the village. The final column also reflects this,
o↵ering little evidence that becoming a police o cer increases one’s self-perceived
impunity to punishment.
Inequity E↵ects
An alternative way to interpret the prosocial e↵ects of empowerment illustrated in
the main results is that they are expressions of altruism. For example, participants
in the study may have an aversion to inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Inequity
aversion theory has been used to rationalize a range of behaviors that depart from the
predictions of standard decision theoretic models based on pure self-interest, includ-
ing rejection of low o↵ers in ultimatum games and giving in trust and dictator games
(Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). The basic suppositions hold that individuals internalize
the other’s payo↵s, and prefer outcomes that produce relatively equal payo↵s: devi-
ations from equal partitions of some good that benefit ego or the other both cause
some disutility, with possibly asymmetric weights. One way to interpret the results
presented in the preceding section is that becoming a community police o cer im-
proves the livelihood of the successful recruit above the average community member,
thus increasing the desire to take actions to reduce inequity. Alternatively, becoming
a police recruit might increase the weight that recruits place on the disutility from
unequal outcomes that are unfavorable to the other.
However, there are several pieces of evidence that undermine this interpretation
of the findings. For one thing, the inequity aversion model envisioned here implies
not only that police recruits who win the first round will behave more prosocially
in the second, but also that losing should induce cheating in favor of ego. Yet both
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police and civilians who do not win the first round behave in a manner consistent
with impartial compliance in the second (see Table 2.3).
Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe that any direct material windfalls
from joining the CAP are minimal. Prior to the recruitment lottery in late 2015, the
extant CAP force had not received its wages in over 8 months. Those recruited in the
lottery also faced months of arrears, yet the share of time they have free to spend on
other lucrative activities reduced considerably as a result of their CAP obligations.
Thus, it is conceivable that recruitment actually caused a negative windfall in some
cases.
Table 2.5 reports the e↵ect of being selected as a police o cer on candidates’
self-assessments of their material welfare. In column 1 we see some evidence of an
increase in the proportion of candidates who claim in late 2016 that their living
conditions have improved since Christmas 2015. However, the e↵ect falls short of
significance. Column 2 presents very little support for an improvement in conditions
relative to the rest of the community. Finally, as mentioned in the previous section,
the results presented in Table B.3 of the appendix suggest that the heterogeneity in
winning e↵ects is unrelated to the imbalance in pre-treatment asset ownership among
candidates who were and were not selected.
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Dependent variable:
Conditions improved Conditions better than others
(1) (2)
Police Recruit 0.237 0.137
(0.120) (0.145)
Block FE Yes Yes
Observations 45 45
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 2.5: There is no strong evidence that community police o cers have higher
wellbeing than civilians.
Each observation is at the level of the candidate. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the
probability of their assigned treatment condition. All specifications include block fixed e↵ects. p-
values reflect the probability of observing an e↵ect at least as large as the estimated e↵ect if the
sharp null hypothesis of no e↵ect for all units is true. This probability is calculated by taking the
proportion of 2000 simulated estimates that are at least as large in absolute value as the absolute
value of the observed estimate, generated by re-permuting the treatment assignment and estimating
the test statistic each time.
Experimenter Demand E↵ects
Before moving from the experimental results onto the observational comparison be-
tween the BPS and the CAP, I briefly consider here an alternative possibility, in
which the prosocial behavioral e↵ects are produced by experimenter demand.
Players may want to signal their prosociality to the survey team through their
behavior. Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi (2015), for example, find that white foreigner
presence increases the amount contributed in dictator games by nineteen percent in
Sierra Leone. I leverage the fact that I personally conducted eight of the forty-five
behavioral games to test for any white foreigner e↵ects. In Table B.7 of the appendix,
I show that there is very little evidence of such e↵ects. If anything, the number of
evens rolled in games I administered is slightly higher than those administered by the
survey coordinator, who is from Bougainville. The interaction provides little evidence
that police in particular responded to my presence.
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Culture versus Institutions
I have argued that being hired as a community police o cer causes more prosocial
behavior because it makes those hired care more about their reputations. Community
police o cers depend upon their reputation for many reasons: among them is the
fact that they often need the support of their community in order to coerce o↵enders.
It is therefore rational for them to sacrifice the short term benefit of a prize in order
to preserve their good reputation among community members.
This explanation has a strong policy implication: the institutional structure gov-
erning the exercise of the community police o cer’s coercive powers may curtail
corrupting e↵ects. However, one must also consider an alternative explanation,
according to which the prosocial empowerment e↵ect is simply a product of the
culturally-specific norms around the exercise of power in small-scale societies, such as
Bougainville. Without ruling out the cultural specificity hypothesis, the applicability
of the findings to other contexts is greatly limited.
The idea that power conferral and prosociality may be culturally related finds
some support in the anthropological literature. Henrich et al. (2005, 2006) docu-
ment the cross-cultural correlation between reliance on cooperation and prosociality
in behavior in ultimatum games: whaling communities in Indonesia frequently o↵er
over half of the stake to their opponent, for example. In a series of cross-cultural
experiments, Torelli and Shavitt (2010) illustrate that individuals from cultures that
exhibit collectivist, horizontal organization conceive power-holders as having a re-
sponsibility to help and benefit others.11 This coheres with the “big man” model
11 As a counterpoint, there is evidence that the behavior exhibited by the community police is
found across many di↵erent cultures, including those with less collectivist understandings of power.
For example, in over ninety games played by some 44,000 subjects in 47 countries, Abeler, Nosenzo,
and Raymond (2018) document widespread “partial lying,” whereby participants refrain from lying
in a purely self-interested manner. In a review of the dishonesty literature, Jacobsen, Fosgaard, and
Pascual-Ezama (2017, 14) point out that inter-personal comparison influences prosocial behavior
and dishonesty across a range of di↵erent cultures: “when the dishonest action directly influences
the benefit of another person, social comparison seems to matter a great deal.”
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of authority in Bougainville, conceptualized in Oliver’s influential 1955 study of the
Siwai community. In pre-WWII Siwai culture, the mumi was the man in the village
who had the most renown, which he attained by generating surpluses of material
goods, usually pigs, and holding large feasts.12 Crucially, the mumi does not inherit
power, but attains and holds it to the extent that he is able to redistribute material
goods. Thus, it is possible that the results speak to the fact that the community
police, having been conferred power through their role as agents of the state, feel
compelled toward redistribution in response to social expectations. This would be
consistent with Wang and Sun (2016), for example, who find in a lab experiment in
China that students with “socialized” power concepts were less likely to steal from
team members than those who hold more individualized concepts of power.
To test this cultural hypothesis, I conducted the same random allocation game and
survey with thirty police o cers from the regular, commissioned force in Bougainville,
the Bougainville Police Service (BPS). O cers in the BPS come from exactly the same
culture as o cers in the CAP: they originate from the same villages and interact with
the same communities. As described above, however, their institutional incentives are
very di↵erent. BPS o cers are armed, and so do not rely on community assistance in
order to coerce o↵enders. They also do not live in the communities they police, but
in the larger towns of Buka, Arawa and Buin, many hours drive from most smaller
villages. In other words, BPS o cers are much less dependent on community support
than CAP o cers are.
According to the cultural specificity hypothesis, we should expect BPS o cers
to respond to first-round windfalls exactly as the CAP do: out of concern for their
reputation as “big men” (or women) and the associated expectations that go with
exercising power in small scale societies, they will behave in such a way as to redis-
12 The model of status attainment through competitive gift-giving is found in Western Papua
New Guinea as well, most famously in the Moka exchange in Mount Hagen (Strathern, 1971) or the
Kula exchange in the Trobriand islands (Malinowski, 1922).
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tribute goods to their partner in the second round. If, on the other hand, it is the
fact that CAP exercise power in a “community dependent” way that causes them to
behave prosocially, then we should not expect to see similar patterns of play emerge
among BPS.
Table 2.6 reports the e↵ect of winning the first round of the game on second
round behavior by both CAP and BPS (column 1 is the same result as reported in
the bottom row of the table on Figure 2.3).
Dependent variable:
Evens called in second round
Community Police (CAP) Regular Police (BPS)
(1) (2)
Won first round  1.281⇤⇤ 1.221⇤
(0.564) (0.613)
Observations 17 30
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.093
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 2.6: Community police o cers behave more prosocially in the second round of
the random allocation game when they win in the first round, whereas regular police
o cers do not.
Weighted least squares regression. Observations weighted by the inverse of the probability of the
first period game outcome.
The results speak against the cultural specificity hypothesis: BPS who are ran-
domly assigned to win the first game do not call significantly fewer evens than those
who lost the first round. If anything, they appear to call more evens. Thus, it is
not simply the case that community police o cers behave prosocially because they
belong to a culture in which those with power are expected to redistribute goods.
While di↵erences between the attributes of the community police and regular
police are not causally identified, it is nevertheless instructive to compare the two
groups’ behavior and responses. Table 2.7 reports the means for community police
(CAP), regular police (BPS), as well as the di↵erence in means and the associated
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p-value from a two sample t-test with unequal variances.
Community Regular
Police Police Di↵erence p-Value
Total evens called 15.4 15.9  0.51 0.49
Reputation 0.8 1.0  0.16⇤⇤⇤ 0.01
Recognition 1.0 0.9 0.07⇤⇤ 0.03
Community independence 0.3 0.7  0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.00
Relative impunity 1.1 1.0 0.08 0.39
Table 2.7: Community police o cers (CAP) consistently call fewer evens than regular
police o cers (BPS). They are significantly more likely to see themselves as incapable
of coercing o↵enders on their own.
First column contains average of responses among 17 candidates selected in the lottery to become
community police o cers. Second column contains average of responses among 30 regular police
o cers. Third column provides di↵erence in responses and fourth the associated p-value from a
Welch two sample t-test.
The BPS call about half an even more on average than the CAP do. Interestingly,
we see that BPS care significantly more about their reputation than CAP, although
they are not as sensitive to recognition as the CAP. BPS are more than twice as likely
as CAP to see themselves as capable of independently coercing community members.
Taken together, these attitudinal and behavioral di↵erences between CAP and
BPS support the idea that community police o cers behave prosocially not due to
any intrinsic or culturally-specific desire to build their reputation, but because they
know that without the support of their community they will not be able to exercise
the authority vested in them by the state.
2.5 Discussion
This study provides one of the first attempts to causally identify the e↵ect of con-
ferring the state’s policing powers on individuals’ behavior. It illustrates that power
does not always corrupt the holder: community police do not cheat against their
community members more than comparable civilians do. If anything, becoming a
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community police o cer makes one behave more prosocially. Specifically, community
police o cers who receive a windfall in the first round of the behavioral game ap-
pear to cheat against themselves in order to avoid winning again in a second round,
thereby preserving their reputation as a non-corrupt person.
Rather than culturally specific, this e↵ect appears to relate to the institutional
incentives of community police o cers: we see no such prosocial behavior among
regular police o cers, who are not dependent on their communities in the same way
that CAP are. A closer look at mechanisms suggests that becoming a community
police o cer makes one more concerned with one’s reputation and especially aware of
one’s limitations in terms of coercing others independently of community support. In
fact, in addition to being more prosocial than regular police o cers, a key di↵erence
that sets community police o cers apart from their less accountable counterparts is
their low belief in their individual coercive capacity.
Seen in this light, the prosocial e↵ects of empowerment in the case of the CAP
seem to result from the institutional setup within which the community police’s power
is structured. The CAP take great pains to ensure that they have a good reputation
among their constituents because they depend upon this good reputation in order
to be e↵ective at their jobs. In this sense, the study coheres with the core tenets
of accountability theory, according to which power can be kept in check by ensuring
those who hold it seek to maintain a favorable reputation among those over whom it
is exercised (Fearon, 1999).
How might we generalize this notion of community dependence from the specific
case of the CAP in order to draw out potential implications for other cases of police
reform? One implication of this study is that there exists a tradeo↵ between empow-
ering police and holding them accountable. The community police are able to coerce
potential o↵enders. But they rely on the aid of the community to do so. This depen-
dence ensures they cannot extort unchecked. The regular police, with their guns, do
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not depend on the community to do their jobs. While this likely makes them more
capable enforcers, it also reduces their incentive to maintain a good reputation with
the community.
An implication of this representation of policing is that policies that increase
o cers’ dependence on community members’ positive appraisals might promote more
prosocial behavior by police. For example, future research might examine a system in
which individual community police o cers are rated via scorecard systems distributed
through the community, which are then taken into account during job evaluations by
their principals.
One lingering question is whether power has not corrupted the community police
yet. Overall, there is very little evidence that the roughly 600 people who have ever
served as CAP engaged in much corruption. Advisors from the New Zealand Police
aid programme were able to produce a handful of letters that they have received
from chiefs over the years, requesting the dismissal of the local CAP (typically citing
behaviors such as drunkenness, fighting, and theft). According to analysis of per-
sonnel records for CAP hired prior to 2012, of the 589 personnel that had worked
as CAP o cers since the project’s beginning, at least sixty-three (11%) had been
terminated. This indicates the possibility for corruption to arise in spite of the in-
stitutional mechanisms described, but it is a rate that is well below the pervasive
corruption documented in police forces in countries with comparable levels of devel-
opment.
Finally, it is worth considering the potential for adverse e↵ects that this study
implies. The community police appear to knowingly break the rules of the game in
order to keep their constituents happy. It seems that the scope for abuse could be
large in such situations. Especially if a police o cer’s reputation only depends on a
select few within the community, one might worry that any prosocial behavior will
benefit those few and not others. One question for future research may be to analyze
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how dependence on the reputation of the few versus the many a↵ects proclivity for
corrupt behavior and the social distribution of forbearance more generally (Holland,
2014).
2.6 Conclusion
This experiment represents one of the first randomized controlled trials to examine
the causal e↵ect of becoming a police o cer on behavior and attitudes. Using a novel
behavioral measure of proclivity to engage in corrupt behavior—here defined as anti-
social non-compliance—I find that civilians who become community police o cers
behave more prosocially than those who do not. In fact, community police o cers
seem so concerned with their reputation as non-corrupt people that they cheat against
themselves to avoid their constituents inferring they are corrupt. In a set of parallel
behavioral games with thirty non-randomly selected members of the regular police
force, I find no evidence of such prosociality. While observational, the comparison
between community police and regular police behavior suggests the prosocial e↵ects
of empowering community police o cers are not simply a culturally-specific quirk.
Rather, it suggests such e↵ects represent a strategic response to institutional incen-
tives. Specifically, community police o cers forego the short-term benefits of winning
the game in order to preserve their reputation, upon which they rely in order to be
e↵ective police o cers. The findings lend external validity to “downwards cheating”
behaviors observed in lab settings in many di↵erent cultural contexts. They also
suggest several pathways for future research into the role of reputation in fostering
more accountable behavior by public o cials.
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Chapter 3
How competitive elections might worsen corruption:
Evidence from electoral cycles in police extortion
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Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections.
[...] Actors know what winning or losing can mean to
them, and they know how likely they are to win or
lose, but they do not know if they will lose or win.
Hence, democracy is a system of ruled
open-endedness, or organized uncertainty.
Adam Przeworski (1991, 10-13)
Introduction
Several prominent theories of government predict that democracy reduces corruption
because political competition enhances the accountability of leaders (Ferejohn, 1986;
Myerson, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Przeworski et al., 2000; Adsera, Boix, and
Payne, 2003; Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi, 2003). Yet, while the cross-national re-
lationship between measures of political competition and corruption is negative over-
all (Treisman, 2000, 2007), it appears non-linear. Di↵erent cross-national measures
of corruption and democratic competition find a concave statistical relationship—
the “inverted U” (Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004; Me´ndez and Sepul-
veda, 2006; Rock, 2009; Charron and Lapuente, 2010; Saha et al., 2014; McMann
et al., 2017). Corruption actually increases with political competition among the
least democratic states, before decreasing among the most institutionalized democra-
cies. As McMann et al. (2017, 5) put it, “the mere introduction of elections (regardless
of nature and quality) unambiguously increases corruption.”
Much recent literature assumes that corruption persists in the face of elections due
to a lack of true competition, and so focuses anti-corruption e↵orts on impediments
such as information sparsity (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Chong et al., 2014; Cruz,
Keefer, and Labonne, 2016; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017; Dunning et al., 2019).
Yet the fact that new democracies often exhibit more corruption than autocracies
poses an important question to which accountability-centric theories do not provide
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a clear answer: why is corruption higher in countries with relatively competitive
elections than in autocracies where leaders are electorally unaccountable?
In answer to this question, I emphasize that electoral competition does not only
increase leader accountability. It also increases the likelihood of leader turnover and
thereby heightens uncertainty about future leadership. Even when increased account-
ability reduces incentives for leaders to engage in high-level corruption, this does not
imply reductions in petty corruption by bureaucrats—the form of corruption on which
this and many other cross-national studies focus.
In countries where bureaucracies are poorly insulated from political influence, new
leadership often brings personnel transfers, new appointments, new approaches to for-
eign aid, and new budgetary priorities (Iyer and Mani, 2012; Cruz and Keefer, 2015).
By raising the prospect of new leadership, competitive elections may increase public
servants’ uncertainty about future income streams. Uncertainty about income raises
the opportunity cost of remaining honest, incentivizing corruption (Rijckeghem and
Weder, 2001; Gorodnichenko and Peter, 2007). These dynamics should be weaker in
autocratic countries, where elections provoke no uncertainty about future leadership,
and in consolidated democracies, where civil service legislation protects bureaucrats
from political vicissitudes (Horn, 1995; Ting, 2012).
I test this theory using data that provides an unprecedented level of detail in the
comparison of bureaucratic corruption around elections in autocracies and democ-
racies. Specifically, I analyze electoral cycles in over 300,000 bribes that police and
other armed forces extorted from truck drivers during some 31,000 trips they made
between Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Senegal and Togo from 2006 to 2013. To un-
derstand the data-generating process behind this dataset, I conducted participant
observation with truck drivers. Over a three-week period in 2014, I traveled over 800
miles of highway through Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, and Benin, observing police
extortion from the cab of a truck. I also interviewed members of the survey team in
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Burkina Faso and Ghana—two hub points for the survey—to better understand risks
of systematic measurement error.
The analysis represents a substantial improvement on previous research insofar as
I am able to estimate the e↵ect of elections within and across countries. Estimation
of electoral cycles in a time-series cross-sectional framework reduces concerns that
the observed election e↵ects arise due to cross-national institutional confounders or
temporal confounders in the seasonal or secular timing of elections. In addition to
parametric approaches to statistical inference, I use a quasi-experimental approach
that simulates placebo elections in the respective countries 2,000 times in order to
estimate the probability of the observed e↵ect sizes given the sharp null hypothesis
of no electoral cycles.
The key finding is that police increase the average bribe they extort in the buildup
to elections—by up to 22% relative to non-electoral periods (p < 0.01)—but only
when incumbents stand some chance of losing those elections. There is no evidence
that corruption follows electoral cycles in autocracies, where elections pose no threat
to leadership. When elections usher in new leadership, police continue to extort at
levels 15% higher than average (p < 0.10) in the post-election period. However, the
average bribe drops to normal levels if instead incumbents are reelected. This pattern
of evidence is consistent with the idea that political competition increases extortion
because it increases uncertainty about leadership.
Supplementary pieces of evidence support this interpretation of the findings and
help to rule out alternative mechanisms linking electoral cycles to extortion. First,
one may stipulate that electoral cycles in extortion arise because parties use the
bureaucracy to collect campaign funds. However, I find no evidence for electoral cycles
in the number of checkpoints, which undermines this interpretation. Rather, the fact
that the intensive margin increases while the extensive margin does not suggests
that electoral cycles are due to the decisions of individual bureaucrats and not their
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higher-ups. Second, one might also believe that o cials are simply opportunistic:
they take advantage of the sparse information and political connections available
to new leadership in order to extort more while monitoring capacity is low. Yet I
find that, whereas an unexpected coup in Mali increased extortion, the death of a
President and his replacement by the vice president did not increase extortion in
Ghana. In other words, non-electoral leader turnover increases extortion when it
changes the leadership direction but does not increase extortion when the party and
policies of the leader remain constant. This pattern lends further support to the
interpretation that uncertainty about future leadership is the key mechanism linking
elections to petty corruption, rather than simple opportunism.
Taken together, the empirical findings demonstrate the plausibility of the key
theoretical claim, namely: political competition can increase corruption by making
bureaucrats less certain about their wages, and thus more willing to extort. This is
a novel explanation for the concave relationship between political competition and
corruption. As I explain in greater detail in the discussion, other authors have mostly
analyzed the “inverted U” under the assumption that corruption persists due to a lack
of political competition, and not due to political competition itself. While the findings
pertain to short- to intermediate-term di↵erences and thus do not conclusively ex-
plain slow-moving cross-national di↵erences in corruption, they point to bureaucratic
insulation as a potentially understudied determinant of corruption. In particular,
the results suggest the need for more research on the possibility that civil service
reforms can complement democratization e↵orts by staving o↵ the adverse e↵ects of
increasing leader turnover.
This chapter proceeds in six sections. The first presents a micro-level theory of the
conditions under which political competition induces bureaucrats to extort bribes and
derives from this theory empirical hypotheses. The second section describes the data
on police extortion and elections that is used to test these hypotheses and explains
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the identification strategy. The third section presents the main results, while the
fourth section appraises evidence for alternative mechanisms that might also link
elections and bureaucratic corruption. The final section discusses the findings in
light of existing theories and concludes.
3.1 Theory
Theories of the relationship between political competition and corruption that fo-
cus on accountability mechanisms potentially miss some adverse e↵ects of heightened
competition because they do not consider direct e↵ects on the decision-making pro-
cesses of bureaucrats. In many ways, this is surprising given that the data used
in many cross-national studies pertains to bribes paid to bureaucrats by individu-
als or firms. In what follows I give a simplified theoretical account of how political
competition might directly a↵ect the decision-making processes of civil servants.
An influential body of literature on bureaucratic corruption explains the bureau-
crat’s decision to extort as a tradeo↵ between the anticipated gains from extortion and
the risk of punishment (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard,
1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Olken, 2007; Treisman, 2007). Olken and Pande
encapsulate this understanding of petty corruption with the claim that a bureaucrat
will extort a bribe in exchange for some government good or service i↵
w   v < 1  p
p
(b  d), (3.1)
where the w wage that the bureaucrat receives net of her v outside option must be
lower than the benefit of the b bribe net of the associated d moral cost, conditional
on the p probability of being caught (Olken and Pande, 2011). Bureaucrats extort
when they expect to do better o↵ by taking bribes, in light of the associated risks
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and the relative worth of their government wage.1
Note in this formulation that the bureaucrat is sure of receiving her wage in full
if she chooses not to extort. However, this common assumption may not be accurate
in practice. A more realistic formulation might multiply the w in equation 3.1 by
q 2 [0, 1], where q is the bureaucrat’s subjective appraisal of the probability with
which they receive their wage. As I describe below, many factors might influence q—
beliefs about future economic conditions, about job security, about future budgetary
decisions. Clearly, however, as q decreases the opportunity cost of not engaging in
extortion increases, incentivizing corruption.
In the theoretical argument below, I argue that two conditions are su cient to
reduce bureaucratic uncertainty about receiving w: low leader turnover or high bu-
reaucratic insulation. While bureaucracies in non-democratic states are not insulated
from political influence, the low risk of leader turnover contributes to relatively cer-
tain expectations that the status quo will be maintained through upcoming elections.
In consolidated democracies, while leadership may change frequently, bureaucracies
are insulated from political influence by civil service legislation. It is in those young
democracies where, as noted, corruption is the highest, that high leader turnover and
low bureaucratic insulation translate into high levels of uncertainty around elections.
Leader Turnover, Patronage and Bureaucratic Insulation
Aminimal requirement of democratic accountability is that the potential exists for the
ruling party to lose elections: when elections work, they make changes in leadership
more likely (Przeworski et al., 2000).
However, turnover in leadership can have deleterious e↵ects on policy outcomes
due to the uncertainty it creates about future decision-making. Inspired by the early
insights of Olson and his coauthors (Olson, 1993; Clague et al., 1996), a more recent
1It is typically assumed that w > v, otherwise the bureaucrat will simply leave the bureau.
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wave of studies has analyzed the e↵ects of leader turnover on a range of policy areas.
Several authors have found that long-standing leaders do a better job of attracting
investment, even in autocracies, because they can more credibly commit to protecting
private interests when they stand to gain from long-run economic growth (Wright,
2008; Kendall-Taylor, 2011; Fails, 2014; Moon, 2015). Along similar lines, Gamboa-
Cavazos, Garza-Cantu´, and Salinas (2007) and Campante, Chor, and Do (2009) find
evidence in Mexico that leaders with longer tenure are less corrupt than those with
short horizons.
I argue that leadership turnover may produce pessimism among bureaucrats about
their future income, because new leaders may change bureaucratic appointments and
budgetary priorities.
In young democracies, o ce-seekers often use their ability to appoint positions in
the public sector toward electoral ends, promising jobs to important political allies or
doling out public sector work as a form of patronage on a broader scale. Employing
an electoral regression discontinuity design, Akhtari, Moreira, and Trucco (2017) find
that up to a quarter of publicly employed headmasters are replaced when new mayoral
leaders win elections in Brazil, for example, while Iyer and Mani (2012) find that the
election of a new Chief Manager in India increases the probability of new bureaucratic
appointments by 10%. When political leaders can easily reappoint bureaucrats to suit
their aims, and political leaders are frequently replaced, bureaucratic turnover is likely
to be particularly high.
In West African democracies, elections frequently result in transformations of
the bureaucracy. In Ghana, for example, after Kwame Nkrumah was elected as the
country’s first Prime Minister in 1951, the senior civil service grew from 1,970 to
3,515 positions (Lentz, 2014, 179).
Ghanaians appear to rely heavily on political patronage to obtain and retain cov-
eted positions in the civil service. Based on expert surveys, Kopecky` (2011) estimates
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that 67% of jobs in the police sector, for example, are based on appointment by the
executive branch. Lentz (2014) describes the case of a civil servant in Ghana who
attested to having lost his position as Director General of the Prison Service due to
a lack of connections to the right patrons in the ruling party.
Analyzing reappointments of forestry agents in Senegal, Blundo (2014, 75) de-
scribes how ministerial reshu✏es resulted in no less than sixty-eight personnel trans-
fers per year in the decade from 1995-2005. He estimates that up to a fifth of the
entire forestry workforce may have been a↵ected each time.
Anecdotal accounts thus suggest the obtention and retention of coveted public
sector jobs is often determined by who holds executive and parliamentary power in
West African states. But this is not the only way in which public sector incomes may
be a↵ected by changes in leadership. In developing countries especially, budgetary
priorities can shift radically in response to popular pressure. New leaders bring with
them new priorities and new electoral coalitions. They may seek to radically alter
the budgetary priorities in order to suit their aims. As Terry Moe put it,
while the right to exercise public authority happens to be [with the incumbent party]
today, other political actors with di↵erent and perhaps opposing interests may gain
that right tomorrow, along with legitimate control over the politics and structures
that their predecessors put in place. Whatever today’s authorities create, therefore,
stands to be subverted or perhaps completely destroyed—quite legally and without
any compensation whatever—by tomorrow’s authorities (Moe, 1990, 227).
One example of the potential for such destruction was given in Mali in the run-
up to the 2007 elections. In 2002, Alpha Oumar Konare´ had endorsed a Poverty
Reduction Service Paper (PRSP), a strategic document required by the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund in order to qualify for the sort of debt relief and
loans that are often used to sustain public sector employment. When Toure´ ran
for reelection in 2007, he refused to endorse the existing PRSP because it had been
drawn up by his predecessor. He instead campaigned on his own Programme de
de´veloppement e´conomique et social, provoking fears that Mali might lose foreign aid
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necessary to fund the public sector. Thus, the sensitivity of the public sector to snap
decision-making around foreign aid and budgetary priorities in West Africa can lead
to a highly uncertain environment for public servants.
According to Erdmann and Engel (2007, 107-8), corrupt behavior by bureaucrats
under such “neopatrimonial” environments is in part “a means to gain protection [...]
in a situation of societal uncertainty created by public institutions which may behave
in ways that are not calculable.” In other words, supplementing one’s income through
extortion becomes more attractive when one’s expectation of enjoying current wages
into the future appears less likely.
Compared to simply doing one’s job and receiving one’s salary as a public servant,
extortion can be a very costly strategy. In May 2017, the Ghanaian Ministry of
Finance suspended the salaries of over 26,000 public sector workers suspected of
corruption. But even when monitoring capacity is low, extortion is a tiresome way
to earn a living. The victims of extortion have at their disposal counter-strategies
ranging from negotiation to violent resistance. During my participatory observation
with truck drivers, I witnessed numerous holdout situations. Police would sometimes
wait hours for the more resistant drivers to produce the demanded bribe, arguing all
the while. Moreover, petty corruption is maligned throughout West African media
as a scourge on economic development. I often observed what can only be described
as embarrassment on the faces of police o cers and customs o cials when, as they
extorted us, they noticed me watching (although, as I show in Cooper, 2018, this did
very little to prevent them from extorting the driver).
Since o cials cannot increase the amount of tra c they can stop, increasing prices
is the only means at their disposal for raising their income from extortion. Yet it is
a di cult and costly process. While many drivers were willing to pay a small “going
rate,” the occasional o cial who departed from this, and demanded more than the
going rate, met with outraged protests and threats from the driver.
122
As argued above, as the threat of losing one’s job or salary increases, so too
does the opportunity cost of not extorting. During periods of heightened political
uncertainty, therefore, we would expect to see o cials extorting higher bribes on
average than during periods of comparative certainty. When one is certain of keeping
one’s income, the benefits of engaging in extortion may not outweigh the costs.
There are of course countries in which elections do not translate into job or in-
come insecurity for bureaucrats. A civil servant in an autocracy that is about to have
facade elections can reasonably expect continuity in the current policy arrangements,
confident in the tenure of the present leaders. In most consolidated democracies,
competitive elections are coupled with strong civil service legislation insulating the
bureau from political influence. The depoliticization of the bureaucracy is a key
process in the transition from clientelist to programmatic politics (Ting et al., 2013;
Cruz and Keefer, 2015). As democracies mature and elected o cials pursue more
ambitious policy programs, they may seek to perennialize the bureaucratic arrange-
ments necessary to implement large programs by insulating the bureau from future
political influence (Horn, 1995). Ting (2012) argues, for example, that incumbent
parties undertook insulating civil service reforms in the U.S. when they anticipated
upcoming electoral losses, e↵ectively seeking to make it harder for incoming parties
to undo prevailing bureaucratic arrangements.
Hypotheses
Low leader turnover and high bureaucratic insulation thus constitute su cient condi-
tions for bureaucratic certainty about future income streams. When leader turnover
is low, as in autocracies, bureaucrats can be relatively confident in the continuity of
prevailing arrangements, even if the bureau is not insulated from political influence.
Similarly, even if leader turnover is very high, in consolidated democracies where civil
service legislation insulates the bureau from political influence, bureaucrats can be
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relatively sure that their jobs and incomes will survive elections unaltered.
By contrast, in many young democracies—such as India, Senegal, Ghana, Thai-
land, Papua New Guinea, Uganda, Brazil, Mexico, and so on—high rates of leader
turnover are accompanied by low levels of bureaucratic insulation. Such states typi-
cally find themselves at the ‘apex’ of the inverted U relationship between bureaucratic
corruption and political competition. In e↵ect, the temptation to engage in risky or
costly extraction of bribes may be stronger in such states because the opportunity
cost associated with not taking bribes is higher when there is uncertainty about fu-
ture wages. In such contexts, the extortion of bribes might constitute an insurance
strategy for bureaucrats facing conditions of uncertainty.
If elections a↵ect bureaucratic corruption primarily by creating uncertainty about
future income streams among bureaucrats, we should expect to see that corruption
increases in the buildup to elections, but only if the election is actually competitive
to some extent:
H1. The average bribe extorted by bureaucrats should increase in the buildup to
elections with uncertain outcomes (competitive elections).
H2. The average bribe extorted by bureaucrats should be una↵ected by the buildup
to elections with certain outcomes (uncompetitive elections).
After the election we should expect di↵erent dynamics as a function of the out-
come. Specifically, if the incumbent wins the election this should restore bureaucrats’
certainty about future income streams. If a challenger wins, however, this might
further increase extortion by increasing uncertainty about future public employment
policies.
H3. The average bribe extorted by bureaucrats should decrease in the post-election
period when the incumbent wins (challenger loses).
124
H4. The average bribe extorted by bureaucrats should increase in the post-election
period when the incumbent loses (challenger wins).
3.2 Research Design
To test for the e↵ect of elections on bureaucratic corruption, I build a weekly panel
on extortion in five West African countries from 2006 to 2013. The data comes from
two principal sources: micro-data on over 300,000 bribes paid by a representative
sample of some 31,000 truck drivers in West Africa from 2006 to 2013; and data on
seven elections in the same five countries.
Data on bribes
The data on extortion used in this study was collected by an organization funded
by USAID and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) called
the West African Trade Hub (WATH), under the auspices of the Improved Road
Transport Governance (IRTG). In order to better understand the data-generating
process and address any potential concerns with the data, I conducted in-depth in-
terviews with the survey enumerators in Ghana and Burkina Faso, the two countries
that served as “hub points” for distributing and collecting surveys. I also carried out
two months of ethnographic fieldwork with truck drivers in Burkina Faso, Ghana,
Togo and Benin, participating in three long-distance hauls along the main trade cor-
ridors with drivers of various nationalities. I supplemented these journeys with over
sixty in-depth interviews with stakeholders in the trucking industry, including union
representatives, drivers, and public agencies working on trade facilitation.
As truck drivers carry goods between ports on the coast and hinterland cities
throughout West Africa, they are typically stopped dozens of times per trip by police,
customs, gendarmerie, and other agents of the state such as forestry and road safety
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o cials. On most stops, the driver must pay a bribe ranging anywhere from 0.50
USD to 20 USD, under threat of various sanctions, including long delays, physical
violence and even unlawful detention.
The WATH dataset details over 300,000 self-reported incidents at which truck
drivers were stopped at a checkpoint by o cials during the seven-and-a-half-year
period from early 2006 to mid-2013. Not all of these stops record bribes: drivers
were also asked to note when they were stopped but not asked to pay anything—in
this case the data contains a bribe of 0. Bribes are expressed in three currencies in
the data: West African Francs (XOF), pre-reform Ghanaian Cedis (GHC) and post-
reform Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). As most bribes are reported in XOF, I use monthly
average exchange rates to convert GHC and GHS into XOF. In 2010, 500 XOF was
roughly equivalent to 1 USD.
During the data collection period teams of two to three enumerators would ran-
domly sample truck drivers using a random-walk methodology at ports and truck-
yards in Ghana, Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Togo. It is generally easy
to predict which route the driver will take from a given departure point, as there are
typically only one or two main trade corridors suitable for freight trucks (see Figure
3.1). The surveys are thus corridor-specific, listing locations at which the drivers may
encounter checkpoints on the route, and leaving space for the drivers to enter their
own checkpoints in case they are stopped at points not pre-listed. Enumerators used
cellphones to coordinate with each other at opposite ends of the trade corridor to
collect the surveys filled out by the drivers.
In terms of the sample frame, literate and illiterate drivers alike were included
in the study. Illiterate drivers would either have their apprentice help them to fill
out the survey or would do so with enumerators at the end of the trip. Since the
original study targeted illegal forms of payment, it was restricted to drivers who had
their o cial papers in order. This likely leads to an under-estimate of the average
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bribe paid by all drivers, as drivers might pay more in bribes to travel without their
paperwork in order. Subsetting the sample to drivers with papers is advantageous,
however, because it minimizes the chance of fines being miscoded as bribes.
Figure 3.1: Trade Highways in West Africa.
Countries in white included in the sample, red lines indicate major highways. Shapefiles for adminis-
trative boundaries from http://www.gadm.org/ and for supply routes from https://geonode.wfp.org/
Importantly, drivers were not remunerated for their work and so were not finan-
cially incentivized to provide socially desirable responses. The drivers I spoke to
seemed to have participated in the study because they saw it as an important way to
shed light on the issues they face.2
One potential source of concern is that drivers have an incentive to exaggerate
the amount they pay in order to bring greater attention to the problem of extortion.
To address this concern, I traveled with drivers observing the bribes extorted from
2Drivers either work for a transport company or are self-employed. Those who work for a
company receive a commission for each haul, but they also keep any money left over from their
‘travel allowance’ (frais de route in Francophone countries). The ‘travel allowance’ is intended to
cover the payment of bribes and other variable costs (the driver’s meals, his apprentice’ daily salary,
etc.). Any surplus left from the travel allowance is income for the driver. Those who are self-employed
make money from haulage contracts and keep as income whatever is not spent on operating costs,
such as bribes, repairs, and fuel. Thus, regardless of whether a driver is self-employed or works for
a transport company, his personal income is reduced every time he pays a bribe.
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a hidden vantage point in the cab. On average, bribes taken were often higher than
those reported in the data, suggesting that—if anything—surveys understate how
much drivers pay. However, to mitigate concerns about reporting bias, I do not focus
on the absolute level of bribes reported, but rather on marginal e↵ects. Assuming that
any systematic error in reporting is not correlated with electoral periods, inferences
about marginal e↵ects will remain unbiased. Nevertheless, there is some concern
that drivers could exaggerate bribes around election times as a way of expressing
discontent with their government. For this reason I condition analyses on whether
the driver was a foreigner in the country in which he paid the bribe, as it is less likely
that foreigners will be prone to partisan cycles in countries where they cannot vote.
Elections in West Africa
Over the period covered by the WATH bribe data, a total of seven presidential elec-
tions took place in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Senegal and Togo. They are listed on
Table 3.1.
Country Year Vote Margin Incumbent reelected
Ghana 2008 0.01 No
Ghana 2012 0.02 Yes
Mali 2007 0.52 Yes
Burkina Faso 2010 0.72 Yes
Senegal 2007 0.41 Yes
Senegal 2012 0.08 No
Togo 2010 0.27 Yes
Table 3.1: Presidential elections analyzed.
Despite their geographic proximity (see Figure 3.1) and the fact that these five
countries all hold elections, they exhibit considerable variation in their degree of elec-
toral competition. In their report on regimes around the world in 2010, for example,
the group behind the Polity IV regime measure classified Ghana, Mali and Senegal
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as democracies and their neighbors, Togo and Burkina Faso, as autocracies (Marshall
and Cole, 2011).
As Table 3.1 illustrates, the elections also vary within and across countries in terms
of their vote margins. At the date of writing, the 2008 presidential election in Ghana
was the closest ever, with the incumbent NPP party losing its hold on the presidency
to the NDC candidate John Atta Mills by less than 1% in runo↵ elections. On the
other end of the spectrum, the incumbent President Blaise Campaore´ predictably won
the 2010 election in Burkina Faso with over 80% of the vote. The elections were widely
criticized as unfair and mired by fraud allegations from international observers, with
one reporter dismissing them as “little more than a formality.”3 Elections in the same
year in Togo were similarly criticized for their predictability, lack of competition, and
strong signs of manipulation. By contrast, while elections in 2007 in Senegal and Mali
featured large margins for the winners and the results were contested by some of the
losing parties, in general international observers agreed the elections were conducted
in a free and fair manner, attributing the winning candidates’ wide margins to their
popularity and to low turnout. Despite the wide margins that make the outcomes
appear obvious ex post, both elections were competitive in the sense that vote shares
were very hard to predict. There was almost no polling data in the buildup to either
election.
The di↵erences in competition in these countries translate into strong di↵erences
in leader tenure. When Blaise Campaore´ stood for reelection in 2010, he had been
in power for twenty-three years. Similarly, Faure Gnassingbe´ prolonged his family’s
forty-three year reign over Togolese politics, inherited following the death of his father
Eyade´ma Gnassingbe´ in 2005. By contrast, no leader in the three democratic countries
served more than two constitutionally mandated terms over the period under analysis.
3 Cristophe Chaˆtelot, “Burkina Faso’s president is in a league of his own” in The Guardian,
12/30/2010. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/burkina-faso
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In sum, while all countries had elections during the period covered by the bribes
data, they produced very di↵erent expectations about future leadership. While elec-
tions in Burkina Faso and Togo were seen as facade institutions that posed no serious
threat to the longevity of the rulers there, those in other countries represented very
real threats of leadership change.
Identification Strategy
Because the theoretical predictions pertain to the calculations and decisions of indi-
vidual bureaucratic agents, in the main analysis I focus on di↵erences in prices set by
individual bureaucrats, and not the total amount that a driver is extorted in a given
country or over the course of a given trip. In supplementary analyses I also examine
e↵ects on the total number of checkpoints encountered over a given trip, however,
as a way of testing an alternative theory in which the decision-making of principals
causes electoral cycles in extortion.
The principal outcome in which I am interested is the average bribe that a bu-
reaucrat extorts from a truck driver at a given point in time in a given country. The
main estimand is the true average di↵erence in the average bribe extorted in a given
country-week during electoral versus non-electoral periods. An electoral period is
defined as the three months preceding or following an election. I am also interested
in the heterogeneity of electoral period e↵ects by whether the period is post- or pre-
election, and by whether the election was competitive (had an uncertain outcome).
I construct a country-week panel of average bribes over the period from November
2006 to June 2013. I collapse firstly to the country-week-driver-level means (all drivers
in the analysis record checkpoints in more than one country), weighting all driver-
level averages equally, and then average to the country-week level, again weighting
all country-weeks equally. This represents a relatively conservative approach to clus-
tering.
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The panel is missing data for some country-weeks. According to interviews with
enumerators and survey coordinators, these periodic breaks in data collection were
due to causes unrelated to election cycles, such as sta ng issues and occasional
unforeseen delays in funding approval. Nevertheless, as missing data can constitute
a source of bias if related to the outcome of interest (King et al., 2001), I use linear
interpolation as implemented in the imputeTS package for R in order to impute missing
country-weeks (Moritz and Bartz-Beielstein, 2017). As Figures C.1 and C.2 in section
C.1.1 of the appendix show, many fewer periods require imputation when collapsing
to the month level, although this reduces e ciency. I demonstrate robustness of
the main results to imputation by estimating the main models at the month level in
section C.2.3 of the appendix. Finally, since Senegal accounts for many of the missing
values, I also demonstrate the results are robust to the exclusion of Senegal in section
C.2.4 of the appendix.
The principal identification concern is that the relationship between the average
bribe extorted in a given country-week and the timing of an electoral period is con-
founded by some other set of variables. To address this concern I take two main
approaches.
The first is premised on a parallel trends assumption, and involves regressing the
average bribe in a given country-week on indicators for country, week and electoral
period,
yct =  c +  t + ⌧Zct + ✏ct, (3.2)
where yct is the average bribe in country c in week t,  c is a country fixed e↵ect,  t is
a week fixed e↵ect, and ⌧Zct is an indicator for whether week t falls within a window
spanning three months before and after an election in country c. The parameter
⌧ thus identifies the e↵ect of an electoral period on the average bribe, using the
generalized di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimator (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
One issue with this approach is that it does not leverage information at a lower
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level of aggregation. The second approach to identification involves residualizing
the dependent variable at the country-week-driver-level using a linear model that
conditions on confounders, before aggregating bribes to the country-week panel. I
focus on three sources of confounding.
First, elections may take place at certain times in the year or even on certain days
of the week for which bribes are seasonally higher or lower. I therefore di↵erence out
weekday (e.g., Tuesday), calendar month (e.g., February) and year (e.g., 2010) e↵ects
to account for potential confounding in the timing of elections and bribe seasonality.
Second, elections of a certain kind may be more or less frequent at times when
bribes in a country were generally trending upwards or downwards, say, due to anti-
corruption policies or changing economic conditions. To account for such confounding,
I di↵erence out country-specific linear trends.
Finally, there is a concern that certain kinds of drivers may self-select into or
out of electoral periods. Qualitatively, there is very little evidence of such trends:
logistics tends to be a margin-driven industry, and drivers respond to demand as
soon as it appears. Nevertheless, I also di↵erence out a range of driver-level e↵ects,
including whether the driver is foreign when he pays the bribe, and the specific route
and direction of travel—which proxy for whether the good was destined for import
or export. Both foreignness and whether the truck is headed in an import or export
direction have been identified as significant predictors of the bribe paid in previous
work on this data (Bromley and Foltz, 2011).
The remaining variation in the dependent variable is thus independent of many
season-, country- and driver-specific e↵ects. I estimate electoral cycles using the
following linear equation,
y˜ct =  c + ⌧Zct + ✏ct, (3.3)
where y˜ct is the average of the residualized bribe in country c in week t, and other
parameters are as above. In section C.2.5 of the appendix, I show that the main
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results are robust to alternative residualization methods.
Statistical Inference
I take two approaches to inferring the probability of observing point estimates given
the estimated sampling variability.
The first adopts a parametric approach that accounts for both spatial and tempo-
ral autocorrelation in order to construct p-values from standard errors (Shin, 2017).
As noted, within-driver and within-week correlation in errors is accounted for by sim-
ply collapsing to the week-country level. There is some concern that the bribe paid
at time t  1 is correlated with the average bribe paid at time t. Serial correlation in
the data is accounted for through the inclusion of an one-period lag of the dependent
variable to equations 3.2 and 3.3. In Tables C.2 and C.3 of the appendix, I show
that the substantive size of the coe cients and their statistical significance are un-
changed when a lag of the dependent variable is not included, and the regressions are
estimated exactly as above.
As section C.1.2 of the appendix illustrates, the partial autocorrelation of the time-
series appears to fall short of significance after one or two lags in most countries.
However, in section C.2.2 of the appendix, I show that main results are robust to
the inclusion of up to four lags. To account for the possibility that errors are non-
spherical, I use a panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) sandwich type estimator to
estimate the covariance matrix (see Beck and Katz, 1995), implemented in the pcse
package for R (Bailey and Katz, 2011). I show in section C.1.3 of the appendix that
residualizing outcomes before collapsing to the country-week level means does not
produce non-conservative standard errors. All main regression specifications include
a country-level fixed e↵ect.
The second approach treats the assumption that the conditional potential out-
comes are independent of election timing as a quasi-experimental assumption. The
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experimental analogue for the study is one in which countries are blocks and groups
of country-weeks are cluster-assigned to be in electoral periods. This analogue gives
rise to a basis for inference using Fisher-style permutation tests.
I generate the distribution of possible election e↵ects under the sharp null of no
electoral e↵ects for any week-month by permuting 2,000 placebo elections between
December 2006 and May 2013. On each permutation I respect the actual number of
elections that took place in each country (two in Ghana and Senegal, one in the other
countries). I also permute incumbent wins and losses in countries with competitive
elections (with probability .5), while setting incumbent win probabilities to 1 in Togo
and Burkina Faso. I compute randomization inference (RI) p-values by taking the
proportion of estimated election e↵ects at least as large in absolute value to the
observed election e↵ects.
3.3 Main Results
Table 3.2 illustrates the average bribe that bureaucrats extort from drivers system-
atically increases around elections, particularly in the buildup to the election. The
first two columns estimate the e↵ect of the so-called “Election Period” by regressing
the bribe variable on an indicator that is 1 if the country-week falls within the three
months preceding or following an election in that country and 0 otherwise. Bribes are
roughly 0.36 USD higher during this period (p < 0.05). The average bribe extorted
in all countries in all country-weeks in the panel was 1,304 XOF, implying average
bribes are approximately 14% higher during election periods. As with all others,
this estimate is conditional on time-invariant di↵erences between countries, country-
specific linear trends, the year, month of year and day of week in which the bribe was
paid, as well as the direction of travel and whether the driver was a co-national of
the bureaucrats when paying the bribe.
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Average Bribe Paid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.399⇤⇤⇤ 0.391⇤⇤⇤ 0.392⇤⇤⇤ 0.387⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Election Period 165.889⇤⇤⇤ 179.940⇤⇤⇤
(30.285) (28.827)
Pre-Election Period 235.757⇤⇤⇤ 230.408⇤⇤⇤
(41.255) (38.038)
Post-Election Period 40.698 68.887⇤
(40.860) (37.251)
Residuals No Yes No Yes
Period FE Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
RI p-value: Elec. Per. 0.0185 0.0095
RI p-value: Pre-Elec. 0.005 0.007
RI p-value: Post-Elec. 0.5485 0.244
Observations 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770
Adjusted R2 0.657 0.202 0.658 0.203
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 3.2: Police extortion of truck drivers exhibits electoral cycles. Extortion is
especially high in the buildup to elections.
All data aggregated from the checkpoint-driver-day level to the driver-level and then to the country-
week level through arithmetic averaging. Missing country-weeks imputed through linear interpola-
tion. The p-values and variance estimates reported in the main table arise from a panel-corrected
standard error estimator. RI p-values are calculated by comparing observed e↵ect sizes to the distri-
bution of e↵ects under the sharp null of no election e↵ects, calculated by simulating placebo elections
and re-estimating e↵ects 2,000 times. In columns labeled ‘Yes’ for residuals, dependent variable is
the residuals from a regression of the bribe on year, weekday, calendar month, country-specific linear
trend, direction of travel, trade corridor, and whether driver is national of country in which bribe
is paid. ‘Election Period’ is 1 if bribe paid in three months preceding or following election in that
country, 0 otherwise. ‘Pre-Election Period’ and ‘Post-Election Period’ are 1 if bribe paid in three
months preceding or following an election in that country, respectively, 0 otherwise.
Columns 2 and 3 indicate that this relationship is driven primarily by an increase
in average bribes extorted in the three-month period building up to elections. Post-
election, bribes appear to fall to levels much closer to the average in non-electoral
periods. The variables “Pre-Election Period” and “Post-Election Period” are indica-
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tors that take the value 1 if the country-week falls within the three months preceding
or following an election in that country, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Police extorted
bribes that were almost .50 USD higher on average in the buildup to elections, rep-
resenting an 18% increase in relative terms. Simulating all elections at random dates
and re-estimating the e↵ects 2000 times, we obtain an estimate as large in absolute
value as the observed one less than 1% of the time, suggesting we can reject the null
of no pre-election e↵ect with at the ↵ = .01 confidence level (p < 0.01).
In Table C.12 of the appendix, I report heterogeneity in pre- and post- election
e↵ects by country. The observed  2 statistic of the di↵erence in the sum of squared
residuals between a model in which slopes vary by country versus the models in
Table 3.2 is highly unlikely to arise by chance (p < 0.01). In other words, there
exists statistically significant heterogeneity in electoral cycles by country. The results
suggest electoral periods produce much smaller (even negative) e↵ects in the two
autocratic states of Burkina Faso and Togo, and much larger positive e↵ects in the
three democratic states.
The fact that bureaucrats change their extortionary strategies around elections
most obviously in democratic states and least obviously in autocratic states is sugges-
tive of a political logic that we can address directly. In the final set of main results,
which provide the most direct test of hypotheses 1-4, I model pre- and post-electoral
periods as a function of whether the country holds competitive elections and of the
outcome of the election. Thus, pre- and post-election trends for non-competitive elec-
tions are estimated by constraining the e↵ects to be the same for Togo and Burkina
Faso. For competitive states, the pre-election variable is constrained to be common
across all elections in Ghana, Mali and Senegal, while the post-election variables are
split into situations in which a challenger won (as in Ghana in 2008 and Senegal in
2012), and in which the incumbent was reelected (all other elections in those three
countries).
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Column 2 of Table 3.3 presents the main results. The e↵ect of pre- and post-
election periods on average bribes in non-competitive states is substantively small
(6-10 cents in USD) and statistically insignificant. By contrast, average bribes are
estimated to increase by 297 XOF (0.60 USD) in the buildup to competitive elections,
which translates to a 22% increase relative to the non-electoral average of 1,305 XOF
in those same countries. These findings are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2,
according to which corruption will increase in the buildup to elections, but only if
they are competitive and thus provoke uncertainty about future leadership.
Turning to post-election outcomes in competitive states, we see that when new
leaders are elected bribes remain higher than average, to the order of 15% relative
to non-electoral periods in those countries. Parametric variance estimates suggest
a highly significant e↵ect, whereas the randomization inference approach yields a p-
value of .173 for the di↵erence-in-di↵erences model and of .081 for the residualized
model. Thus, while the estimates certainly do not point to a large post-election
increase, they suggest bureaucrats continue to extort at relatively high levels when
challengers win.
However, when incumbents win elections, bribes fall again to levels that are not
statistically distinguishable from non-electoral periods. This pattern of evidence is
consistent with hypotheses 3 and 4, according to which the uncertainty provoked
by new leadership causes bureaucrats to extort more in the aftermath of elections.
Under this model of political competition’s e↵ect on corruption, we do not expect
to see strong evidence of increased corruption when incumbents are reelected, and




Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.382⇤⇤⇤ 0.376⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.028)
Pre-Election (Non-Competitive) 51.438 31.668
(82.679) (71.486)
Post-Election (Non-Competitive) 25.474  24.703
(82.696) (71.481)
Pre-Election (Competitive) 295.316⇤⇤⇤ 296.925⇤⇤⇤
(48.567) (44.882)
Post-Election (Competitive - Challenger Won) 177.133⇤⇤⇤ 193.187⇤⇤⇤
(59.742) (48.717)
Post-Election (Competitive - Incumbent Won)  59.038 35.302
(70.111) (65.479)
Residuals No Yes
Period FE Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes
RI p-value: Pre-Elec. (NC) 0.587 0.618
RI p-value: Post-Elec. (NC) 0.765 0.72
RI p-value: Pre-Elec. (C) 0.01 0.01
RI p-value: Post-Elec. (C-CW) 0.173 0.081
RI p-value: Post-Elec. (C-IW) 0.627 0.764
Observations 1,770 1,770
Adjusted R2 0.660 0.208
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 3.3: Elections only increase police extortion when they pose a real threat of
replacing the incumbent leader.
All data aggregated from the checkpoint-driver-day level to the driver-level and then to the country-
week level through arithmetic averaging. Missing country-weeks imputed through linear interpola-
tion. The p-values and variance estimates reported in the main table arise from a panel-corrected
standard error estimator. RI p-values are calculated by comparing observed e↵ect sizes to the dis-
tribution of e↵ects under the sharp null of no election e↵ects, calculated by simulating placebo
elections and re-estimating e↵ects 2,000 times. In columns labeled ‘Yes’ for residuals dependent
variable is the residuals from a regression of the bribe on year, weekday, calendar month, country-
specific linear trend, direction of travel, trade corridor, and whether driver is national of country in
which bribe is paid. ‘Non-competitive’ indicates the variable is common to Togo and Burkina Faso,
while ‘Competitive’ indicates the variable is common to Ghana, Mali and Senegal. ‘Pre-Election’
and ‘Post-Election’ are 1 if bribe paid in the three months preceding or following an election in that
country, respectively, 0 otherwise. ‘Challenger Won’ and ‘Incumbent Won’ are 1 if the challenger or
incumbent won the preceding election, respectively, 0 otherwise.
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3.4 Alternative Mechanisms
The main results illustrate that there are electoral cycles to corruption, even when
accounting for the timing of elections, country-specific trends, and a host of contextual
factors. Overall, the heterogeneity in these cycles among di↵erent countries produces
a pattern of evidence that is consistent with the proposition that political competition
increases corruption by provoking uncertainty about public sector incomes. The
estimation strategy helps to rule out a number of possible confounders that would lead
to spurious relationships between electoral cycles and bribes, and in the appendix I
show the results are robust to a range of alternative approaches. To delve more deeply
into the proposed mechanism I address here two alternative substantive mechanisms
that might link elections and corruption.
The first mechanism that might produce a systematic link between extortionary
dynamics and elections is the instrumentalization of the bureaucracy by the ruling
party in order to raise campaign funds through extortion. I refer to this as the Party
Capture mechanism.
Bribes might constitute an important source of campaign finance during elec-
tions. Especially where bureaucratic insulation is low, incumbent parties may be
able to use the bureaucracy to gather additional revenues for use in campaigns (Doig,
1999; McMann et al., 2017). This would create a systematic relationship between
bureaucratic corruption and elections, even in the absence of leadership uncertainty.
As many scholars of autocratic regimes have shown, non-competitive elections can
play an important institutional function in autocratic and semi-autocratic regimes
(Magaloni, 2008; Blaydes, 2010). In both autocracies and new democracies, ruling
parties may instrumentalize the bureau to fund their election campaigns.
The second mechanism that might link leadership change to bureaucratic extortion
is Opportunism by bureaucrats.
New leaders may arrive into power with less information about the bureaucracy
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and less capacity to implement strong anti-corruption crackdowns than their prede-
cessors, at least in the early phases of their tenure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Saha
et al., 2014). Political intervention into the complex organizational structures that
characterize modern bureaucracies requires building personal relationships with the
heads of those bureaus, which takes time and political capital. Civil servants may
take advantage of the window of opportunity a↵orded by the arrival of a new leader,
benefiting from a relatively lax environment to extract more from the citizenry and
further supplement their income. In this case, even if new leadership does not provoke
uncertainty we would expect to see an increase in extortionary trends following the
election of new leaders.
As a first appraisal of the evidence in support of these three alternative accounts,
we can contrast their predictions with the evidence presented in Table 3.3 above. The
rows of Table 3.4 represent four di↵erent changes in the electoral dynamics in a given
week-month and predictions about how extortionary dynamics will be a↵ected under
the mechanisms posited in the columns.
Predictions in Table 3.4 are underlined when they find support in the main spec-
ification reported in column 2 of Table 3.3. As the final row of the table indicates,
the predictions of the leadership uncertainty mechanism are best supported by the
data. If party capture of the bureaucracy explains the relationship between corrup-
tion and elections in West Africa, extortion should not remain high after elections and
should always increase before elections. Similarly, if bureaucrats act in a purely op-
portunistic manner, extortion should not increase before elections. Both stipulations





Moving from non-electoral period to
period before uncompetitive election,
average bribe will...
remain constant increase remain constant
Moving from non-electoral period to
period before competitive election,
average bribe will...
increase increase remain constant
Moving from pre-electoral period to
period following competitive election
won by incumbent, average bribe
will...
decrease decrease remain constant
Moving from pre-electoral period to
period following competitive election
won by challenger, average bribe
will...
remain constant decrease increase
Predictions consistent with Table 3.3 4/4 2/4 1/4
Table 3.4: The evidence from the main results most strongly supports the leadership
uncertainty mechanism.
Predictions are underlined when they are consistent with the estimates in column 2 of Table 3.3.
The party capture and opportunism mechanisms imply other observable hypothe-
ses that I test here. First, if extortion increases because the incumbent party uses the
bureaucracy to generate funds around elections, we would expect to see the number
of checkpoints increase. While individual bribes are very hard for principals to mon-
itor and thus to manipulate, the existence of a checkpoint is easily observed. Thus, a
principal looking to extract a larger amount cumulatively would likely do better by
increasing the extensive margin (increasing the number of agents extracting bribes)
than by increasing the intensive margin (increasing the average bribe extorted).
However, as Table 3.5 illustrates, there is no evidence to support this mechanism.
We see no signs that the average number of checkpoints encountered by truck drivers
over the period under consideration varies systematically with electoral cycles. All of
the estimated coe cients are substantively small and statistically insignificant.
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N Checkpoints Per Trip
(1) (2) (3)














Post-Election (Competitive - Challenger Won)  0.009
(0.739)
Post-Election (Competitive - Incumbent Won) 0.050
(0.813)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,770 1,770 1,770
Adjusted R2 0.454 0.454 0.453
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 3.5: There is no evidence of electoral cycles in the number of checkpoints.
All data aggregated from the checkpoint-driver-day level to the driver-level and then to the country-
week level through arithmetic averaging. Missing country-weeks imputed through linear interpola-
tion. All p-values and variance estimates from panel-corrected standard error estimator. ‘Election
Period’ is 1 if bribe paid in three months preceding or following election in that country, 0 otherwise.
‘Non-competitive’ indicates the variable is common to Togo and Burkina Faso, while ‘Competitive’
indicates the variable is common to Ghana, Mali and Senegal. ‘Pre-Election’ and ‘Post-Election’ are
1 if bribe paid in the three months preceding or following an election in that country, respectively,
0 otherwise. ‘Challenger Won’ and ‘Incumbent Won’ are 1 if the challenger or incumbent won the
preceding election, respectively, 0 otherwise.
Finally, to discriminate better between the opportunism and leader uncertainty
accounts I analyze two non-electoral leadership changes that took place in Ghana
and Mali over the period under consideration. The first is the sudden death of John
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Atta Mills in Ghana in 2012. Following his death, the Vice President John Mahama
took over in a smooth transition. While the timing of his death came as a shock,
news of Atta Mills’ poor health had circulated in Ghana for some months and it was
well-known that Mahama would take over from Mills. Mahama had often expressed
that he would maintain Mills’ platform. The second non-electoral leadership change
is the 2012 coup in Mali. The coup brought in a new government whose priorities
were very unclear, introducing a significant amount of uncertainty about their future
policies. While it was known that there were tensions between the government and
the armed forces tasked with controlling the Tuareg rebellion in the north, there were
very few indications that this would result in a total change in leadership via military
means. The militia that took over had very di↵erent aims and goals to the political
leaders they replaced.
The two instances of non-electoral turnover in 2012 represent very di↵erent out-
comes in terms of leadership uncertainty: while Mahama’s takeover in Ghana augured
continuity with the status quo, the coup in Mali overturned pre-existing arrangements
in a dramatic fashion. Under the leadership uncertainty mechanism, we would there-
fore only expect an increase in bribes resulting from the Malian coup, while the
opportunism mechanism would lead to increases in both cases.
Table 3.6 provides support for the leadership uncertainty mechanism and against
the opportunism mechanism. If anything, bribes decreased in the aftermath of Atta
Mills’ replacement by Mahama, although the coe cient is statistically insignificant.
Consistent with both mechanisms, the coup is estimated to increase the average bribe
extorted, although the estimates are very noisy. Again, we see a strong electoral cycle
in the average bribe paid, suggesting regular, routine elections are a more substantial




Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.391⇤⇤⇤ 0.390⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.027)




Election Period 177.307⇤⇤⇤ 183.353⇤⇤⇤
(30.588) (29.036)
Residuals No Yes
Period FE Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,770 1,770
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.202
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 3.6: Non-electoral leader turnover only increases extortion when it changes the
direction of leadership.
All data aggregated from the checkpoint-driver-day level to the driver-level and then to the country-
week level through arithmetic averaging. Missing country-weeks imputed through linear interpola-
tion. All p-values and variance estimates from panel-corrected standard error estimator. In columns
labeled ‘Yes’ for residuals dependent variable is the residuals from a regression of the bribe on
year, weekday, calendar month, country-specific linear trend, direction of travel, trade corridor, and
whether driver is national of country in which bribe is paid. ‘Post-Presidential Death’ is 1 if bribe
paid in Ghana in three months following the death of President John Atta Mills, 0 otherwise. ‘Post-
Coup’ is 1 if bribe paid in Mali in three months following the coup in 2012, 0 otherwise. ‘Election
Period’ is 1 if bribe paid in three months preceding or following election in that country, 0 otherwise.
3.5 Discussion
Puzzling over young democracies’ tendency to exhibit higher levels of corruption than
autocracies, Treisman (2000, 45) concludes that “The fact that a country is demo-
cratic today makes just about no di↵erence to how corrupt it is perceived to be.
What matters is whether or not it has been democratic for decades. The regres-
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sion estimates suggest a painfully slow process by which democracy undermines the
foundations of corruption.”
In this chapter, I have proposed an explanation for this slowness: against the
predictions of accountability theory, political competition may actually increase cor-
ruption in the absence of structures that insulate the bureaucracy from political in-
fluence. By increasing the likelihood of future leader turnover, political competition
decreases bureaucrats’ expectation of enjoying present income streams into the future
and raises the opportunity cost of remaining honest. Using fine-grained time-series
cross-sectional data on bureaucratic extortion over a seven-year period in five coun-
tries that vary strongly in their degree of political competition, I provide evidence in
support of this theory. In the buildup to elections that are competitive, the average
bribe extorted by bureaucrats increases by 22% relative to non-electoral periods, and
when new leaders win o ce it remains high at around 15% above the non-electoral
period average. Consistent with the idea that political competition only increases
extortion when it increases uncertainty, bribes in the post-election period return to
the non-electoral average when incumbents win reelection. Moreover, we observe
no such dynamics around elections in states with little to no political competition.
The estimation strategy rules out a range of potential temporal and contextual con-
founders related to the timing of elections, and supplementary analyses cast doubt
on alternative substantive mechanisms linking extortion and elections.
The idea that leader turnover is an important determinant of political behavior
was developed in work by Olson and his coauthors and has been used in the explana-
tion of a number of diverse outcomes (Olson, 1993; Clague et al., 1996; Wright, 2008;
Gamboa-Cavazos, Garza-Cantu´, and Salinas, 2007; Campante, Chor, and Do, 2009;
Kendall-Taylor, 2011; Moon, 2015; Fails, 2014). Surprisingly, however, this insight
has not been applied to understanding the relationship between political competition
and corruption—even though leader turnover is at the heart of political liberalization
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and many cross-national measures of corruption focus specifically on bureaucratic
behavior. The results and theory presented in this chapter shed new light on the
literature on the non-linear relationship between democracy and corruption.
McMann et al. (2017, 4), for example, argue that “introduction of elections, re-
gardless of how free and fair they are, motivates government o cials to engage in
illicit activities to raise funds for garnering political support.” Sung (2004, 181) sim-
ilarly points to “the enormous costs of mounting electoral campaigns” in explaining
why elections might increase corruption.
However, I find no support for the idea that elections increase the aggregate
amount of corruption because money from bribes is used to fund campaigns: the
extensive margin of extortion is una↵ected by elections, and extortion increases in
the post-election period when challengers win. Furthermore, I find that elections
only increase the average bribe extorted when they are competitive. These facts are
inconsistent with the notion that extortion is used to fund autocratic elections.
Other studies argue that political liberalization does not reduce corruption due to
a lack of political competition. According to such accounts, democratization reduces
control over the bureaucracy in the short term without increasing political competi-
tion su ciently to reduce corruption. For example, Montinola and Jackman (2002,
163) argue that “the pronounced corruption-inhibiting political competitiveness and
transparency generated by democracy comes into play [when] democracies become
fully competitive.” In a similar vein, Mohtadi and Roe (2003) present a theoretical
argument tested empirically by Rock (2009), according to which democracy increases
both the opportunities and competition for people outside government to seek rents
by bribing o cials. However, as democratic consolidation proceeds “eventually in-
creased competition among rent-seekers and increased sanctions against rent-seeking
and corruption drive the returns to rent-seeking so low that aggregate rents (and cor-
ruption) fall when the state of democracy is su ciently well developed” (Rock, 2009,
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58). By contrast, the theory presented in this chapter provides good reasons to see
political competition itself as a cause of corruption, because at the core of competi-
tion for leadership is the assurance that incumbents can lose. Empirically, it is those
elections that are the most competitive that most strongly exacerbate extortionary
dynamics.
By taking seriously the direct e↵ects of political competition on bureaucratic
decision-making and testing the resulting predictions empirically through unusually
fine-grained data, this chapter provides some nuance to the understanding of how
political competition a↵ects corruption. Increased political competition may not con-
stitute a silver bullet for reducing bureaucratic corruption, even if it helps to dampen
high-level corruption by improving the incentives of elected legislators and executives
in the government (Ferraz and Finan, 2011). Without the necessary insulation of the
bureau from their influence, corruption may even increase as a result of democrati-
zation, due to the (real or perceived) harm that increased leader turnover does to
public sector wages.
More research into the direct e↵ects of democratization on bureaucratic behavior
is required in order to substantiate these findings. In particular, because the present
study has focused on dynamic processes that vary over the short- to intermediate-
term, we cannot conclude from its findings that long-term di↵erences in corruption
result from leadership uncertainty. Rather, the findings presented in this chapter
illustrate the plausibility of leader uncertainty as a causal mechanism mediating the
concave relationship between political competition and bureaucratic corruption. If
the results of this study are to be believed, then one policy implication is that bu-
reaucratic insulation is an important anti-corruption measure, not just for limiting
patronage, but also for ensuring e cient and honest bureaucratic performance. Thus,
future work might look at the long-run impact of civil service reform on cross-national
levels of corruption among democracies.
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3.6 Conclusion
I have proposed a novel explanation for the concave relationship between political
competition and corruption: by increasing the risk of job or wage volatility through
increased leader turnover, democratization increases bureaucrats’ temptation to en-
gage in risky extortionary strategies, thereby worsening corruption in the short-term.
The empirical analysis leveraged a dataset on over 300,000 self-reported bribes paid
in five West African countries to test this claim against competing theoretical ac-
counts, looking specifically at the e↵ect of moments of potential and actual leadership
changes on the corrupt behavior of bureaucrats. Taken as a whole, the specific pattern
of findings supports the notion that bureaucratic uncertainty can cause increases in
corruption: extortion does increase in the buildup to elections, but only when there
is a serious possibility of the incumbents losing those elections; elections do increase
corruption, but only when challengers with new policy priorities win. The results
suggest an understudied connection between the fight against bureaucratic corrup-




The invention of “the police” makes available to actors in society a power Bittner
(1973, 41) describes as “non-negotiable coercive force:” “when a deputized police
o cer decides that force is necessary, then, within the boundaries of this situation, he
is not accountable to anyone, nor is he required to brook the arguments or opposition
of anyone who might object to it.” The scope for abuse of such power is wide.
Police do not always abuse it: this dissertation suggests they are sometimes pre-
vented from doing so because their behavior is also “policed” by those over whom
they exercise power. In many places, and in the minds of many people, however, the
terms police and corruption remain virtually synonymous.
This dissertation has cast doubt on some avenues for reform and highlighted others
that may be more fruitful. In future work, I would like to explore some of these pro-
posals, and not only in developing states. In the United States, where an increasingly
militarized police force frequently turns lethal violence against structurally disadvan-
taged members of society, “calls for reform and oversight of police organizations are
now widespread” (Mummolo, 2018).
In this dissertation, I have tried to remain spatially and temporally proximate to
the micro-level interactions underlying the deployment of state policing power. I have
made the case that this proximity yields novel insights that challenge conventional
wisdom in the literature on state-building, accountability, and bureaucratic politics.
Yet there remain two particular areas of inquiry that constraints did not allow me
to explore and where a number of open questions linger.
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The first is the role of elite strategy in setting limits on policing power. In this
dissertation, I focused on the micro-politics that lie in the everyday interactions be-
tween civilians that do and do not have state policing powers conferred upon them.
But what about the “authorities?” How do chiefs experience state expansion, and
what kinds of strategic behavior does this induce? Do chiefs who attain authority
through competitive gift-giving relinquish dispute resolution functions more readily
than chiefs who inherit authority and possibly a set of extractive institutions? What
does such heterogeneity imply for state-building? Moreover, political elites can appar-
ently rely on police o cers’ ability to extort civilians as a form of informal taxation
during times of political uncertainty. Does this create incentives to leave open a space
for petty corruption, so that fiscal resources can be spent on other electorally-popular
programs? Do those elected to government really want to supplant customary au-
thorities, or are hybrid policing environments sometimes politically useful?
The second unexplored area concerns the way in which social networks structure
policing power. To home in on individuals’ strategic decision-making, these chapters
adopted a form of methodological individualism that is probably at odds with the
determinant role of social norms in the contexts I study. In a book called Society
Against the State, the political anthropologist Pierre Clastres (1974) put forth an
idea that I came across late in my research and that resonated strongly with me. He
claims that social scientists often misapply a hierarchical model of authority to tradi-
tional societies, in which community members are depicted as subjects at the bidding
of a commanding and all-powerful sovereign leader, The Chief. To the contrary, he
argues, seemingly all-powerful headmen often live in gilded cages. Chiefs, in his view,
are e↵ectively prisoners to their communities; the expression of a di↵use, relational
power that is shared among a much broader network of actors. What if that were true
not only of chiefs but also of the state police? In Uganda, for example, police o cers
I spoke to often struck me as quite terrified by the coercive power held by the com-
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munities they police. Throughout the world, community members frequently appoint
themselves policing power and form vigilante mobs to brutally kill those accused of
theft or assault. Women express particularly high support for such institutions of
networked policing power (Cooper and Wilke, 2018). What implications would a net-
work perspective on policing power have for the study of gender-based violence? How
does reducing men’s coercive control over women in the household a↵ect the broader
distribution of coercive power within a network? How can and should the awesome
coercive powers of the state be deployed to best protect individuals from avoidable
harms?
These are among many questions to which I would gratefully devote a lifetime of
scientific inquiry and collaboration.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 1
1
A.1 Supplementary Information
• Subsection A.1.1 contains a link to the pre-analysis plan.
• Subsection A.1.2 explains the summary statistics reported in regression tables.
• Subsection A.1.3 describes the sampling strategy employed in the endline sur-
vey.
• Subsection A.1.4 describes the measurement strategy.
• Subsection A.1.5 explains the randomization.
• Subsection A.1.6 provides descriptive information about the CAP and the kind
of policing work they do.
• Subsection A.1.7 describes the international crime victimization survey data
sources.
A.1.1 Pre-Analysis Plan
The PAP and addendum are available at http://egap.org/registration/2042 and the
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1505.
A.1.2 Explanatory Note on Regression Tables
Summary statistics reported in tables in main text and appendix are as follows. The
complier average causal e↵ect (CACE) is calculated through weighted instrumental
variables regression (p-value not reported). The RI p-values are calculated as above
and correspond to the Comm. Police coe cient. Contr. mean represents mean
outcomes for the control, while Contr. clust. SD reports the standard deviation of
the cluster-level means among control villages. [Min, Max] indicates the minimum
and maximum values observed for that outcome. ICC reports the intra-cluster corre-
lation of the outcome, estimated using ANOVA. Hypothesis indicates the direction
of the test as per the pre-analysis plan: lwr is a lower-tailed test, upr is an upper-
tailed test, and two is a two-tailed test. The M-W p-value reports the probability
of observing, under the null of no true di↵erence, an absolute di↵erence in the e↵ect
for men and women at least as large as that observed.
A.1.3 Sampling Strategy
Interviews were restricted to adults between the ages of eighteen to sixty-five. The
survey was translated, programmed onto tablets, and conducted in the local language,
Tok Pisin. The target number of respondents for the household survey was 1,550,
1,383 of whom we successfully interviewed, giving a response rate of 89%. Women
responded at a higher rate than men, 92% vs. 86%, respectively.
2
The data on candidates was collected during the same period by a single enumer-
ator, and when necessary by the author, in both Pidgin and English. Great lengths
were undertaken in order to track down all candidates in the recruitment lottery,
including those who were unsuccessful and had thus occasionally moved to di↵erent
locations. Surveying was successfully conducted in all of the treatment and control
villages. In the constituency of Bolave, what were thought to be two separate villages
were in fact separate hamlets of one large village, so sampling occurred at the hamlet
level, treating each candidate’s hamlet as a separate village. In one village in Tinputz
the survey team was unable to access the main hamlet of the candidate’s village due
to its location high in the mountains, and so surveyed in a sub-hamlet located roughly
forty minutes away by foot (but still part of the jurisdiction of the o cer).
Household members were selected to be interviewed using a two-stage sampling
procedure. In the first stage, enumerators worked with a village chief to develop a
list of the names of the heads of each household in the village. This list was then
re-ordered according to a random vector of integers pre-generated in R and printed
on paper. The first twenty-five households were designated to have a man sampled in
them, and the last twenty-five to have a woman sampled in them. On the day that
the household listing was conducted, no surveying took place. Rather, this occasion
was used to explain the purpose of the study, to set a date for data collection with the
chief(s) in the village, and to organize an awareness campaign to ensure that village
members would be present on the day the survey team returned for data collection.
In the second step of the random sampling process, enumerators were guided
by villagers to the respective households to which they had been assigned. Once
there, they asked to know how many members of that household within the eligible
age range and of the selected gender lived there at present. When the k number
of eligible respondents was obtained, enumerators used a household sampling grid
(generated prior to sampling in R and printed on paper) to randomly select the x’th
eldest member of the household, with x 2 {1, ..., k}. If the respondent was not
available enumerators were instructed to return to the household later in the day and
wait. Failing this, the enumerators moved to the next row of the grid and randomly
sampled another household member. When they ultimately failed to sample anyone
from the household, the household was marked as a non-respondent household.
There are fewer men in the sample than women. This occurred due to a failure to
sample as many men after about 10AM in the morning, by which time many had left
for the day to hunt or farm. As Table A.1 shows, there is no evidence of di↵erential
response due to treatment. Response rate di↵erences are calculated using inverse
probability weighted least squares regression with block fixed e↵ects. All p-values are
two-tailed, and calculated by permuting the treatment assignment 2000 times and
re-estimating e↵ects under the sharp null of no e↵ects for all units. The first column
reports cluster-level response rate among all household respondents, while the second
and third report rates among men and women, respectively.
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Dependent variable:
rate rate m rate w
(1) (2) (3)
Comm. Police  0.065  0.034  0.095
(0.048) (0.055) (0.060)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39 39 39
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.031 0.050
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.1: There is no evidence that the response rate among men or women is
systematically related to treatment assignment.
Response rate calculated by taking number of respondents surveyed in cluster j over target number of
respondents in j. Inverse-probability weighted regression conditioning on block indicators, p-values
from pre-registered randomization inference procedure.
Whereas the pre-registration plan indicated that fifty households would be sur-
veyed in each village, in more remote areas of the country it was discovered that this
was unfeasible, as many villages simply did not contain more than thirty households.
Because the randomization is blocked on small geographic areas, and village sizes
were very similar within blocks, the solution to this issue was simply to designate
some blocks as those in which the target for surveying was thirty households per vil-
lage, and others in which it was forty or fifty. Thus, cluster sizes are constant within
blocks but heterogeneous among them. This feature of the design was intended to
mitigate bias that can arise due to heterogeneous cluster sizes (Imai et al., 2009).
A.1.4 Measurement of Outcomes
Household-, respondent- and incident-level outcomes were measured through a seem-
ingly unrelated survey billed as ‘the Columbia University Bougainville Community
Safety Survey’ approximately eight months after the successful recruits had begun
working in their communities. Surveys were conducted in the local language, Tok
Pisin, and were gender-matched. The survey usually took around one hour to com-
plete, although the time varied somewhat due to the conditional nature of the incident
questions (explained below). Enumerators were not informed about the recruitment
lottery, nor were the community police o cers.
In addition to a range of questions measuring respondent-level outcomes, the sur-
vey sought to measure aspects of crime victimization at the incident-level, pertaining
to all members of the household of the respondent. Specifically, as criminal case
records suggest property crime and physical assault are the most common forms of
crime victimization in Bougainville (see figure A.2 above), two separate batteries of
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conditional questions sought to gather data on up to four incidents1 of each kind that
had occurred during the approximately one-year interval between the Bougainville
presidential elections in 2015 and the day of the survey. The 2015 Bougainville elec-
tions were chosen as a temporal marker as they represented an unprecedented e↵ort
by the authorities to expand representation into the most remote peripheries, and
thus it was reasonable to assume that respondents would not have trouble pinpoint-
ing this time. This was also a period of drought and strong winds, in Bougainville,
so these meteorological cues were also used to assist respondents’ e↵orts at recall.
For property incidents, the enumerator would begin by asking the respondent
about the things they or their household owned at some point over the past year, in
order to prime them to think of their valuables, livestock and crops. The enumerator
would then ask approximately how many times someone had damaged or stolen any
of those things over the past year, using the temporal markers of the election and
weather as guides. Typically respondents recalled such incidents with striking clarity.
Conditional on the respondent answering that more than 0 such incidents had oc-
curred, a range of incident level questions were asked about each incident, including
whether it took place before or after Christmas. Most Bougainvillean communities
are Christian, and so observe Christmas. The randomization took place right on
Christmas, and so this serves as a pre- post- temporal marker. The survey also asked
about the characteristics of the victim and perpetrator at a very abstract level so as
to avoid breaches of confidentiality. It asked about whether the incident was reported,
and if so to whom (chiefs, family, police, other), and how the incident was resolved if
at all.
The same procedure was followed for assault incidents, except that respondents
were primed with a definition of assault before beginning that section of the survey.
Respondents were never asked directly about whether someone in their household
had experienced sexual assault or intimate partner violence. Rather, the survey
asked how many times any member of the household had been a victim of assault
as defined in the prompt since the Bougainville elections in 2015, and then condi-
tional on the response being greater than 0, the survey asked about the victim, the
victim’s relationship to the perpetrator, and then asked what kinds of behavior the
incident involved. This question o↵ered ‘select all’ options, and so incidents might be
recorded as involving, shouting, hitting and sexual touching, for example. As with
property incidents, the survey asked if the incident occurred before or after Christmas,
and approximately how many months before or after. Every incident-level question
asked whether the perpetrators seemed to have planned the attack in advance (pre-
meditation), or whether it seemed to be the result of a spontaneous impulse (crime
of passion).
1While the raw number of incidents was recorded for each respondent and was not limited to four,
the incident-level questions were only asked in reference to four property and four assault incidents in
order to keep the survey within a manageable temporal duration. To avoid chronological censoring,
the survey asked respondents to order incidents in terms of how much distress they caused, beginning
with the most distressing and working to the least.
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A.1.5 Randomization
The candidates came from fifteen di↵erent administrative units, called constituencies.
Each constituency is represented by one facet on Figure A.1: the first two candidates
in the top left corner of the plot came from the Bolave constituency, for example, while
the next four to the right all came from the Carterets constituency. By conducting
fifteen lotteries in which 1-2 o cers were hired in each constituency the central police
were able to ensure an even territorial distribution at the constituency level.
Each facet representing a constituency on the plot contains four rows. The first
indicates individual candidates: circles represent men and triangles women; shapes
are filled when the candidate was selected through the lottery and empty when the
candidate was not selected. The second row indicates the villages from which the
candidates originated. In the Carterets constituency, for example, each of the four
candidates came from a di↵erent village. In Peit, by contrast, there are five candidates
from two villages: four candidates came from one village and only one came from the
other. The third and fourth rows indicate the numbers of men and women sampled
using a two-stage random selection procedure in each village, at least eight months
after the recruitment lottery.
The di↵erences in lottery size and composition generate di↵erential probabilities of
assignment to treatment at both the village and candidate level, which is reflected in
the size of the shapes. While these di↵erences can be relatively large at the candidate
level, at the village level they are fairly homogeneous. Turning to Peit, for example,
the probability of observing the treated candidate in treatment was 1/5 and the
probability of observing each of the control candidates in control was 4/5. However,
the probability of observing the treatment village in treatment was 1 - 1/5 = 4/5,
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Figure A.1: Households were cluster-assigned to community police presence by hiring
or not hiring a member of their village to become a community police o cer through
fifteen constituency-level lotteries.
Each panel represents one constituency-level lottery – an experimental block. The first row rep-
resents candidates to the CAP: if a shape is filled that candidate was selected, and if it is empty
that candidate was not selected. Circles indicate men and triangles women. The second row indi-
cates villages to which the candidates belong, with circles indicating a man was selected to become
a community police o cer in that village, triangles indicating a woman was selected to become
a community police o cer, and squares indicating that no member of the village was selected to
become a community police o cer. The bottom two rows indicate the number of men and women
sampled in the village. Shape sizes correspond to the inverse of the probability of observing the
candidate or village in the assigned condition (treatment or control).
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Assignment Gender Cand. ID Village ID COE (Block) Pr(Selected for Recruitment)
Not Selected M 1 1 Hagogohe 0.50
Selected M 2 2 Hagogohe 0.50
Not Selected F 3 1 Haku 0.33
Selected F 4 2 Haku 0.33
Not Selected M 5 3 Haku 0.33
Selected M 6 1 Halia 0.50
Not Selected F 7 2 Halia 0.50
Not Selected M 8 1 Peit 0.20
Not Selected F 9 1 Peit 0.20
Selected F 10 1 Peit 0.20
Not Selected M 11 1 Peit 0.20
Not Selected F 12 2 Peit 0.20
Not Selected F 13 1 Tsitalato 0.50
Selected M 14 2 Tsitalato 0.50
Not Selected M 15 1 Suir 0.25
Not Selected M 16 2 Suir 0.25
Selected M 17 3 Suir 0.25
Not Selected M 18 4 Suir 0.25
Selected F 19 1 Tinputz 0.33
Not Selected F 20 2 Tinputz 0.33
Not Selected M 21 2 Tinputz 0.33
Selected M 22 1 Carterets 0.50
Selected F 23 2 Carterets 0.50
Not Selected F 24 3 Carterets 0.50
Not Selected M 25 4 Carterets 0.50
Not Selected F 26 1 Kunua 0.40
Selected F 27 2 Kunua 0.40
Not Selected F 28 3 Kunua 0.40
Not Selected F 29 3 Kunua 0.40
Selected F 30 4 Kunua 0.40
Not Selected M 31 1 Selau 0.33
Selected M 32 2 Selau 0.33
Not Selected F 33 3 Selau 0.33
Selected M 34 1 Terra 0.50
Not Selected F 35 2 Terra 0.50
Not Selected M 36 1 Rau 0.33
Not Selected M 37 2 Rau 0.33
Selected M 38 3 Rau 0.33
Not Selected M 39 1 Eivo and Torau 0.50
Selected F 40 2 Eivo and Torau 0.50
Not Selected M 41 1 North Nasioi 0.33
Not Selected M 42 2 North Nasioi 0.33
Selected F 43 3 North Nasioi 0.33
Selected M 44 1 Bolave 0.50
Not Selected M 45 2 Bolave 0.50
Table A.2: People living in thirty-nine di↵erent villages were cluster-randomized to
have or not have a CAP o cer living in the village by randomly selecting seventeen
of forty-five candidates to be recruited into the CAP.
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Average age 30 37
Average years of education 15 12
Average number of large assets
owned
1.4 1.3
Average household sizes 5.4 4.9
Chief is close family 49% 37%
Police
Attitudes
Believe chief should always defer
to police
77% 40%
Believe police more likely than
chief to respond to crime
31% 12%
Table A.3: Those who become Community Auxiliary Police are younger and more
educated than the average member of their community. While they are closer to the
chief in terms of family ties, they are much more likely to believe the chief should
defer to the police.
Results from survey with all CAP candidates in recruitment lottery for this study (successful and
unsuccessful) and with random probability sample of men and women in households from the can-
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Figure A.2: The Community Auxiliary Police are involved in all aspects of village
life, but spend most of their time dealing with disputes over property and personal
matters.
Panels show frequency distribution of incidents dealt with by the Community Auxiliary Police as
reported in mandatory monthly incident reports from 2005 - 2009. Panes are organized in order of
the importance of each major category. x-axis plots the proportion of all incidents represented by
the type of incident indicated on the y-axis.
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A.1.7 International Victimization Data
country global region years
1 Austria west europe 1996 (N = 1507)
2 Belgium west europe 1989 (N = 2060), 1992 (N = 1485), 2000 (N = 2501)
3 Catalonia west europe 2000 (N = 2909)
4 Denmark west europe 2000 (N = 3007)
5 England & Wales west europe 1989 (N = 2006), 1992 (N = 2001), 1996 (N = 2171), 2000 (N = 1947)
6 Finland west europe 1989 (N = 1025), 1992 (N = 1655), 1996 (N = 3830), 2000 (N = 1782)
7 France west europe 1989 (N = 1502), 1996 (N = 1003), 2000 (N = 1000)
8 Germany(west) west europe 1989 (N = 5274)
9 Italy west europe 1992 (N = 2024)
10 Malta west europe 1997 (N = 1000)
11 Netherlands west europe 1989 (N = 2000), 1992 (N = 2000), 1996 (N = 2008), 2000 (N = 2000)
12 Northern Irel west europe 1989 (N = 2000), 1996 (N = 1042), 2000 (N = 1511)
13 Norway west europe 1989 (N = 1009)
14 Portugal west europe 2000 (N = 2000)
15 Scotland west europe 1989 (N = 2007), 1996 (N = 2194), 2000 (N = 2055)
16 Spain west europe 1989 (N = 2041), 1993 (N = 1634), 1994 (N = 1505)
17 Sweden west europe 1992 (N = 1707), 1996 (N = 1000), 2000 (N = 2001)
18 Switzerland west europe 1989 (N = 1000), 1996 (N = 1000), 2000 (N = 4234)
19 Australia new world 1989 (N = 2012), 1992 (N = 2006), 2000 (N = 2005)
20 Canada new world 1989 (N = 2074), 1992 (N = 2152), 1996 (N = 2134), 2000 (N = 2078)
21 Japan new world 1989 (N = 2411)
22 New Zealand new world 1992 (N = 2048)
23 USA new world 1989 (N = 1996), 1992 (N = 1501), 1996 (N = 1003), 2000 (N = 1000)
24 Albania east / central europe 1996 (N = 1200), 2000 (N = 1498)
25 Belarus east / central europe 1997 (N = 999), 2000 (N = 1520)
26 Bulgaria east / central europe 1997 (N = 1076), 2000 (N = 1505)
27 Czech republic east / central europe 1992 (N = 1262), 1996 (N = 1801), 2000 (N = 1500)
28 Croatia east / central europe 1997 (N = 994), 2000 (N = 1532)
29 Estonia east / central europe 1992 (N = 1000), 1995 (N = 1173), 2000 (N = 1700)
30 Georgia east / central europe 1992 (N = 1395), 1996 (N = 1137), 2000 (N = 1000)
31 Hungary east / central europe 1996 (N = 756), 2000 (N = 1513)
32 Kyrgyzstan east / central europe 1996 (N = 1750)
33 Latvia east / central europe 1996 (N = 1411), 2000 (N = 1201)
34 Lithuania east / central europe 1997 (N = 1176), 2000 (N = 1526)
35 Macedonia east / central europe 1996 (N = 700)
36 Mongolia east / central europe 1996 (N = 1200)
37 Poland east / central europe 1992 (N = 2033), 1996 (N = 3483), 2000 (N = 6337)
38 Rumania east / central europe 1996 (N = 1091), 2000 (N = 1506)
39 Russia east / central europe 1992 (N = 1002), 1996 (N = 1018), 2000 (N = 1500)
40 Slovakia east / central europe 1992 (N = 508), 1997 (N = 1105)
41 Slovenia east / central europe 1992 (N = 1000), 1997 (N = 2053), 2001 (N = 3886)
42 Ukraine east / central europe 1997 (N = 1000), 2000 (N = 1509)
43 Yugoslavia east / central europe 1996 (N = 1094)
44 Azerbaijan asia 2000 (N = 930)
45 Cambodia asia 2001 (N = 3155)
46 China asia 1992 (N = 2000)
47 India asia 1992 (N = 1040), 1996 (N = 1200)
48 Indonesia asia 1989 (N = 600), 1992 (N = 3239), 1996 (N = 1400)
49 Japan asia 2000 (N = 2211)
50 Mongolia asia 2000 (N = 944)
51 Philippines asia 1992 (N = 1503), 1996 (N = 1500), 2000 (N = 1500)
52 Republic of Korea asia 2000 (N = 2043)
53 Botswana africa 1997 (N = 644), 2000 (N = 1197)
54 Egypt africa 1992 (N = 1000)
55 Lesotho africa 2000 (N = 1010)
56 Mozambique africa 2002 (N = 993)
57 Namibia africa 2000 (N = 1061)
58 Nigeria africa 1998 (N = 1012)
59 South Africa africa 1993 (N = 988), 1996 (N = 1006), 2000 (N = 1336)
60 Swaziland africa 2000 (N = 1006)
61 Tanzania africa 1992 (N = 1002)
62 Tunisia africa 1992 (N = 1086)
63 Uganda africa 1992 (N = 1023), 1996 (N = 1197), 2000 (N = 998)
64 Zambia africa 2000 (N = 1047)
65 Zimbabwe africa 1996 (N = 1006)
66 Argentina latin america 1992 (N = 1000), 1996 (N = 1000), 2001 (N = 8931)
67 Bolivia latin america 1996 (N = 999)
68 Brazil latin america 1992 (N = 1017), 1996 (N = 1000)
69 Colombia latin america 1997 (N = 1000), 2000 (N = 1016)
70 Costa Rica latin america 1992 (N = 983), 1996 (N = 1000)
71 Panama latin america 2000 (N = 902)
72 Paraguay latin america 1996 (N = 587)
Table A.4: Years and countries included in International Crime Victimization Survey
data.
11
A.2 Identification and Robustness
• Subsection A.2.1 reports the balance across all available covariates.
• Subsection A.2.2 reports a Monte Carlo power analysis and diagnosis of the
experimental design’s inferential features (unbiasedness, coverage, and so on).
• Subsection A.2.3 describes the properties of the strategy used to estimate re-
porting estimands.
• Subsection A.2.4 describes the procedure employed to construct confidence in-
tervals through inverted hypothesis tests.
• Subsection A.2.5 provides a graphical representation of the variation in where
and when women police o cers were present in villages in the observational
data.
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A.2.1 Balance on Covariates
Covariate p-value Control Treatment
education 0.00 12.30 11.70
student 0.02 0.00 0.10
cap is was 0.04 0.00 0.00
conditions 0.08 0.70 0.60
cap fam is was 0.13 0.20 0.30
had cap 0.25 0.30 0.20
education yes no 0.25 1.00 1.00
television 0.26 0.10 0.10
spouse present 0.27 0.00 0.00
n vegetables crops 0.30 8.30 8.60
n appliances 0.40 0.80 0.70
woman 0.43 0.50 0.50
n large assets 0.43 1.30 1.30
years had cap 0.46 1.40 1.00
chief clan 0.46 0.00 0.00
n cash crops 0.46 0.90 0.90
chief ext fam 0.47 0.40 0.40
n assets 0.51 5.90 5.80
age 0.52 36.80 36.10
bps is was 0.53 0.00 0.00
cellphone 0.62 0.70 0.70
household size log1p 0.63 1.70 1.70
chief close fam 0.66 0.40 0.40
chief wantok 0.74 0.10 0.10
others present 0.74 0.20 0.20
bps fam is was 0.75 0.20 0.30
chief dk 0.84 0.00 0.00
pig 0.87 0.40 0.40
Table A.5: Balance on covariates among household respondents. Di↵erences esti-
mated using inverse probability weighted least squares regression with block fixed
e↵ects. All p-values two-tailed, calculated by permuting the treatment assignment
2000 times and re-estimating e↵ects under the sharp null of no e↵ects for all units.
Control and treatment columns report inverse probability weighted means of covari-
ates, ignoring blocks.
A.2.2 Power Analysis and Design Diagnosis
I conduct here a simulated power analysis that treats some information about the
study as known and other information as unknown. In particular, I treat as known
the number of blocks and clusters, as well as the average size of clusters. I treat as
unknown the true underlying intra-cluster correlation: I consider ICC varying from
.01 to .10, which is consistent with the range of ICCs estimated in the data. I also
treat the true underlying ATE as unknown, and consider power at e↵ect sizes ranging
from .05 to one-quarter of a standard deviation. To address the concern that the
estimator could be biased due to the heterogeneous assignment probabilities, the data-
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generating process stipulates correlation between outcomes and block membership.
I use the DeclareDesign software and procedure described with co-authors in Blair
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Figure A.3: The study is powered at 80% to detect an e↵ect equal to one-fifth of a
standard deviation in the outcome. This translates roughly to a 7 - 10 percentage
point e↵ect for binary outcomes.
Power displayed on y-axis and true percentage point e↵ect on a binary outcome displayed on x-axis.
Assumes a one-tailed test with confidence level of 90%, 20 clusters per arm, and an N of 1,400.
The ex-post power analysis reveals that the design is powered at 80% to detect
at least a 1/5th standard deviation e↵ect, at all considered levels of ICC. In terms of
binomial outcomes, the study is powered to detect a roughly 7-10 percentage point
e↵ect.
Setting the ICC to .01 and the e↵ect size to .2 standard deviations, we can examine
other properties of the estimator, displayed on Table A.6.
Mean SD Mean Type
Bias RMSE Power Coverage Estimate Estimate SE S Rate Estimand
-0.00 0.06 0.91 0.96 0.20 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table A.6: Even allowing for correlation in potential outcomes and block member-
ship, some positive ICC, and stochastic cluster sizes, the design exhibits desirable
properties in terms of key diagnosands such as bias, RMSE, power, and coverage.
(See Blair et al., 2018, for more details on the notion of diagnosands)
The estimator is unbiased, even when block membership and potential outcomes
are correlated. The design exhibits the correct coverage properties, with a cover-
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age probability that the bootstrap simulation standard errors indicate is statistically
indistinguishable from 95%. The high power of the study also means that the proba-
bility of statistically-significant e↵ects being wrongly signed is 0 in this range of e↵ect
sizes (Gelman and Carlin, 2014).
A.2.3 Post-Treatment Estimands
I show here that the strategy used to estimate “post-treatment” reporting e↵ects in
Table 1.1, and Figures 1.5 and 1.8 is unbiased.
Suppose that there is a population of N = 1000 people assigned to treatment with
probability Pr(Z = 1) = .5. Let individuals indexed i 2 {1, ..., N} have two sets of
potential outcomes as a function of Z. First, crime: Ci = 1 if individual i is victimized
and 0 otherwise. Thus, Ci(Z = 1), for example, denotes victimization status of
individuals assigned to treatment. The average treatment e↵ect on victimization can
thus be denoted E[Ci(Z = 1)  Ci(Z = 0)].
Second, conditional on victimization we have reporting: if Ci = 1 then Ri = 1
when individual i reports and 0 otherwise. We assume that the reporting status of
crimes that do not occur is undefined. Using this notation we can define a potential
outcome that is a combination of both Ci and Ri.
Mi =
8><>:
1 if Ci = 0,
2 if Ci = 1 and Ri = 0,
3 if Ci = 1 and Ri = 1.
Denoting an indicator for Mi = 2, for example, by Y 2i 2 {0, 1}, we can then define as
our estimand the average e↵ect of the treatment on the probability that a respondent
experiences crime and does not report it:
E[Y 2i (Z = 1)  Y 2i (Z = 0)] (A.1)
Similarly, we could define Y 1i as an indicator for Mi = 1 so that E[Y
1
i (Z = 1)  
Y 1i (Z = 0)] would describe the average e↵ect of the treatment on the probability
that a respondent experienced no crime, or Y 3i as an indicator for Mi = 3 so that
E[Y 3i (Z = 1)   Y 3i (Z = 0)] corresponds to the average e↵ect of the treatment on
the probability that a respondent experienced crime and reported it. Because Yi is
observed irrespective of crime in all of these cases, it does not constitute a post-
treatment quantity and is not subject to post-treatment bias.
Employing the simulation method described in separate work (Blair et al., 2018),
I show here that a multinomial estimator can estimate these estimands in an unbiased
manner, even in the presence of an e↵ect on crime and correlation between reporting
and e↵ects on crime.
In the simulation exercise I define potential outcomes and estimands as above.
I suppose that there are two types in the population: those who are high reporters
(Hi = 1) are more likely to report crime when victimized and those who are not
15
high reporters (Hi = 0) are less likely to report crime when victimized. I assume
Pr(Hi = 1) = .5, without loss of generality.
Whether or not subject i is victimized is determined by a probit process of the
form
⌘i|Z=0 ⇠ N(1, 1),
⌘i|Z=1 ⇠ N(1 +H⌧H + ⌧C , 1),
Ci ⇠ Binom( (Z⌘i|Z=1 + (1  Z)⌘i|Z=0)),
where the treatment e↵ect e↵ect is a combination of ⌧C , which a↵ects all subjects,
and ⌧H , which is an extra e↵ect only received by high reporters. For example, if
⌧C < 0 and ⌧H < 0, the treatment would reduce crime overall and especially strongly
for high reporters.
Reporting outcomes are defined by the following data-generating process:
⇣i|Z=0 ⇠ N(0 +H, 1),
⇣i|Z=1 ⇠ N(0 +H + ⌧R, 1),
Ri ⇠
(
Binom( (Z⇣i|Z=1 + (1  Z)⇣i|Z=0)) if Ci = 1,
Undefined if Ci = 0.
Thus, whether someone is a high reporter is correlated both with overall reporting
levels and with the treatment e↵ect on crime, which determines whether there is
anything to report at all. In other words, the data-generating process is highly
susceptible to post-treatment bias under naive estimation strategies.
I estimate the estimand in equation A.1 by fitting a multinomial likelihood to
Mi as a function of Zi, and using the model to calculate the di↵erence in predicted
probabilities for the whole sample: E[ \Pr(Y 2 = 1 | Z = 1)]  E[ \Pr(Y 2 = 1 | Z = 0)].
For the simulation study, I consider all possible combinations of negative, zero and
positive e↵ects for ⌧H , ⌧C and ⌧R. For each combination of parameters, I simulate
the data-generating process and random assignment 1000 times, and calculate both
the true underlying estimand as well as the bias in the estimates. The results of the
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Figure A.4: The multinomial estimator is able to estimate the estimand described in
equation A.1 without bias, even in the presence of treatment e↵ects on crime that are
correlated with reporting probabilities. However, the estimand cannot be interpreted
as purely about reporting: it is a mix of e↵ects on the crime rate and on reporting. In
this study, the weak evidence for e↵ects on crime lends weight to the interpretation
of e↵ects as primarily related to reporting dynamics.
The x-axis reports the postulated e↵ect on the probability of crime (in terms of latent probits). The
y-axis on the top row corresponds to the true ATE on the probability that a respondent experiences
crime and does not report it (equation A.1). The y-axis on the bottom row plots bias in the estimates
with respect to this estimand. The first column of plots corresponds to a world in which there is a
negative treatment e↵ect on conditional reporting behavior, the middle column to a world in which
there is no e↵ect, and the last column to a positive e↵ect on reporting. The lines are colored to
represent negative, neutral or positive e↵ects on crime among high reporters.
The x-axis reports the postulated e↵ect on the probability of crime (in terms
of latent probits). The y-axis on the top row corresponds to the true ATE on the
probability that a respondent experiences crime and does not report it (equation
A.1). The y-axis on the bottom row plots bias in the estimates with respect to this
estimand. The first column of plots corresponds to a world in which there is a negative
treatment e↵ect on conditional reporting behavior, the middle column to a world in
which there is no e↵ect, and the last column to a positive e↵ect on reporting. Finally,
the lines are colored to represent negative, neutral or positive e↵ects on crime among
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high reporters.
Focusing firstly on the bottom row, no combination of e↵ects produces bias in the
estimator. However, we see that the estimand does change as a function of all of these
features: the value of the estimand depends both on crime and reporting probabilities.
In particular, as the middle column reveals, the probability of experiencing and not
reporting crime can decline (increase) even when there is no e↵ect on reporting, due
to a negative (positive) e↵ect on crime. In general, however, the interpretation of the
estimand as is consistent with e↵ects on reporting – especially in those cases when
there is no e↵ect on the crime rate.
In this study, we cannot rule out e↵ects on the crime rate conclusively. However,
this is an issue for interpretation: the estimator that is used can obtain an unbiased
estimate of the quantities it targets. The fact that we can rule out even quite small
e↵ects on crime with a large degree of certainty (see plot 1.7, for example) aids
strongly with the interpretation that e↵ects we observe are largely due to underlying
changes in reporting behavior.
A.2.4 Inverted-Hypothesis Testing Procedure
In light of the null results on crime, I test a range of hypotheses to see what sorts
constant e↵ects are highly implausible, given the data.
Denote the treated and control potential outcomes of subject i Yi|Z=1 and Yi|Z=0,
respectively. As implied by equation 2.1, these outcomes are thought to be a function
not just of the treatment, but also of block fixed e↵ects and other covariates. We can
thus denote the residualized potential outcomes
Y˜i|Z=1 = Yi|Z=1    ˆk  Xi ˆ = ⌧Zj + ✏i
Y˜i|Z=0 = Yi|Z=1    ˆk  Xi ˆ = ✏i
Similarly, denote the residualized observed outcome for subject i by Y˜i.
Now, suppose we posit a constant treatment e↵ect, ⌧h. If the data was indeed
truly generated by ⌧h = ⌧ , the following equality will hold:
Y˜i   ⌧hZj = Y˜i|Z=0 = ✏i.
In other words, ⌧h can be used to construct a hypothetical residualized control out-
come that we can denote Y˜i|⌧h = Y˜i   ⌧hZj. Because Zj is randomly assigned, we
know that Zj |= ✏i, and therefore Zj |= Y˜i|Z=0. We can thereby construct a test for how
well ⌧h approximates ⌧ by using randomization inference to evaluate the hypothesis
that Y˜i|⌧h |= Zj.
As in Bowers, Fredrickson, and Aronow (2016), I employ the sum of squared
residuals (SSR) as a test statistic. Let ⌧ˆh denote the estimated treatment e↵ect in a
regression of Y˜⌧h on a given realization of the treatment vector Z and ↵ the intercept
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in this regression. Then we can define the SSR test statistic as,
T (Y˜⌧h , Z) =
X
i
( ˜Yi|⌧h   ⌧ˆhZj   ↵)2.
Intuitively, the closer that ⌧h approximates the true ⌧ , the closer that ˜Yi|⌧h approxi-
mates ˜Yi|Z=0 and the more poorly ⌧ˆh will do in explaining variance in ˜Yi|⌧h because this
outcome will be independent of Zj. T is thus monotonically increasing (decreasing)
as the observed data becomes more (less) plausible given the hypothesized e↵ect.
Since the pre-analysis plan specified a negative relationship between the crime rate
and the treatment, I restrict the domain of constant e↵ects hypotheses to be negative.
Specifically, I consider hypotheses in the domain from -.5 to 0, in increments of .01:
⌧h 2 {⌧1 =  .5, ..., ⌧50 = 0}.
Prior to testing, I residualize and standardize the outcomes by first taking the
residuals from a regression of the post-treatment crime outcome on block indicators,
“pre-treatment” crime and all available covariates, and then mean-centering the re-
sulting residuals and dividing by their standard deviation. The hypotheses can thus
be understood as standard deviation e↵ects, ranging from negative one-half to zero
standard deviations.
For each hypothesis I conduct the following steps:
1. Construct Y˜⌧h under hypothesized constant e↵ect ⌧h by subtracting Z⌧h from
the observed residualized and standardized outcome, Y˜ .
2. Record the sum of squared residuals under the observed assignment, T (Y˜⌧h , Z).
3. Permute the treatment assignment vector while respecting the original blocking
and clustering schema, in order to obtain a new assignment vector, Z 0. Repeat
this process 1000 times and group the resultant vectors into an N⇥1000 matrix
of permuted assignments, Z0.
4. Record the test statistic for every Z 0 in Z0, T (Y˜⌧h , Z 0). The 1000 test statistics
correspond to the distribution of the SSR test statistic under the null hypothesis
of Z |= Y˜⌧h . As discussed above, this hypothesis is true when ⌧ = ⌧h.
5. Calculate the p-value as the probability of observing an SSR so large if in-
deed the hypothesized constant e↵ect had produced the data: E[T (Y˜⌧h , Z)  
T (Y˜⌧h , Z 0)].
A.2.5 Temporal Variation in Female O cer Presence
The left panel of Figure A.5 illustrates the length of time for which the villages were
covered in the data, by either a man or woman police o cer. Green dots indicate
the start and red the end of the woman police o cer’s tenure in the village, with
dotted lines indicating presence of a male police o cer and solid lines the presence of
at least one woman police o cer. The panel on the right shows the cumulative total
































































































































































No women police present Women police present
Figure A.5: There is substantial temporal variation in the presence of women police
o cers among villages where women police worked at least once.
Left panel : Plots the presence of men and women police o cers in the sixty-one villages in
Bougainville in which a woman worked as a police o cer at some point from 2005-2009. The
y-axis indicates the village, the x-axis indicates the date. Lines indicate presence of a police o cer:
dotted when there is no woman o cer present and solid when there is a woman police o cer work-
ing. Points indicate the start and end of women police o cer presence in the village.
Right panel : Plots the monthly total number of villages in which a woman police o cer was present,
among villages where a woman worked at least once from 2005-2009. The y-axis indicates the num-
ber of villages, the x-axis indicates the date. Bars are colored light gray to indicate the number of
villages in a given month in which no woman police o cer was present, and dark gray to indicate
the number of villages in a given month where a woman police o cer was present.
Source: Bougainville Police Service.
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A.3 Supplementary Analyses
• Subsection A.3.1 provides the regression tables underlying the plots in the main
results section.
• Subsection A.3.2 provides an explanation for the di↵erence in treatment e↵ects
on “victimization” versus “prevalence” measures of violence and property crime.
• Subsection A.3.3 reports an attempt to estimate the long-run e↵ect of police
o cer presence on the number of incidents of violence against women.
• Subsection A.3.4 reports treatment e↵ects on broader attitudes toward the
state.
• Subsection A.3.5 reports treatment e↵ects on support for mob violence versus
police intervention.
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A.3.1 Regression Tables for Figures in Main Results
Dependent variable:
Proc. Just. Index Treat Same Treat Polite Listen
M W M W M W M W
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Comm. Pol.  0.033 0.070⇤⇤  0.049 0.073⇤  0.037 0.033  0.010 0.058⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.035) (0.031) (0.047) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.027)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contr. mean 0.6 0.7 0.47 0.63 0.63 0.77 0.69 0.8
[Min, Max] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
ICC 0.06 0.1 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04
Hypothesis upr upr upr upr upr upr upr upr
M-W p-value 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.22
CACE -0.05 0.1 -0.07 0.1 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.08
Observations 668 715 668 715 668 715 668 715
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Dependent variable:
Seem Concerned Take Serious Seem Competent Explain Process
M W M W M W M W
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Comm. Pol.  0.047 0.076⇤  0.036 0.104⇤⇤  0.009 0.062⇤  0.040 0.086⇤
(0.036) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.049)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contr. mean 0.59 0.69 0.63 0.64 0.5 0.71 0.66 0.65
[Min, Max] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
ICC 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.09 0 0.07 0.08 0.08
Hypothesis upr upr upr upr upr upr upr upr
M-W p-value 0.06 0.01 0.14 0.02
CACE -0.06 0.11 -0.05 0.15 -0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.12
Observations 668 715 668 715 668 715 668 715
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.7: Regression results underlying Figure 1.2.
All results estimated at household-level. Columns labeled M report results among male respondents,
those labeled W among female respondents. Label P indicates that outcome concerns police. Index
created by summing other procedural justice items. Point estimates are calculated using inverse-
probability weighted least squares regression, with fixed e↵ects for blocks and probability of being in
assigned condition as (inverse) weight. All standard errors clustered at the village level. The analysis
conditions on all available covariates (see Table A.5). All p-values calculated using randomization
inference with the hypothesis test as pre-registered in the pre-analysis plan.
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Dependent variable:
Proc. Just. Index Treat Same Treat Polite Listen
M W M W M W M W
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Comm. Pol.  0.037 0.177⇤  0.129⇤⇤ 0.161 0.042 0.092 0.0002 0.173⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.096) (0.061) (0.125) (0.060) (0.069) (0.039) (0.064)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contr. mean 0.6 0.66 0.49 0.61 0.64 0.75 0.68 0.76
[Min, Max] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
ICC 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.04
Hypothesis upr upr upr upr upr upr upr upr
M-W p-value 0.12 0.16 0.62 0.34
CACE -0.06 0.32 -0.23 0.29 0.07 0.16 0 0.31
Observations 328 339 328 339 328 339 328 339
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Dependent variable:
Seem Concerned Take Serious Seem Competent Explain Process
M W M W M W M W
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Comm. Pol.  0.017 0.166  0.005 0.213⇤  0.082⇤⇤ 0.152⇤⇤  0.065⇤ 0.279⇤⇤
(0.071) (0.112) (0.051) (0.120) (0.036) (0.075) (0.034) (0.131)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contr. mean 0.57 0.66 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.68 0.67 0.59
[Min, Max] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
ICC 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.14 0 0.1 0.12 0.12
Hypothesis upr upr upr upr upr upr upr upr
M-W p-value 0.36 0.2 0.15 0.15
CACE -0.03 0.3 -0.01 0.38 -0.15 0.27 -0.12 0.5
Observations 328 339 328 339 328 339 328 339
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.8: Regression results underlying Figure 1.3.
All results estimated at household-level, among villages that could have had a woman police o cer
hired in them. Columns labeled M report results among male respondents, those labeled W among
female respondents. Label P indicates that outcome concerns police. Index created by summing
other procedural justice items. Point estimates are calculated using inverse-probability weighted
least squares regression, with fixed e↵ects for blocks and probability of being in assigned condition
(having woman police o cer hired) as (inverse) weight. All standard errors clustered at the village
level. The analysis conditions on all available covariates (see Table A.5). All p-values calculated
using randomization inference with the hypothesis test as pre-registered in the pre-analysis plan.
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Dependent variable:
Chief vs. Police Lynching vs. Police
M W M W
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Comm. Police 0.065⇤⇤⇤ 0.012  0.039⇤  0.038⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.029) (0.022) (0.019)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contr. mean 0.59 0.59 0.22 0.18
[Min, Max] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
ICC 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.05
Hypothesis two two lwr lwr
M-W p-value 0.27 0.98
CACE 0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.05
Observations 668 715 668 715
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.9: Regression results underlying Figure 1.4 in main text and Figure A.6 in
appendix.
Columns labeled M report results among male respondents, those labeled W among female respon-
dents. Point estimates are calculated using inverse-probability weighted least squares regression,
conditioning on block indicators and available covariates (see Table A.5). Probability of being in
assigned condition is (inverse) weight. All standard errors clustered at the village level. All p-values
calculated using randomization inference. A detailed description of the summary statistics can be
found under section A.1.2.
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Relative to no reports of VAW in village-month,
log-odds of some cases reported and...
...resolved by ...resolved by ...resolved by
Chief only Police only Chief and Police
(1) (2) (3)
Woman police presence 0.867⇤⇤ 0.922⇤⇤⇤ 0.666⇤
RI P-value 0.044 0.008 0.08
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes
N Village-Months 1322 1322 1322
N Villages 61 61 61
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.10: Regression results underlying Figure 1.5.
Multinomial regression of the reporting outcome on indicator for presence of a woman police o cer
in that village-month, an imputation fixed e↵ect, as well as month fixed e↵ects. Randomization
p-values calculated by randomly simulating start and end dates for women police o cers.
Relative to no reports of VAW in village-month,
log-odds of some cases reported and...
...resolved by ...resolved by ...resolved by
Chief only Police only Chief and Police
(1) (2) (3)
Woman police presence 0.814⇤⇤⇤ 0.934⇤⇤⇤ 0.822⇤⇤⇤
Patrilocal 0.646 0.315  1.151
Woman police x Patrilocal  1.290⇤⇤⇤  0.137  10.767⇤⇤
RI p-val - WPP 0.000 0.000 0.000
RI p-val - Patr. 0.278 0.562 0.506
RI p-val - WPP x Patr. 0.004 0.718 0.024
Year-Month FE No No No
N Village-Months 9197 9197 9197
N Villages 275 275 275
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.11: Regression results underlying Figure 1.8.
Multinomial regression of the reporting outcome on indicator for presence of a woman police o cer
in that village-month, an imputation fixed e↵ect, as well as month fixed e↵ects. Randomization
p-values calculated by randomly simulating start and end dates for women police o cers.
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Relative to no reports of VAW in village-month,
log-odds of some cases reported and...
...resolved by ...resolved by ...resolved by
by Chief only by Police only by Chief and Police
(1) (2) (3)
Woman police presence 1.462⇤⇤⇤ 0.356 0.970⇤
RI P-value 0.008 0.336 0.064
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
N Village-Months 1322 1322 1322
N Villages 61 61 61
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.12: Replicating Table A.10 using a generalized di↵erence-in-di↵erence esti-
mator.
Multinomial regression of the reporting outcome on indicator for presence of a woman police of-
ficer in that village-month, an imputation fixed e↵ect, as well as month and period fixed e↵ects.
Randomization p-values calculated by randomly simulating start and end dates for women police
o cers.
A.3.2 Explaining E↵ects on Public Order
The results presented on Table 1.3 illustrate the community police are estimated
to reduce the respondent’s perception that alcohol use has been a serious problem
in the village over the past 6 months by 8-11% (ITT = -.13, CACE = -.18, p <
.1). This e↵ect is relative to the baseline of about 1.6 on a scale coded 0 (“Alcohol
not a problem”), 1 (“Alcohol is a problem, but not so serious”) and 2 (“Alcohol
is a very serious problem”). Note further that the intra-cluster correlation is much
higher for this measure than for others, indicating a relatively strong consensus among
respondents about the extent to which alcohol is a problem.
This result is consequential in the Bougainvillean context, where alcohol abuse
is seen as a response to trauma induced by the experience of civil war hostilities,
and has been linked to perpetration of intra-household violence (Jewkes, Jama-Shai,
and Sikweyiya, 2017) and property destruction. Alcohol is frequently pointed to as
a causative or aggravating factor in police case records detailing assault and theft in
Bougainville. According to estimates provided by the police, one CAP operation in
early 2016 involved destroying approximately eighty-five of the LPG canisters used
to make homebrew in the communities where they work. The destruction of so many
canisters represents a substantial blow to the informal homebrewing sector.
These points lend support to the idea that the estimated reductions in VAW
and theft prevalence represent a successful e↵ort at de-escalating or even preventing
certain kinds of community disorder through preventative policing. In qualitative
interviews, chiefs often mentioned the CAPs’ e↵orts to rid communities of the means
to produce homebrew by seizing used LPG canisters as one of the concrete ways in
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which the CAP had improved order. Dismantling homebrew operations is a delicate
task, and it is di cult to see how it could be achieved by either the regular police or
by chiefs. As CAP explained in focus groups in 2015, homebrew is often a livelihood
model for elderly people who can no longer farm. Putting a stop to these operations
and finding alternative, less punitive solutions for “o↵enders” requires a combination
of independent authority and deep connection to the community that outside police
o cers or risk averse chiefs often lack.
A.3.3 Long-Run Analysis
Dependent variable:
N VAW Incidents Reported in Month
Police Presence: 6-12 months  0.051
(0.036)
Police Presence: 12-18 months  0.086
(0.056)
Police Presence: 18-24 months  0.077
(0.076)
Police Presence: 24-30 months  0.121
(0.098)
Police Presence: 30-36 months  0.142
(0.120)
Police Presence: 36-42 months  0.147
(0.139)
Police Presence: 42-48 months  0.190
(0.157)







Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.13: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences between village-months that have 1-6 months
versus up to five years of community police presence.
The long-run e↵ect of community-policing presence is estimated using the full set of panel data,
aggregated to the village-month level. Outcome is the number of incidents of violence against women
(VAW) reported to police o cers in a village in a given month. Regression specification treats village-
months within the first 6 months of CAP presence as the reference category, and estimates the e↵ect
of subsequent half-years of exposure on the number of VAW incidents reported, conditional on fixed
e↵ects for the village and month in which the village-month is observed. Standard errors clustered




Trust State Vote Independently Know President
M W M W M W
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Comm. Police  0.034 0.082  0.025  0.060  0.026  0.009
(0.075) (0.083) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contr. mean 3.09 3.24 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.77
[Min, Max] [1,4] [1,4] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
ICC 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01
Hypothesis upr upr upr upr upr upr
M-W p-value 0.3 0.42 0.66
CACE -0.05 0.11 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01
Observations 668 715 668 715 668 715
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table A.14: There is no strong evidence that experience with community policing
a↵ects trust in government, propensity to vote with the chief, or knowledge of gov-
ernment.
All results estimated at household-level. Point estimates are calculated using inverse-probability
weighted least squares regression, with fixed e↵ects for blocks and probability of being in assigned
condition as (inverse) weight. All standard errors clustered at the village level. The analysis condi-
tions on all of the thirty available covariates (see Table A.5). All p-values calculated using random-
ization inference with the hypothesis test as pre-registered in the pre-analysis plan.
A.3.5 E↵ects on Support for Mob Violence
Among both men and women the availability of the community police reduces sup-
port for lynching, a non-state institution that punishes accused wrongdoers through
extrajudicial group violence.
Men and women become similarly supportive of police involvement over vigilan-
tism as a result of the CAP presence. Figure A.6 presents the e↵ects of the community
police presence on two forced pair vignettes. The first reads:
Imagine that a man was driving too fast through a village and killed a small boy. The
villagers have stopped the man and the passengers and have them surrounded. Which
statement comes closest to your view?
A: The group should beat the driver and his passengers there and then
B: The group should contact the police and let them handle it, without beating the
driver or his passengers
The second reads:
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Now I’d like you to imagine that a woman in a village has died, and her family says
she was killed by another woman who is known to practice sorcery. A group has
surrounded the woman, which statement comes closest to your view?
A: The group should beat the woman there and then
B: The group should contact the police and let them handle it, without beating the
woman
Responses are coded 1 when respondents choose A, the pro-vigilantism option, and
0 when they chose B, the pro-police option. The average of the responses is taken to
form an index (Cronbach’s ↵ = .6). As Table A.9 illustrates, the support for vigi-
lantism is moderate at baseline, with about 22% of men and 18% of women favoring
vigilantism over police involvement. Support for lynching decreases in favor of police
intervention as a result of the treatment (ITT = -.04, CACE = -.06, significant at
↵ = .10). These findings provide causally identified support to an observational find-
ing in Ghana (Tankebe, 2009), Liberia (Blair, 2018), and Uganda (Cooper and Wilke,





Men: − 4 pp*








0 = The group should contact
the police and
let them handle it.
1 = The group should 
beat the accused
then and there.
Figure A.6: Community police presence reduces support for lynching relative to po-
lice intervention among both men and women.
Predictions arising from inverse-probability weighted regression of outcome on treatment and block
indicators, and all available covariates. Predictions generated by holding all variables at their mean
and varying treatment assignment and gender. Statistical significance is calculated using randomiza-
tion inference, ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01. Underlying regression specification reported in Table
A.9.
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A.4 A Theory of Dispute Resolution
The purpose of this model is to formalize intuitions about how the expansion of
formal policing institutions a↵ects the provision of order through its e↵ects on dispute
resolution behavior. Expansion of formal institutions is conceived of as a decrease in
the cost of accessing the institution.
A.4.1 Setup
The game contains two strategic actors, A and B. In a first stage A and B simul-
taneously decide to defect (D) or cooperate (K). Indexing the actors using i, this
first-period crime decision is denoted  1i 2 {K,D}. If both actors cooperate (refrain
from crime), the game ends. If any actor defects, the game passes to a second stage
in which A and B make a simultaneous reporting decision. They can choose to not
report (;), to report to the chief (C) or to the police (P ). This is the actors’ insti-
tutional choice, denoted  2i 2 {;, P, C}. The game ends following the institutional
choice, and payo↵s are realized.
The crime function ⌧i( 1A, 
1
B) maps the actors’ crime decisions to actor i’s payo↵







both actors’ crime and reporting decisions to their payo↵ following the second stage














The payo↵s for the first stage, presented on Table A.15 are structured to capture
the idea of defection as property crime: when actors bilaterally cooperate the status
quo is maintained – they keep their property; unilateral defection constitutes a trans-
fer from the cooperating to the defecting actor – theft; and under mutual defection
both actors su↵er – through fighting one another or destroying each other’s prop-
erty. The value of theft is assumed to be strictly positive, 0 < s 2 R+. Information





K (0, 0) ( s, s)
D (s, s) ( s, s)
Table A.15: Normal form representation of simultaneous crime decision in first stage
- ⌧i.
In the second stage of the game, if either actor plays an institutional strategy
the stolen property is transferred from any actor who defected to any actor who
cooperated. If both actors defect they are further punished (receiving  s). The
total payo↵ an actor receives in the second stage is conditioned by two other types
of parameters.
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First, the chief and the police o cer are biased in favor of or against actor B.
The bias of the chief toward B is denoted  C , and that of the police toward B is
denoted  P , with  j 2 R. Whenever institution j has been chosen in the second
stage of the game,  j is added to the payo↵ of B and subtracted from that of A.
Thus, when  j < 0 bias takes the form of a transfer from B to A, and when  j > 0
it takes the form of a transfer from A to B. Institution j is defined as neutral when
 j = 0, A-biased when  j is negative, and B-biased when  j is positive.
This bias can be thought of as relative to some norm n 2 R+ that is subtracted
o↵ actor A’s payo↵ in any instance where authorities are involved. For su ciently
high n, A never defects or reports. Thus, to home in on the relevant comparative
statics and to simplify exposition, I set n = 0.
Second, those who report to institutions in the second stage incur costs related
to reporting. Any time an actor reports to an institution they incur a transaction
cost denoted t 2 R+. The transaction cost is assumed to be small (see specifically
equation A.4 below).
The second kind of cost, denoted ✓(1 Z) is a travel cost incurred when accessing
the police. The parameter Z takes the values of 0 or 1, whereas ✓ is assumed to satisfy
the following constraint: ✓ > s+ | P |+ | C |+ t. In other words, ✓ represents a cost
that is greater than the sum of all other parameters combined. Variation in Z thus
represents the expansion of the state. Specifically, expansion is conceived of as a shift
from Z = 0 to Z = 1 resulting in the elimination of costs that would have made the
state police prohibitively expensive to access. This definition of expansion captures
the idea that even for those people in very remote “stateless” areas, the option of
somehow accessing services does exist: they could travel the necessary hours to the
nearest place in which state services are available and demand access. The state is
“absent” from such areas in the sense that the costs involved in accessing make it





; 0  C-s-t  P -s-t-⇥
0 - C+s - P+s
C
 C-s  C-s-t  C+ P -s-t-⇥
- C+s-t - C+s-t - C- P+s-t
P







0 - C-s - P -s
 C+s  C+s-t  C+ P+s-t-⇥
- C-s-t - C-s-t - C- P -s-t
 P+s  C+ P+s-t  P+s-t-⇥





0  C-s-t  P -s-t-⇥
0 - C-s - P -s
 C-s  C-s-t  C+ P -s-t-⇥
- C-s-t - C-s-t - C- P -s-t
 P -s  C+ P -s-t  P -s-t-⇥
- P -s-t-⇥ - C- P -s-t-⇥ - P -s-t-⇥
Table A.16: Normal form representation of simultaneous institutional choice in second
stage - ⇡i. Payo↵s for A in rows and for B in columns. Note: ⇥ = ✓(1 Z).
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A.4.2 Assumptions
The purpose of the game is to derive predictions for a specific situation in which the
state expands its policing institutions into an environment that was already policed
by customary institutions that are biased toward some subgroup. Moreover, I assume
that – relative to some socially-determined baseline – the state is comparatively par-
tisan to the subgroup who is disadvantaged by the custom. The partisan institutions
assumption is as follows:
 P < 0 <  C , (A.2)
so that when  P is subtracted o↵ A’s payo↵s and added to those of B, this is a
transfer from B to A, for example.
The primary comparative static of interest concerns the move from Z = 0 to
Z = 1, i.e., state expansion. I thus hold constant at some positive values the property
(s), the bias of the chief ( C) and police ( P ), and the transaction cost involved in
reporting (t).
A second core assumption concerns the relationship between these parameters. It
stipulates that bias cannot be so great as to incentivize an actor to defect and report
their own defection so as to obtain the biased transfer. Although in principle one can
imagine a logic whereby social actors would instrumentalize theft in order to “buy an
audience” with a more powerful co-partisan, in practice there is very little evidence
such behavior occurs. The specific form this “no audience-buying” constraint takes
is as follows:
 C    P   t < s. (A.3)
Finally, I assume that the transaction costs involved in reporting are relatively
small. Anecdotally, men typically see it as worthwhile to go and grab the chief if
they are being called upon by the police. This implies that it is worth calling in
one’s co-partisans: the marginal benefit from having one’s co-partisan involved in
dispute resolution should outweigh the marginal cost of going to hail them, given





To derive comparative statics with respect to Z, I first solve for outcomes via
backwards induction when the state is absent, Z = 0. I then repeat the process when
the state is present, Z = 1, and present the comparative statics as a corollary to
those equilibrium outcomes.
A.4.3 Equilibrium Outcomes when Cost of Accessing Police
is Prohibitively High
When the cost involved in reaching the state police is high, Z = 0, any strategy
involving P in the institutional choice subgame depicted on Table A.16 is strictly
dominated. To see this, note that in the normal form representations of the subgames
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on Table A.16, ✓ is subtracted from every row in which A chooses P and from every
column in which B chooses P . ✓ is defined such that it is strictly larger than the sum
of all other parameters. Therefore, playing P yields strictly lower payo↵s than any
alternative choice when Z = 0. Attention can thus be restricted to the four upper
left quadrants of the normal form representation.
Second Stage Behavior when State Police are Inaccessible
Starting in the second stage of the game, I consider first the subgame that arises
when B has defected against A, who has cooperated:  1A, 
1
B = K,D (see left panel
of Table A.16).
Lemma 1. When the cost of accessing state police is prohibitively high (Z = 0) and
customary authorities are B-biased (0 <  C), in the subgame that arises when A
cooperates and B defects (( 1A, 
1
B) = (K,D)) the equilibrium outcome depends on
net cost of reporting relative to the bias of the chief. If bias is high relative to the net
benefits of reporting such that s  t <  C, there is a unique equilibrium in which not
reporting is a strictly dominant strategy for both actors, ( 2A, 
2
B) = (;, ;). If bias in
the customary sector is not too high relative to the net benefit of reporting such that
 C < s  t, there is a unique equilibrium in which A reports to the chief and B does
not report, ( 2A, 
2
B) = (C, ;).
Proof. Suppose that s   t <  C . If B plays ; A’s best response is to play ; since
s   C   t < 0. If B plays C, A’s best response is to play ; because 0 < t. Given ; is
a strictly dominant strategy for A in this subgame, B plays ; if  C   s  t < 0. Note
that under partisan bias,  P < 0, implying  C   s   t <  C    P   s   t. Thus, by
equation A.3  C   s  t <  C    P   s  t < 0)  C   s  t < 0.
Suppose that  C < s   t. B’s best response when A plays C is to play ;, given
strictly positive reporting costs (0 < t). When A plays ;, B plays ; if  C   s  t < 0.
Note that positive reporting costs imply that  C   t   s <  C   s and that the
stipulation  C < s   t implies  C + t   s < 0, such that  C   s   t < 0: ; is thus
a strictly dominant strategy for B. A’s best response if B plays ; is to play C:
 C < s  t) 0 < s  t   C . We have proven lemma 1.
We now turn to the second phase subgame that arises when A defects and B
cooperates in the first stage.
Lemma 2. When the cost of accessing state police is prohibitively high (Z = 0) and
customary authorities are B-biased (0 <  C), in the subgame that arises when A
defects and B cooperates ( 1A, 
1
B) = (D,K), there is a unique equilibrium in which
A does not report and B reports to the chief, ( 2A, 
2
B) = (;, C).
Proof. If B chooses ; A will choose ; since   C   s  t < 0 given the lefthand terms
are strictly positively valued and negatively signed. If B chooses C, A will choose ;
since   C   s  t <   C   s. Thus, ; is a strictly dominant strategy for A. We can
thus derive Nash equilibria by examining B’s optimal response to  2A = ;. Player B
reports to the chief when A is playing ; i↵ 0 <  C + s  t. The inequality in equation
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A.4 implies 0 <  C   t) 0 <  C   t+ s, so B reports to the chief. We have proven
lemma 2.
Consider now the subgame that arises when both A and B defect.
Lemma 3. When the cost of accessing state police is prohibitively high (Z = 0) and
customary authorities are B-biased (0 <  C), in the subgame that arises when A
and B defect ( 1A, 
1
B) = (D,D), there is a unique equilibrium in which neither actor
reports, ( 2A, 
2
B) = (;, ;)
Proof. See firstly that ; is a strictly dominant strategy for A, as the payo↵s are iden-
tical to those in the subgame when ( 1A, 
1
B) = (D,K). Similarly, ; is a strictly dom-
inant strategy for B, as the payo↵s are identical to the subgame in which ( 1A, 
1
B) =
(K,D). We have proven lemma 3.
First Stage Behavior when State Police is Inaccessible
Having solved for  2⇤A and  
2⇤
B – A and B’s best responses at the institutional
choice stage – we can now solve for the optimal first period choices. There are four
possible outcomes of the first period decisions: {(K,K), (K,D), (D,K), (D,D)}, as
represented on Table A.15.
Lemma 4. If the cost of accessing the state police is prohibitively high (Z = 0) and
customary authorities are B-biased (0 <  C), the “no audience-buying” constraint
holds ( C  P   t < s), and it is worthwhile calling upon co-partisans (t < minj | j|),
there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which B – the partisan of the chief




Proof. Each actor chooses to cooperate (K) or defect (D) in order to maximize their
expected utility given each player’s best response at the institutional choice stage.
We must consider two cases: one in which s  t <  C , so that in the unique subgame
equilibrium that arises in the reporting phase when ( 1A, 
1
B) = (K,D) the actors
choose ( 2⇤A , 
2⇤
B ) = (;, ;); and another in which  C + t < s, so that in the unique
equilibrium that arises in the reporting phase when ( 1A, 
1
B) = (K,D) the actors
choose ( 2⇤A , 
2⇤
B ) = (C, ;).
The cells of Table A.17 give the expected payo↵s of each crime decision given best
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Table A.17: Expected payo↵s from the crime decision given best responses in

























. In top panel s   t <  C ,
whereas in bottom panel  C < s  t.
Considering firstly the payo↵s in the top panel that arise when s   t <  C , we
see that if B cooperates, A cooperates since   C < 0. If B defects A is indi↵erent
between cooperation and defection, which both yield a payo↵ of  s. If A is cooper-
ating, B defects since 0 < s. If A defects, B cooperates since  s <  C   t. To see
this, note that s is strictly positive, and that equation A.4 implies 0 <  C   t.
Suppose now that  C < s   t, as represented in the lower panel of Table A.17.
In that case, the payo↵s in the (K,D) quadrant are di↵erent. Note, however, that
this does not change the equilibrium crime behavior. If B cooperates, A cooperates
as before. If B defects, A cooperates, since the assumption  C < s   t implies
 s <   C   t. If A cooperates, B defects since 0 <  C . If A defects, then B
cooperates as before. We have thus proven lemma 4.
Note that lemma 4 holds irrespective of whether the net benefit of reporting s t is
greater or lower than the cost incurred due to the chief’s bias  C . When the police is
inaccessible and the chief is biased, the actor who benefits from the bias always defects
against the actor who is disadvantaged by it. However, how the disadvadvantaged
actor responds to this defection is a↵ected by the net benefits of reporting, given that
the chief is biased.
Theorem 1 (Customary monopoly leads to victimization of and low reporting by
outgroup members). If the state police is inaccessible (Z = 0), customary authorities
are biased toward some group (0 <  C), “audience-buying” is not rational ( C  
 P   t < s), and calling upon partisans is worthwhile (t < minj | j|), there is a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the member of the chief-advantaged group
commits crime against the member of the chief-disadvantaged group ( 1⇤A = K, 
1⇤
B =
D). If the chief ’s bias is not too high ( C < s   t), A reports to the chief and does
not report otherwise (s  t <  C).
Proof. According to lemma 4, the unique equilibrium outcome at the first stage is
cooperation by the outgroup member (A) and defection by the ingroup member (B).
The unique subgame equilibria that arise at this stage of the game are given by
lemma 1: if s   t <  C , there is a unique equilibrium in which not reporting is a
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strictly dominant strategy for both actors, ( 2A, 
2
B) = (;, ;). If bias in the customary
sector is not too high relative to the net benefit of reporting such that  C < s   t,
there is a unique equilibrium in which A reports to the chief and B does not report,
( 2A, 
2
B) = (C, ;). We have proven Theorem 1.
A.4.4 Equilibrium Outcomes when the State Expands
I now consider the equilibrium behavior when the cost of accessing the chief and the
state police is equivalent (Z = 1).
Second Stage Behavior when State Police is Accessible
Lemma 5. Under partisan bias ( C < 0 <  P ) when there is no extra cost for
accessing state police (Z = 1), in the subgame that arises when A cooperates and B
defects (( 1A, 
1
B) = (K,D)), there is a unique equilibrium in which A reports to the
state police and B reports to the chief ( A2 , 
B
2 ) = (P,C).
Proof. When B does not report ( B2 = ;) A reports to the police because 0 <
  P + s  t and  C + s  t <   P + s  t. When B reports to the chief ( B2 = ;), A
reports to the police because the benefits of having the police mitigate the bias of the
chief o↵set the costs of reporting:   C + s <   C    P + s  t) 0 <   P   t. If B
ever reports to the police, A freerides by not reporting so as to avoid the transaction
costs:   P + s   t <   P + s. Choosing P is a strictly dominated strategy for
B, however, given P ’s bias toward A. Thus, we need only consider what B will
choose given A reports to the police. Given A reports to the police, it is within B’s
interest to report to the chief in order to minimize the e↵ect of the police’s bias:
 P   s <  P +  C   s  t. In sum, the threat of biased punishment induces reporting
by B, even when B has defected. We have proven Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. Under partisan bias ( C < 0 <  P ) when there is no extra cost for
accessing state police (Z = 1), in the subgame that arises when A defects and B
cooperates ( 1A, 
1






Proof. Note that the payo↵s in the institutional subgame under ( 1A, 
1
B) = (D,K)
are symmetrical to those under ( 1A, 
1
B) = (K,D). Here, reporting to the chief is
a dominant strategy for B whenever A is not reporting or reports to the police.
Knowing that B will report to the chief, A’s best response is to mitigate the biased
punishment by reporting to P . We have proven Lemma 6.
Lemma 7. Under partisan bias ( C < 0 <  P ) when there is no extra cost for
accessing state police (Z = 1), in the subgame that arises when both players defect
( 1A, 
1
B) = (D,D) there are three nash equilibria: one in which (P,C) one in which
(0,0), and a mixed strategy equilibrium (A chooses ; with probability q⇤A and P with
1  q⇤A, B chooses ; with probability q⇤B and C with probability 1  q⇤B.
Proof. Equation A.3 implies no player has an incentive to report when they know
that the other is not reporting:  C  P   t  s < 0. However, if either player chooses
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to report to their partisan, then a second nash equilibrium arises in which each
player reports to their partisan in order to mitigate biased punishment:   C   s <
  C  P s t implies A reports to P whenB reports to C, and  P s <  C+ P s t
implies the inverse for player B.
In addition to the equilibrium outcomes that arise from the weakly dominant
strategy pairs (;, ;) and (P,C), there is a nash equilibrium in which A and B play
mixed strategies. Note that we can restrict attention to the subgame in which A
chooses between ; and P and B chooses between ; and C, since these are the only
strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
Denote by qA the probability that A chooses ; so that 1   qA is the probability
that A chooses P , and by qB the probability that B chooses ; so that 1   qB is the
probability that B chooses C. Then in the mixed strategy equilibrium A chooses the
q⇤A =
 C t
s , which renders B indi↵erent between choosing ; or C, given A’s behavior.
B chooses q⇤B =
  P ✓(1 Z)
s , which renders A indi↵erent between ; and P , given the
strategy chosen by B. We have proven lemma 7.
First Stage Behavior when State Police is Accessible
Lemma 8. Under partisan bias ( P < 0 C), if the state police is accessible (Z = 1),
actors have no incentive to engage in “audience-buying” ( C    P   t < s), and the
bias of policers is relatively equal such that | C+ P | < t < minj | j|, there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in which both players cooperate: ( 1⇤A , 
1⇤
B ) = (K,K)).
Lemma 9. Under partisan bias ( P < 0 C), if the state police is accessible (Z = 1),
actors have no incentive to engage in “audience-buying” ( C    P   t < s), and the
chief is more strongly B-biased than the police is A-biased, such that t < ( C +  P ),
there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the partisan of the chief defects
against the partisan of the police  1⇤A , 
1⇤
B ) = (K,D).
Lemma 10. Under partisan bias ( P < 0 C), if the state police is accessible (Z =
1), actors have no incentive to engage in “audience-buying” ( C    P   t < s),
and the state police are more strongly A-biased than the chief is B-biased, such that
t <  ( C +  P ), there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the partisan
of the state police defects against the partisan of the chief  1⇤A , 
1⇤
B ) = (D,K).
Proof. First, note that even though multiple equilibria obtain in the institutional sub-
game that arises when both players defect (( 1A, 
1
B) = (D,D)), lemmas 8-10 describe
unique subgame perfect equilibria because the subgame with multiple equilibria lies
o↵ the equilibrium path.
To see this, we can consider whether it is ever rational for A (B) to defect when
B (A) is defecting, given expected payo↵s for the mixed strategy equilibrium taken
over all possible values of q⇤A and q
⇤
B (the pure strategy equilibria are special cases of
the mixed strategy equilibrium where qA = qB = 1 and qA = qB = 0).
The expected payo↵s from defection when the other player is defecting are some
weighted combination of the four quadrants represented on Table A.18.
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Actor B
; (qB) C (1  qB)
Actor A
; (qA) ( s, s) (  C   2s, C   2s  t)
P (1  qA) (  P   2s  t, P   2s) (  C  P  2s  t, C+ P  2s  t)
Table A.18: Payo↵s from mutual defection under mixed strategy. Each cell denotes 
⌧A(D,D) + ⇡A(D,D, 2⇤A , 
2⇤






. The parameters qA
and qB indicate the probabilities that A and B choose not to report as opposed to
reporting to the police or the chief, respectively.
If B defects, a su cient condition for A’s cooperation is that the expected payo↵
from cooperation is greater than all four of the payo↵s in the matrix on Table A.18.
From Lemma 5 we know that the equilibrium payo↵ for A for (K,D) is   C  P   t.
Turning first to the payo↵ in (;, ;) in Table A.18, we know that  s <   C  P t
because equation A.4 implies  p + t < 0, equation A.3 implies  s <   C +  P + t,
and together these constraints imply  s <   C +  P + t <   C    P   t. Second, it
is simple to show that   C 2s <   C  P   t)  2s <   P   t, since the lefthand
term is strictly negative and the righthand term is strictly positive. Third, we can
verify that   P 2s t <   C  P t, since equation A.3 implies  2s <  s <   C .
Finally,   C    P   t  2s <   C    P   t implies  2s < 0, which we know is true
given s is strictly positive. Since qA and qB are in the [0, 1] interval, payo↵s under
mixed strategy are simply a weighted sum of the four extrema considered above.
Thus, we have proven that payo↵s to A from cooperation when B defects are strictly
greater than the payo↵s from defection, for all possible mixed strategies, including
the special case of the pure strategies when qA = qB = 0 and qA = qB = 1.
Furthermore, given the payo↵s to A and B are symmetrical, we know that the
same holds for B. Thus, we have proven that it is never a best response for one
player to defect when the other defects. Defection as a response to defection is thus
a strictly dominated strategy.
When B cooperates, A cooperates if   P    C   t < 0, and defects otherwise.
When A cooperates, B cooperates if  P +  C   t < 0, and defects otherwise. Thus,
the relative size of the partisan bias determines criminal outcomes. For example,
if   P =  C , the partisan bias is equal and both actors cooperate. Note that -
 P    C   t < 0)   P    C < t,  P +  C   t < 0)  P +  C < t and | P +  C | =
|    P    C |. This implies that a su cient condition for mutual cooperation is
| P+ C | < t, proving Lemma 8. Furthermore, it implies there is a unique equilibrium
in which B defects and A cooperates when t <  P+ C , and one in which A cooperates
and B defects when t <  ( P +  C). We have thus proven Lemmas 9 and 10,
respectively.
Theorem 2 bias follows as a direct result of Lemmas 5-10.
Theorem 2 (Reporting to authorities and cooperation high under partisan bias).
Under partisan bias ( P < 0 <  C), if the state police is accessible (Z = 1), there is
no incentive to engage in “audience-buying” ( C    P   t < s), and it is worthwhile
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appealing to partisans (t < minj | j|), then crime depends on the relative bias of the
chief to the police:
if | C +  P | < t there is no crime,
if t < ( C +  P ) B defects against A,
if t <  ( C +  P ) A defects against B.
Conditional on defection by either actor, the unique equilibrium outcome is for each
actor to report to their co-partisan (A to P and B to C).
Proof. We have shown that mutual defection never occurs when the state is accessible.
Lemma 8 shows that when | C+ P | < t there is mutual cooperation in the first stage,
and when this condition does not hold, lemmas 9 and 10 illustrate that this results in
defection by one of the players, the unique outcome of which is co-partisan reporting
(A to P and B to C). We have proven theorem 2.
The comparison of theorems 1 and 2 gives rise to the ‘Partisan Demand E↵ect’
corollary.
Corollary 1 (Partisan Demand E↵ect). Under partisan bias ( P < 0 C), if the state
police is accessible (Z = 1), actors have no incentive to engage in “audience-buying”
( C    P   t < s), it is worthwhile to report to co-partisans (t < minj | j|), and
chiefs are strongly biased toward ingroup members relative to the state’s partiality for
outgroup members (s   t <   P <  C), state expansion has no e↵ect on crime but
increases total institutional demand from zero to both chief and police being called
upon to resolve disputes.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 2
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B.1 Supplementary Information
• Subsection B.1.1 presents the behavioral game in practice.
• Subsection B.1.2 presents the frequency distributions of rolls called by partici-
pants.
B.1.1 The Random Allocation Game in Practice
Figure B.1: A candidate hired for recruitment playing the “no-monitoring” game
against a randomly-selected community member.
From left: enumerator, onlooker from community, (hired) candidate, community member in ‘oppo-
nent’ position. Photo anonymized to protect participant confidentiality.
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Figure B.2: Density of evens called by players in experimental sample by treatment
status and game. Smooth line indicates PDF of true underlying binomial distribution.
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Figure B.3: Cumulative density of evens called by players in experimental sample by
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Figure B.4: Number of evens called by players in experimental sample by treatment
status and round. Smooth line indicates PDF of true underlying binomial distribu-
tion.
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Figure B.5: Cumulative density of evens called by players in experimental sample by
treatment status and round. Smooth line indicates CDF of true underlying binomial
distribution.
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B.2 Identification and Robustness
• Subsection B.2.1 describes balance across covariates in the experimental sample.
• Subsection B.2.2 reports main results, conditioning on imbalanced covariates.
B.2.1 Balance Tables
Covariate p-value Control Treatment
n appliances 0.02 1.00 0.50
n large assets 0.03 1.70 1.10
age 0.09 31.30 27.80
chief close fam 0.14 0.40 0.60
household size log1p 0.16 1.90 1.70
television 0.24 0.10 0.00
others present 0.28 1.60 1.00
had cap 0.51 0.30 0.20
chief ext fam 0.54 0.30 0.20
student 0.54 0.10 0.20
chief clan 0.55 0.20 0.20
years had cap 0.56 1.20 0.90
chief wantok 0.58 0.10 0.00
conditions 0.58 0.70 0.70
pig 0.58 0.30 0.40
n assets 0.59 6.70 6.50
cellphone 0.67 0.90 0.90
education 0.68 14.80 15.40
woman 0.75 0.50 0.40
n cash crops 0.89 0.90 0.90
n vegetables crops 0.94 9.10 9.20
education yes no 1.00 1.00 1.00
chief dk 1.00 0.00 0.00
Table B.1: Balance on Covariates among Candidates.
Di↵erences estimated using inverse probability weighted least squares regression with block fixed
e↵ects. All p-values two-tailed, calculated by permuting the treatment assignment 2000 times and
re-estimating e↵ects under the sharp null of no e↵ects for all units. Control and treatment columns
report inverse probability weighted means of covariates, ignoring blocks.
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B.2.2 Main Results Conditional on Imbalanced Covariates
Dependent variable:
Number of Evens Called in Round
All games Monitoring No Monitoring All games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Police Recruit  0.482  0.783  0.181  0.083  1.884⇤⇤
(0.422) (0.701) (0.506) (0.712) (0.761)
Age 0.001  0.034 0.037  0.063 0.052
(0.042) (0.074) (0.055) (0.070) (0.045)
Large Assets 0.430⇤ 0.824⇤ 0.035 0.540  0.359
(0.261) (0.438) (0.394) (0.335) (0.276)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes No No
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 90 45 45 25 20
Adjusted R2 0.014  0.099  0.064 0.010 0.230
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table B.2: The e↵ect of becoming a community police o cer on number of evens
rolled in random allocation game, conditional on imbalanced covariates. Observations
weighted by the inverse of the probability of their assigned treatment condition.
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Dependent variable:
Evens called in second round
Police = 0 Police = 1 Won = 0 Won = 1 Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Won first round 0.503  1.368⇤⇤ 0.464 0.471
(0.846) (0.629) (0.720) (0.702)
Police recruit  0.083  1.884⇤⇤ 0.012 0.052
(0.712) (0.761) (0.655) (0.639)
Police x Won  1.812  1.810⇤
(1.101) (1.072)
Monitoring game first 0.845⇤
(0.480)
Age 0.019  0.014  0.063 0.052 0.004 0.001
(0.064) (0.045) (0.070) (0.045) (0.042) (0.041)
N Large Assets 0.076 0.155 0.540  0.359 0.105 0.117
(0.314) (0.315) (0.335) (0.276) (0.230) (0.224)
Constant 7.368⇤⇤⇤ 8.269⇤⇤⇤ 9.333⇤⇤⇤ 7.721⇤⇤⇤ 7.795⇤⇤⇤ 7.433⇤⇤⇤
(2.115) (1.326) (2.302) (1.452) (1.423) (1.401)
Observations 28 17 25 20 45 45
Adjusted R2  0.098 0.108 0.010 0.230  0.012 0.039
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table B.3: The e↵ect of becoming a community police o cer and winning in first round on number of evens reported in second




• Subsection B.3.1 presents a graphical representation of the main windfall find-
ing.
• Subsection B.3.2 presents the regression tables underlying the two-by-two in
the main results.
• Subsection B.3.3 presents a time-series cross-sectional analysis of the experi-
mental sample.
• Subsection B.3.4 presents evidence on experimenter demand e↵ects.
B.3.1 Graphical Representation of Main Finding
First round − Police Second round − Police
First round − Civilian Second round − Civilian
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32




















Figure B.6: Community police o cers appear to cheat against themselves to avoid
winning the second round when they win the first round. Civilians exhibit no such
behavior.
Plots (unweighted) proportion of evens called among various subgroups in the data: each point
represents the proportion of evens (y axis) called at the n’th roll (x axis), and horizontal lines report
the proportion of evens across the entire round for each of the subgroups.
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B.3.2 Regression Tables for Two-by-Two in Main Results
Dependent variable:
Evens rolled in second round
Police = 0 Police = 1 Won = 0 Won = 1 Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Won first round 0.523  1.281⇤⇤ 0.523 0.542
(0.785) (0.564) (0.687) (0.669)
Police recruit  0.039  1.843⇤⇤  0.039 0.008
(0.675) (0.767) (0.621) (0.605)
Police x Won  1.804  1.809⇤
(1.073) (1.046)
Monitoring game first 0.839⇤
(0.469)
Constant 8.072⇤⇤⇤ 8.032⇤⇤⇤ 8.072⇤⇤⇤ 8.594⇤⇤⇤ 8.072⇤⇤⇤ 7.620⇤⇤⇤
(0.561) (0.259) (0.534) (0.421) (0.491) (0.541)
Observations 28 17 25 20 45 45
Adjusted R2  0.021 0.206  0.043 0.201 0.032 0.081
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table B.4: The e↵ect of becoming a community police o cer and winning in first round on number of evens reported in second
round. Observations weighted by the inverse of the probability of their assigned treatment condition and of the first period
game outcome.
B.3.3 Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis
Dependent variable:
Called Even
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Selected in lottery  0.044  0.045⇤  0.045⇤  0.046⇤  0.044⇤
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Truth revealed in 0.043
previous roll (0.041)
Truth revealed in 0.083
previous roll (first time) (0.076)
Truth revealed at 0.032
least once in prev. roll (0.027)
Monitoring game first  0.004
(0.037)
Second game  0.012  0.039
(0.026) (0.037)
Monitoring game first x 0.055
Second game (0.053)
Intercept 0.522⇤⇤⇤ 0.525⇤⇤⇤ 0.512⇤⇤⇤ 0.538⇤⇤⇤ 0.539⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030)
Observations 1,395 1,395 1,440 1,440 1,440
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table B.5: The e↵ect of becoming a community police o cer and of community
monitoring on probability of rolling an even in random allocation game. Observations




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Selected in Lottery  0.046⇤  0.045⇤  0.045⇤  0.044
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Called Even - Lag 1 0.002  0.003  0.001
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Called Even - Lag 2  0.006 0.003
(0.027) (0.028)
Called Even - Lag 3  0.007
(0.028)
Constant 0.532⇤⇤⇤ 0.527⇤⇤⇤ 0.535⇤⇤⇤ 0.533⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.024) (0.028) (0.032)
Observations 1,440 1,395 1,350 1,305
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table B.6: The e↵ect of becoming a community police o cer on probability of rolling
an even in random allocation game under auto-regressive process. Observations
weighted by the inverse of the probability of their assigned treatment condition.
B.3.4 Experimenter Demand E↵ects
Dependent variable:
Number of Evens Called in Round
(1) (2) (3)




Researcher x Police Recruit  1.012
(0.970)
Block FE No Yes Yes
Observations 45 45 45
Adjusted R2  0.023  0.136  0.072
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table B.7: Experimenter demand e↵ects.
Researcher is an indicator for whether the author of the study conducted the interview and game.
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 3
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C.1 Supplementary Information
• Figures C.1 and C.2 in subsection C.1.1 plot the bribe data aggregated to the
week and month levels, respectively. They show the raw trends in average bribes
paid in West African Francs (XOF) and where panel data was interpolated.
• Figures C.3 to C.7 in subsection C.1.2 illustrate the autocorrelation and partial
autocorrelation in the weekly panel data of the raw bribes for each country.
Most of the partial autocorrelations drop below the 95% confidence interval at
the second or third lag, which is why the main regression specification is fit
as an AR(1) process. The next section of the appendix shows that results are
robust to modeling series as higher order autoregressive processes.
• Table C.1 in subsection C.1.3 shows that the residualizing approach does not








































































































Figure C.1: Time-series aggregated to week-level.
Each point represents an average of driver-level arithmetic averages of bribes paid in that week
of the year in that country. Each square represents an imputed average from linear interpolation.







































































































Figure C.2: Time-series aggregated to month-level.
Each point represents an average of driver-level arithmetic averages of bribes paid in that month
of the year in that country. Each square represents an imputed average from linear interpolation.
Vertical bars represent elections. Dotted horizontal line represents LOESS-smoothed trend.
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C.1.2 Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation

































Figure C.3: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation in Burkina Faso time-series
of average bribes extorted by bureaucrats.
Dotted horizontal lines represent 95% confidence interval.
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Figure C.4: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation in Ghana time-series of aver-
age bribes extorted by bureaucrats. Dotted horizontal lines represent 95% confidence interval.
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Figure C.5: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation in Mali time-series of average
bribes extorted by bureaucrats.
Dotted horizontal lines represent 95% confidence interval.
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Figure C.6: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation in Senegal time-series of
average bribes extorted by bureaucrats.
Dotted horizontal lines represent 95% confidence interval.
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Figure C.7: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation in Togo time-series of average
bribes extorted by bureaucrats.
Dotted horizontal lines represent 95% confidence interval.
C.1.3 Diagnosis of Standard Errors
Recall that the experimental analogue for the design in Chapter 3 is to consider coun-
tries as blocks, and country-weeks as clusters that are assigned to electoral periods.
I here show that, under this assumption, the residualizing approach taken in the
main analyses does not produce non-conservative standard errors (Recall that the
main basis for statistical inference is the randomization inference approach used to
construct p-values).
The simulation study supposes that di↵ering numbers of individuals, i, are clus-
tered into periods, t. Clusters of individuals are assigned to treatment, Zt 2 {0, 1}
with equal probability. Assume individuals have the following potential outcomes:
Yi(Z = 0) = ✏i + ✏t + t/10 (C.1)
Yi(Z = 1) = ✏i + ✏t + t/10 + 1 (C.2)
Where ✏i and ✏t are standard-normally distributed shocks at the individual and cluster
level, respectively, and t 2 {1, ..., 100} (a linear time trend correlated with cluster).
I compare three approaches to estimating e↵ects. The first, no res, does not
residualize the outcomes, but collapses them to the cluster-level means and estimates
the e↵ect of Z on Y using OLS regression. The second, with res, first takes the
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residuals from a regression of Y on t, before collapsing to the cluster-level means, and
estimating the e↵ect of Z on Y using OLS. The final approach, no agg, estimates
e↵ects at the individual level, conditioning on t, and clustering standard errors at the
cluster-level.
The design is simulated 2000 times, and estimates are compared to the true un-
derlying ATE in order to calculate bias, coverage, the mean of the estimates, the
standard deviation of the estimates, and the mean standard error. The results are
displayed on Table C.1.
Design Label N Sims Bias Coverage Mean Estimate SD Estimate Mean Se
no res 2000 -0.01 0.95 0.99 0.62 0.62
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
with res 2000 -0.01 0.96 0.99 0.21 0.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
no agg 2000 0.01 0.96 1.01 0.23 0.23
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table C.1: Diagnosis through simulation suggests residualizing for trends and col-
lapsing to cluster level does not produce non-conservative standard errors.
We see that, if anything, the approach taken in the paper is slightly conservative:
the average standard error is slightly higher than the true standard deviation of the
estimates.
62
C.2 Identification and Robustness
• Tables C.2 and C.3 in subsection C.2.1 illustrate that the simple version of the
main specifications, without a lag, does not change substantive or statistical
interpretation of the main results.
• To show robustness of the main results to the specification of higher-order au-
toregressive processes, Tables C.4 and C.5 in subsection C.2.2 report the main
results with up to four lags of the dependent variable included. Estimates are
attenuated somewhat but the substantive and statistical significance of the main
results is unchanged.
• Less of the panel data is missing when aggregating to the country-month level,
so Tables C.6 and C.7 in subsection C.2.3 report main results when aggregating
data to the country-month level. Overall, this does not change the substantive
interpretation of the results, and the statistical significance remains unchanged.
• As Figures C.1 and C.2 show, many observations are imputed for Senegal. Thus,
to assess robustness to imputation Tables C.8 and C.9 in subsection C.2.4 report
the main results when excluding Senegal from the analysis. The substantive and
statistical significance of all main analyses remains unchanged.
• Main results residualize the dependent variable by di↵erencing out e↵ects for
year, weekday, calendar month, country-specific linear trend, direction of travel,
trade corridor, and whether driver is national of country in which bribe is paid.
To assess robustness to the specific di↵erencing strategy employed, Tables C.10
and C.11 in subsection C.2.5 report the main results under two alternative
residualizing strategies. When country-specific trend is labeled ‘No’ the linear
trend specific to countries is not included in residual estimation. When year,
month and weekday FE is labeled ‘No’ those fixed e↵ects are not included in
residual estimation. Main results are robust to these two methods.
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C.2.1 Simple Specification of Main Results
Average Bribe Paid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Election Period 282.942⇤⇤⇤ 301.554⇤⇤⇤
(30.285) (28.827)
Pre-Election Period 403.473⇤⇤⇤ 390.671⇤⇤⇤
(41.255) (38.038)
Post-Election Period 74.238 120.956⇤
(40.860) (37.251)
Residuals No Yes No Yes
Period FE Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
RI p-value: Elec. Per. 0.0185 0.0095
RI p-value: Pre-Elec. 0.006 0.004
RI p-value: Post-Elec. 0.5425 0.2405
Observations 1,775 1,775 1,775 1,775
Adjusted R2 0.592 0.059 0.596 0.064
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.2: Electoral Cycles in Extortion of Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa,
using simplest specification.




Pre-Election (Non-Competitive) 83.595 47.283
(82.679) (71.486)
Post-Election (Non-Competitive) 38.670  28.521
(82.696) (71.481)
Pre-Election (Competitive) 501.084⇤⇤⇤ 497.815⇤⇤⇤
(48.567) (44.882)
Post-Election (Competitive - Challenger Won) 263.678⇤⇤⇤ 291.486⇤⇤⇤
(59.742) (48.717)
Post-Election (Competitive - Incumbent Won)  56.636 83.178
(70.111) (65.479)
Residuals No Yes
Period FE Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes
RI p-value: Pre-Elec. (NC) 0.589 0.664
RI p-value: Post-Elec. (NC) 0.804 0.8
RI p-value: Pre-Elec. (C) 0.006 0.006
RI p-value: Post-Elec. (C-CW) 0.231 0.112
RI p-value: Post-Elec. (C-IW) 0.79 0.673
Observations 1,775 1,775
Adjusted R2 0.602 0.079
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.3: The E↵ect of Political Competition and Leader Turnover on Extortion of
Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa, using simplest specification.
See caption of Table 3.2 for more details.
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C.2.2 Inclusion of More Lags
Average Bribe Paid
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged (1) Avg. Bribe 0.322⇤⇤⇤ 0.298⇤⇤⇤ 0.285⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Lagged (2) Avg. Bribe 0.176⇤⇤⇤ 0.133⇤⇤⇤ 0.120⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Lagged (3) Avg. Bribe 0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.109⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.030)
Lagged (4) Avg. Bribe 0.092⇤⇤⇤
(0.030)
Election Period 145.129⇤⇤⇤ 121.852⇤⇤⇤ 107.726⇤⇤⇤
(28.551) (28.462) (28.509)
Residuals Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,765 1,760 1,755
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.239 0.244
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.4: Electoral Cycles in Extortion of Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa,
including up to four lags.




Lagged (1) Avg. Bribe 0.313⇤⇤⇤ 0.289⇤⇤⇤ 0.277⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Lagged (2) Avg. Bribe 0.169⇤⇤⇤ 0.127⇤⇤⇤ 0.115⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Lagged (3) Avg. Bribe 0.135⇤⇤⇤ 0.109⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.030)
Lagged (4) Avg. Bribe 0.092⇤⇤⇤
(0.030)
Pre-Election (Non-Competitive) 26.661 22.840 18.778
(71.652) (71.125) (71.411)
Post-Election (Non-Competitive)  20.365  19.031  19.145
(71.648) (71.110) (71.383)
Pre-Election (Competitive) 241.662⇤⇤⇤ 213.182⇤⇤⇤ 195.871⇤⇤⇤
(43.983) (43.836) (43.701)
Post-Election (Competitive - Challenger Won) 161.917⇤⇤⇤ 140.682⇤⇤⇤ 127.169⇤⇤⇤
(47.964) (47.406) (47.321)
Post-Election (Competitive - Incumbent Won)  7.686  37.947  60.754
(63.994) (63.381) (62.714)
Residuals Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,765 1,760 1,755
Adjusted R2 0.229 0.242 0.247
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.5: The E↵ect of Political Competition and Leader Turnover on Extortion of
Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa, including up to four lags.




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.440⇤⇤⇤ 0.353⇤⇤⇤ 0.429⇤⇤⇤ 0.345⇤⇤⇤
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)
Election Period 154.099⇤⇤⇤ 193.270⇤⇤⇤
(53.346) (51.258)
Pre-Election Period 256.184⇤⇤⇤ 285.280⇤⇤⇤
(72.406) (66.181)
Post-Election Period 43.482 102.852
(68.421) (63.040)
Residuals No Yes No Yes
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 400 400 400 400
Adjusted R2 0.723 0.192 0.728 0.209
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.6: Electoral Cycles in Extortion of Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa,
with data aggregated to month-level.




Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.417⇤⇤⇤ 0.321⇤⇤⇤
(0.061) (0.059)
Pre-Election (Non-Competitive)  12.629 11.437
(122.651) (109.360)
Post-Election (Non-Competitive) 32.207  40.560
(122.599) (109.340)
Pre-Election (Competitive) 356.489⇤⇤⇤ 390.506⇤⇤⇤
(88.956) (80.192)
Post-Election (Competitive - Challenger Won) 132.330 189.398⇤⇤
(106.759) (90.663)
Post-Election (Competitive - Incumbent Won) 0.641 154.845
(118.765) (107.957)
Residuals No Yes
Country FE Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes
Observations 400 400
Adjusted R2 0.730 0.223
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.7: The E↵ect of Political Competition and Leader Turnover on Extortion of
Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa, with data aggregated to month-level.




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.367⇤⇤⇤ 0.381⇤⇤⇤ 0.361⇤⇤⇤ 0.376⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029)
Election Period 239.657⇤⇤⇤ 211.339⇤⇤⇤
(41.451) (38.219)
Pre-Election Period 316.145⇤⇤⇤ 282.110⇤⇤⇤
(56.623) (51.259)
Post-Election Period 93.082⇤ 64.303
(56.245) (49.988)
Residuals No Yes No Yes
Period FE Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416
Adjusted R2 0.669 0.193 0.669 0.194
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.8: Electoral Cycles in Extortion of Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa,
with Senegal excluded.




Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.343⇤⇤⇤ 0.358⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.029)
Pre-Election (Non-Competitive) 82.170 32.412
(87.979) (71.282)
Post-Election (Non-Competitive) 30.001  24.908
(87.953) (71.277)
Pre-Election (Competitive) 450.950⇤⇤⇤ 427.589⇤⇤⇤
(74.709) (69.683)
Post-Election (Competitive - Challenger Won) 343.972⇤⇤⇤ 217.676⇤⇤⇤
(103.912) (83.917)
Post-Election (Competitive - Incumbent Won) 22.049 70.129
(98.646) (93.386)
Residuals No Yes
Period FE Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,416 1,416
Adjusted R2 0.673 0.202
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.9: The E↵ect of Political Competition and Leader Turnover on Extortion of
Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa, with Senegal excluded.
See appendix page 63 and caption of Table 3.3 in main text for explanatory notes.
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C.2.5 Alternative Residualizing Approaches
Average Bribe Paid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.374⇤⇤⇤ 0.471⇤⇤⇤ 0.371⇤⇤⇤ 0.469⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Election Period 191.854⇤⇤⇤ 140.548⇤⇤⇤
(29.012) (29.020)
Pre-Election Period 241.045⇤⇤⇤ 175.236⇤⇤⇤
(38.175) (38.789)
Post-Election Period 79.490⇤⇤ 51.307
(37.292) (37.773)
Country-specific trend No No No No
Year, month, weekday FE Yes No Yes No
Residuals Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770
Adjusted R2 0.339 0.398 0.340 0.398
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.10: Electoral Cycles in Extortion of Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa,
with alternative approaches to residualizing before collapsing to week-
level.




Lagged Avg. Bribe 0.361⇤⇤⇤ 0.464⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.028)
Pre-Election (Non-Competitive) 49.787 34.000
(71.173) (73.722)
Post-Election (Non-Competitive) 6.865 21.568
(71.160) (73.731)
Pre-Election (Competitive) 305.079⇤⇤⇤ 221.827⇤⇤⇤
(45.206) (45.812)
Post-Election (Competitive - Challenger Won) 190.104⇤⇤⇤ 115.102⇤⇤
(48.577) (46.896)
Post-Election (Competitive - Incumbent Won) 42.032 19.845
(65.884) (67.567)
Country-specific trend No No
Year, month, weekday FE Yes No
Residuals Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,770 1,770
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.399
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.11: The E↵ect of Political Competition and Leader Turnover on Extortion
of Truck-Drivers by Police in West Africa, with alternative approaches to resid-
ualizing before collapsing to week-level.
See appendix page 63 and caption of Table 3.3 in main text for explanatory notes.
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C.3 Supplementary Analyses
• Table C.12 in subsection C.1.1 illustrates that electoral periods produce much
smaller (even negative) e↵ects in the two autocratic states of Burkina Faso and
Togo, and much larger positive e↵ects in the three democratic states.
C.3.1 Heterogeneous E↵ects by Country
The e↵ect of the electoral period is statistically significant in the three democratic
countries of Ghana, Mali and Senegal. In those countries the election period increases
the average bribe paid by truck drivers to bureaucrats by about a quarter to one USD
(p < 0.10).
While it is tempting to interpret the di↵erences in country-level intercepts as dif-
ferences in the degree of corruption in each country, this is a somewhat misleading
inference to draw, as the average bribe says little about the overall amount of corrup-
tion in the country. For one thing, the length of road and the number of checkpoints
vary from one country to another. Thus, drivers will mechanically pay more in bribes
in large countries, simply because more road leads to more checkpoints. Suppose, for
example, that there are two countries of equal size, A and B, but there are only two
checkpoints in country A and ten in country B. Then even if the o cials in country
A extort twice as much on average as those in country B (producing a large di↵erence




Intercept (Ref = Burkina Faso) 952.213⇤⇤⇤ 53.396⇤⇤⇤
(49.497) (19.322)










Election Period (Burkina Faso)  26.124  12.033
(78.057) (67.050)
Ghana x Election Period 93.824 237.886⇤⇤⇤
(90.162) (82.721)
Mali x Election Period 625.451⇤⇤⇤ 555.427⇤⇤⇤
(137.324) (130.535)
Senegal x Election Period 147.996⇤ 121.929⇤
(82.633) (72.618)




Adjusted R2 0.641 0.216
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table C.12: Country-Specific Electoral Cycles in Extortion of Truck-Drivers by Police
in West Africa.
All data aggregated from the checkpoint-driver-day level to the driver-level and then to the country-
week level through arithmetic averaging. Missing country-weeks imputed through linear interpola-
tion. All p-values and variance estimates from panel-corrected standard error estimator. In columns
labeled ‘Yes’ for residuals dependent variable is the residuals from a regression of the bribe on
year, weekday, calendar month, country-specific linear trend, direction of travel, trade corridor, and
whether driver is national of country in which bribe is paid. ‘Election Period’ is 1 if bribe paid in
the three months preceding or following election in that country, 0 otherwise.
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